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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL POLICY DESIGN AND 
EVALUATION 
BY 
JUAN JOSE MIRANDA MONTERO 
 
July 2012 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Paul J. Ferraro 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation comprises two essays. The unifying theme is the evaluation of non-pecuniary 
(information or norm based messages) conservation programs. These types of policies are widely 
applied in developing and developed countries to promote conservation, however, their empirical 
evidence and their effectiveness are not well documented. Each chapter examines some 
methodological facets of the heterogeneity of non-pecuniary conservation programs and the 
reliability of non-experimental methods (program evaluation and econometric techniques) to 
evaluate treatment effects in the context of non-pecuniary conservation programs. 
 
Chapter I evaluates causal channels, heterogeneous responses and policy impacts of information-
based programs. Policymakers often rely on non-pecuniary, information-based programs to 
achieve social objectives. Using data from a water conservation information campaign 
implemented as a randomized controlled trial, we evaluate heterogeneous household responses. 
Understanding such heterogeneity is important for improving the cost-effectiveness of non-
pecuniary programs and extending them to other populations. We find little evidence of 
heterogeneous responses to purely technical information or traditional conservation messages, 
but strong evidence of heterogeneous responses to pro-social messages that highlight social 
norms: wealthier, owner-occupied households, and households that use more water are more 
responsive. In contrast, these subgroups tend to be least responsive to pecuniary incentives. 
Combining theory and data, we also shed light on the mechanisms through which the treatment 
effects arise: norm-based messages induce behavioral (variable-cost), rather than technological 
  xiii 
(fixed-cost), changes in outdoor water use and work through social preferences, rather than by 
serving as signals of privately efficient behavior to boundedly rational agents. 
 
Chapter II assesses the performance of non-experimental evaluation designs. In environmental 
policy, as in other areas of social policy, randomized evaluation designs are difficult to 
implement and thus researchers must rely on non-experimental empirical designs to evaluate 
program impacts.  Yet there is considerable debate about whether non-experimental designs can 
generate accurate estimates of program impact. Design-replication studies assess the ability of 
non-experimental designs to replicate unbiased (experimental) estimators of program impact. 
Our design-replication study uses, as a benchmark, a large-scale randomized field experiment 
that tested the effectiveness of messages designed to induce voluntary reductions in water 
consumption during a drought. We find that by following best practices described in the 
literature, panel data methods combined with matching methods, using a rich covariate set 
including baseline outcomes, can replicate the experimental estimates. However, minor 
deviations from these practices or the use of fewer covariates can yield grossly inaccurate 
estimates of treatment effects. In particular, we find that fixed-effects panel data methods fail to 
replicate experimental estimates unless matching methods are used to pre-process the data. 
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CHAPTER I:  
HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS AND MECHANISMS IN 
INFORMATION-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: EVIDENCE FROM A 
LARGE-SCALE NATURAL FIELD EXPERIMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
Non-pecuniary, information-based environmental policy strategies have long been used to 
influence individual decision-making (e.g., Smith et al. 1990; Smith and Desvousges 1990) and 
are growing in popularity in all social policy fields (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; House of Lords 
2011). Such strategies include norm-based persuasive messages, commitment devices, changes 
to default options and the provision of technical information to lower transaction costs of 
information acquisition. Under standard economic assumptions of perfectly-informed, rational, 
self-interested agents, these strategies should be ineffective. However, under behavioral theories 
that include other-regarding preferences or bounded rationality, they may be effective. A 
growing empirical literature in economics and psychology suggests that such strategies can 
indeed affect policy-relevant behaviors (e.g., Bui and Meyer 2003; Duflo and Saez 2003; Jin and 
Leslie 2003; Bjørner et al. 2004; Schultz et al. 2007; Goldstein et al. 2008; Bennear and 
Olmstead 2008; Allcott and Mullainathan 2010; Habyarimana and Jack 2011). 
In the context of environmental policies and programs, the conceptual and empirical 
foundations of such strategies remain under-researched (Shogren and Taylor 2008). A new 
literature uses randomized controlled trials, which are rare in environmental economics 
(Greenstone and Gayer 2009; List and Price, forthcoming), to test the impacts of non-pecuniary, 
norm-based messages on environmental outcomes such as energy use (e.g. Ayres, Raseman and 
Shih 2009; Yoeli 2009; Allcott 2010; Costa and Kahn 2010) and water use (e.g. Ferraro and 
Price forthcoming; Ferraro, Miranda and Price 2011). These studies find that sending pro-social 
messages and social comparisons that contrast own consumption to peer-group consumption can 
reduce, on average, water and energy consumption. However, a more important question is to 
understand the mechanisms through which the messages affect behavior, and also it is important 
to move forward from mean effects to understand the variability of results and recognize the 
types of households that are most responsive to these types of messages.  
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Studying heterogeneous treatment effects yields policy and research-relevant insights 
(Heckman, Smith and Clements 1997; Angrist 2004; Djebbari and Smith 2008). For example, it 
can help policy makers more cost-effectively target the treatments to subgroups that are most 
responsive. It can also help strengthen the external validity of randomized controlled trials. The 
mean effects of the same experimental design could be different when applied in other 
populations with different distributions of observable characteristics (Hotz et al. 2005). Third, by 
combining theory and subgroup analysis, one can explore potential mechanisms through which 
the causal effects are generated. As Deaton (2010) noted in his critique of the way in which 
randomized controlled trials are done in economics, we need to move beyond determining 
whether a treatment is effective to determining why it is effective.1 
We study heterogeneity and mechanisms in the context of the large-scale field 
experiment. The experiment was run in 2007 in partnership with the Cobb County Water System 
in metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia, USA. To induce voluntary reductions in water use during a 
drought, three types of messages were sent, at random, to households. The three treatments 
comprise: (i) a tip sheet with information about reducing water consumption (pure information 
message), (ii) a tip sheet and a personalized letter promoting pro-social behavior (weak social 
norm message); and (iii) a tip sheet, personalized letter promoting pro-social behavior, and a 
social comparison of the household’s water consumption with the median county consumption 
(strong social norm message). Each treatment group comprised roughly 11,700 houses and the 
control group comprised roughly 71,800 houses. Ferraro and Price (forthcoming) report short-
term average treatment effects and Ferraro, Miranda and Price (2011) extend the analysis to 
report longer-term average treatment effects. 
When estimating heterogeneous treatment effects from experimental or non-experimental 
data, there is a substantial risk of labeling spurious correlations as conditional treatment effects. 
We mitigate this risk through our experimental design and a multi-step framework that trades 
increasingly stringent assumptions for increasingly precise characterizations of the heterogeneity. 
We find little evidence of heterogeneous responses to the pure information and weak social norm 
messages, but strong evidence of heterogeneous responses to the strong social norm message: 
                                                
1 Evidence of heterogeneous responses also informs future observational studies that may use instrumental variables 
to estimate treatment effects from information-based strategies. Heterogeneity implies that the estimates should be 
interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATE) rather than population average treatment effects (ATE). 
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wealthier households, owner-occupied households, and households that use more water are more 
responsive. Interestingly, these are among the households identified in the literature to be least 
responsive to pecuniary incentives. Also, in contrast to predictions from the psychology literature 
that low resource users may respond to the social comparison message by increasing their use 
(e.g., Schultz et al.), we find no evidence that low users or any other subgroups increase their 
water use, on average, in response to the social comparison message. With regard to 
mechanisms, the evidence suggests that norm-based messages induce behavioral (variable-cost), 
rather than technological (fixed-cost), changes in outdoor water use and work through social 
preferences, rather than by serving as signals of privately efficient behavior to boundedly rational 
agents. Further, we provide cost-effectiveness evidence of targeting information campaigns. 
The next section reviews the most relevant literature. Section 3 describes our 
methodology. Section 4 describes the experimental design and data. Section 5 provides results 
and main findings. 
 
2. Experiments with Information-based Environmental Programs 
A small number of experimental studies estimate the effects of pro-social and social comparison 
messages on environmental outcomes. Ayres, Raseman and Shih (2009), Allcott (forthcoming), 
Costa and Kahn (2010) and Yoeli (2009) focus on energy consumption, while Ferraro and Price 
and Ferraro, Miranda and Price focus on water consumption. Although the studies differ in terms 
of location and the content and framing of the messages, the authors find that pro-social 
messages with social comparisons cause reductions in consumption.2 
The studies by Ferraro and Price and Ferraro, Miranda and Price are described in section 
4. Allcott evaluates a field experiment in Minnesota run by OPower, a firm that promotes energy 
efficiency for its utility partners. OPower sends home energy reports that include information on 
strategies to conserve energy, social comparisons of the household’s consumption to 
consumption of geographical neighbors in homes of comparable size, and positive and negative 
emoticons to indicate the social desirability of the household’s position in the distribution used to 
                                                
2 Studies on social comparisons without pro-social messages, however, have found no effect (see, for example, the 
review by Fischer (2008)), suggesting that mixing both types of messages may be necessary. 
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make the social comparison.3 OPower’s restriction of the social comparison to neighbors with 
comparable house sizes is intended to heighten the relevance of the social comparison, but it 
might also reduce the scope and impact of the comparison because consumption variability may 
be low within the comparison group. Allcott finds that these reports reduce energy consumption 
by a little over 2 percent. Ayres, Raseman and Shih evaluate two other OPower field experiments 
(in California and Washington) and find the reports reduce natural gas and electricity use by 1.2 
and 2.1 percent, respectively. Yoeli examines a field experiment in California in which the 
decision to sign-up for a blackout prevention program was randomly varied to be private versus 
observable to one’s neighbors. Participation is 3.6% higher in the publicly observable treatment, 
but the effect of the program on energy consumption is not reported. 
Only three studies examine heterogeneous treatment responses. Allcott runs a quantile 
regression and Ferraro and Price examine how treatment responses vary as function of being 
below or above the median use. Both studies report that historically larger users appear to 
respond more, on average, to social comparison messages. Costa and Kahn use data from the 
California OPower experiment to test whether responses vary with political affiliation (obtained 
for a subsample from public voting records). Democratic households, on average, reduce their 
consumption, whereas Republican households, on average, do not. These three studies do not 
conduct a careful analysis of heterogeneity and do not examine heterogeneity further. Moreover, 
these studies do not probe the potential mechanisms through which treatment effects are 
generated. 
 
3. Methodology 
When exploring treatment effect heterogeneity, there is a substantial risk of finding statistically 
significant differences among subgroups when no true treatment effect heterogeneity exists 
because the subgroups are formed after the experiment is implemented (Imai and Strauss 2011). 
To mitigate this potential bias, we adopt five complementary methods to estimate heterogeneous 
treatment effects. First, prior to the analysis, we select only a few subgroups based on theory, 
field experience and policy relevance. Second, we demonstrate that, although randomization was 
                                                
3 Specifically, treated households receive home energy reports containing: (i) personal use history; (ii) current period 
neighbor comparison; (iii) twelve-month neighbor comparison; and (iv) energy efficiency advice. For further details: 
http://www.opower.com/Approach/TargetedMessaging.aspx 
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not conducted within these subgroups, our large sample size, combined with randomization 
within 390 small neighborhood strata, generated within-subgroup balance in pre-treatment water 
use among treated and control households. This balance suggests no systematic bias when 
drawing inferences from treatment-control outcome contrasts within subgroups. Third, we begin 
testing for heterogeneity with a nonparametric approach developed by Crump et al. (2008), 
which tests for the presence of heterogeneity without attempting to characterize the nature of the 
heterogeneity. Then we impose additional assumptions and estimate quantile treatment effects 
(Firpo 2007; Bitler et al. 2005, 2006, 2008; Djebbari and Smith; Heckman, Smith and Clements; 
Heckman, Hienrich and Smith, 2002). Finally, we isolate systematic variations among subgroups 
through interactions terms between the treatment variable and other covariates. We then use 
these estimates of heterogeneous subgroup responses, along with complementary analyses, to 
test hypotheses about the mechanisms through which treatment effects were achieved. 
 
3.1. Heterogeneity in Treatment Responses 
To estimate heterogeneous responses, we select covariates that are observable to policymakers 
and that theory or empirical studies suggest could be important modifiers of the treatment 
effects. We wish to keep the number of covariates small to avoid charges of data mining. These 
covariates generate policy-relevant subgroups. We select (i) two measures of previous water use, 
(ii) three household characteristics, and (iii) two neighborhood characteristics. Furthermore, in 
our final analysis that uses multiple hypothesis tests, we adjust the Type I error rate for 
sequential tests. Below, we present the covariates that define subgroups in the order we believe 
reflects their policy-relevance, and thus the order in which we will conduct the sequential tests. 
These variables represent our independent variables. 
Ferraro and Price’s analysis shows that previous water use predicts future water use and 
provides suggestive evidence of heterogeneous treatment responses conditional on a household’s 
percentile in summer 2006. Moreover, for utilities, previous water use is the easiest characteristic 
on which to target future messages. We use the two variables used by Ferraro and Price in their 
treatment effect regressions: June – November 2006 billed use (corresponds to May – October 
use, which is the main water use season) and April – May 2007 billed use (to reflect changes in 
landscaping prior to treatment assignment in May 2007). 
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Mansur and Olmstead (2011) find that, as theory would predict, high-income households 
in urban areas are less price-sensitive to changes in residential water prices. Whether such 
households are more or less responsive to non-pecuniary approaches is an open empirical 
question. We cannot observe household income, but we can observe the fair market value of the 
home in the year in which the treatment was assigned. Based on the high correlation between 
housing value and income, we use fair market value as a proxy for income (and wealth).4 
Davis (2010) shows that renters are significantly less likely to have energy efficient 
appliances, like clothes washers and dishwashers. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that when tenants pay the utility bills, landlords may buy cheap inefficient appliances. 
In our sample, almost all renters are directly billed (multi-dwelling structures, like apartment 
buildings, are not in our sample). With regard to water conservation, owner-occupants have a 
greater incentive to invest in cost-saving water conservation innovations that are capitalized into 
the value of the home. Owner-occupants may also have greater social connections to their 
neighbors and thus be more responsive to pro-social messages. Rohe et al. (2001) posit that 
homeowners are more likely to participate in community activities and might be more civically 
active because they have higher location-based investments (homes) than renters, higher 
transaction costs associated with moving, and stronger expectations of staying in their homes 
longer. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) offer evidence that homeowners are more likely to have 
greater social capital than renters (e.g., homeowners are more likely to participate in solving 
local problems, and more likely to be members of non-professional organizations).  
Owner-occupants, however, may have weaker incentives than renters to reduce water 
consumption. For example, DiPascuale and Glaeser (1999) also found that homeowners are 12% 
more likely to garden than non-homeowners. Furthermore, landscaping may be detrimentally 
affected by water conservation, which could affect home values (landlords may be unable to shift 
this risk to tenants). Ownership status is revealed by the owner’s homestead exemption status 
(only owner-occupiers receive a homestead exemption). 
Another measure that reflects the scope and incentives for water conservation is the age 
of the home. Older homes, on average, have older water-intensive capital (e.g., toilets), which 
                                                
4 The 2007 American Housing Survey shows a high correlation (>0.90) between housing values and incomes, and 
thus we believe it is reasonable to assume a similar or higher correlation between housing values and wealth. 
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are more cost-effective to replace to achieve water conservation goals, and they are more likely 
to have repairable leaks.5 
Environmental preferences of household occupants would likely also affect their 
treatment responses. We cannot observe environmental preferences, but survey evidence 
suggests that environmental preferences vary with education levels and race (e.g. Greenberg, 
2005). We (and water utilities) cannot observe education and race at the household-level, and so 
we use measures of education (percent with bachelor’s degree or higher) and race (percent white) 
at the census block group. The average number of households per block group in our sample is 
about 425 households. 
There are, of course, other covariates that may moderate treatment effects in our 
experiment, but which we do not measure (e.g., risk preferences). While it may be relevant for 
theory, this kind of heterogeneity is less relevant for policy makers because it is not easily 
observed. Recall, we are not making claims that the observable characteristics themselves cause 
the observed differences in treatment responses. Instead, we wish to measure heterogeneous 
treatment responses conditional on observable characteristics, with which policymakers can 
improve program targeting, gain insights into the external validity of experimental results, and 
better understand the mechanisms through which the treatments operate. 
 
3.2. Nonparametric Tests 
Crump et al. (2008) propose tests of two null hypotheses: the conditional average treatment 
effect is equal to zero (Zero CATE) and the conditional average treatment effect is constant 
(Constant CATE). Both tests are evaluated using all the subgroup covariates described in 3.1. 
The Zero CATE null hypothesis states that the impact of a program is zero on average for all 
subgroups. Testing this hypothesis is relevant for treatment 1 (pure information), which Ferraro 
and Price report did not have a mean treatment effect different from zero, but which may have 
had an impact for some subgroups. For each of the other two treatments, which generated 
nonzero mean impacts, the natural question is whether the treatment effects are constant across 
subgroups. This question can be evaluated with the Constant CATE test. Crump et al. prove that 
                                                
5 We do not explore heterogeneity conditional on lot size because lot size is highly correlated with fair market value. 
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both tests using nonparametric regression functions based on series estimators can be 
implemented through regression analysis using an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator. 
The null hypothesis for the Zero CATE test is that the average effect for the 
subpopulation with covariate values X is equal to zero for all values of X, while the alternative 
hypothesis is that the average effect for the subpopulation with covariate values X is different 
from zero for some values of X. To test this hypothesis, we run an OLS regression for treated and 
control group separately controlling for X. After obtaining the quadratic form of the difference of 
estimated coefficients vector (𝑒 𝛽! − 𝛽! ), we divide it by the variance-covariance matrix 
(𝑒 𝑉! + 𝑉! ). This test statistic follows a chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom: 𝑒 𝛽! − 𝛽! 𝑒 𝑉! + 𝑉! !!𝑒 𝛽! − 𝛽! ~  𝜒!(𝑘) 
 
The null hypothesis for the Constant CATE test is that the average treatment effect (ATE) 
for the subpopulation with covariates values X is equal to the ATE for all values of X, while the 
alternative hypothesis is that the average effect for subpopulation with covariates value X is 
different from the ATE for some values of X. To test this hypothesis, we run an OLS regression 
with treated and control groups controlling for X. After obtaining the quadratic form of the 
estimated coefficients vector excluding the constant term (𝑒!!! 𝛽! − 𝛽! ), we divide it by the 
variance-covariance matrix excluding the constant term (𝑒!!! 𝑉! + 𝑉! ). The constant term is 
excluded because it represents the average effect for everybody. This test statistic follows a chi-
square distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom (because the constant term is excluded): 𝑒!!! 𝛽! − 𝛽! 𝑒!!! 𝑉! + 𝑉! !!𝑒!!! 𝛽! − 𝛽! ~  𝜒! 𝑘 − 1  
 
Following Crump et al. (p.397), we select the final model specification in three ways: (i) 
include all covariates; (ii)  ‘top down’ selection of covariates, where one starts with the full set of 
covariates and sequentially (one by one) drops the covariate with the smallest t-statistic until all 
remaining covariates have a t-statistic larger than or equal to 2 in absolute value; and (iii) 
‘bottom up’ selection of covariates, where, for each covariate, one runs K regressions with just 
an intercept and the covariate (K = number of covariates), and then selects from this set the 
covariate with the highest t-statistic, after which one runs, for each of the remaining covariates, 
K-1 similar regressions, choosing the one with the highest t-statistic, and continuing the process 
until no potential covariate has a t-statistic equal to or above 2 in absolute value. We present test 
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results using specifications with higher degree order terms of continuous variables to improve 
robustness (Crump et al.).6  
 
3.3. Quantile Treatment Effects 
The nonparametric tests described in 3.2 provide evidence of whether heterogeneous treatment 
effects exist, but do not characterize this heterogeneity. The next step is to impose some 
parametric assumptions to begin characterizing this heterogeneity. Within a quantile regression 
framework, we use estimates of the effects of the treatment on the outcome distribution, or 
quantile treatment effects (QTE), to infer the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects. QTE 
show the difference of two marginal distributions at different quantiles, 𝜏!, 𝜏! = 𝐹! !!! 𝑞 − 𝐹! !!! 𝑞    (1) 
rather than the quantile of treatment effect, 𝜏!, 𝜏! = 𝐹! ! !! !!! 𝑞 .    (2) 
In other words, quantile regressions tell us about the effects on the outcome distribution, rather 
than on households, which is sufficient to inform us about the presence of heterogeneous 
treatment effects across quantiles of water use. 
Although we do not need an estimate of the effects on households – i.e., the distribution 
of treatment effects – to infer heterogeneity of causal effects, an estimate of this distribution 
could be useful to policy makers.  For example, one could use the distribution of treatment 
effects to infer the fraction of the sample for which the treatments increased water use. To 
estimate this distribution, one needs the joint conditional distribution of treated and untreated 
states (Heckman, Smith and Clements; Djebbari and Smith 2008). Randomized experiments, 
however, only provide the marginal distribution of treated outcomes and the marginal 
distribution of untreated outcomes (which permit the estimation of the ATE).  
Nevertheless, under a rank preservation assumption, QTE estimate the distribution of 
treatment effects (Firpo 2007; Bitler et al. 2005, 2006, 2008). Rank preservation implies that 
household's ranks in the outcome distribution are the same regardless of whether they are 
assigned to treatment or control groups (Bitler et al. 2008). If household ranks do not change 
                                                
6 The tests were conducted using the command test_condate for STATA, which is available at Oscar Mitnik’s 
website: http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~omitnik/ 
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under exposure to the treatment, the ranks in the two marginal distributions from the experiment 
correspond. Thus, for example, the median outcome in the treated distribution has as its 
counterfactual the median outcome in the untreated distribution (and so on for all quantiles). In 
this case, the impact of the treatment on the distribution would be equivalent to the distribution 
of treatment effects.  
Paraphrasing Angrist and Pischke (2009), if we discover, for example, that a message 
lowers the bottom decile of the water use distribution, we would not necessarily know if 
someone who would have been a low user without the message is now using less water. We 
know only that those who use less water with the message are using less water than bottom-
decile users would have used without the message. They may not be the same users. In contrast, 
if the rank preservation assumption holds, the same discovery would mean that the message 
reduces use among users at the quantile being examined (e.g., the message reduced use among 
users in the bottom decile). 
To test the rank preservation assumption, we follow Bitler et al. (2005) and Djebbari and 
Smith by using observable covariates of treated and control households. If these covariates vary 
significantly between treated and control groups in a given quantile, the variation provides 
evidence against the rank preservation assumption. Dividing our sample into quartiles, we find 
that 25% of the 84 possible combinations (7 covariates, 4 quartiles and 3 treatments) show 
statistically significant differences (without adjusting for the multiple sequential tests, which 
would reduce the number of null hypotheses rejected).7 These results suggest that some rank 
reversal may be present based on the covariates selected. In particular, households with high fair 
market value and high previous water consumption may have migrated down the outcome 
distribution when treated (See Appendix 2). We conclude there is support for viewing our QTE 
results as a useful approximation to the distribution of treatment effects, but only as an 
approximation. 
 
3.4. Subgroup Analysis 
The nonparametric and quantile regression approaches described above do not specify which 
subgroups are most responsive to the treatments. We explore subgroup variation through 
                                                
7 Using the same test and data from PROGRESA, the Mexican conditional cash transfer program, Djebbari and 
Smith (2008) rejected 30% and Lehmann (2010) rejected 31% of the possible combinations. 
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interactions terms between the treatment variables and other covariates in a regression 
framework (Heckman, Smith and Clements; Heckman, Heinrich and Smith; Djebbari and 
Smith). 
 To guard against spurious findings, we first conduct an F-test to test the null hypothesis 
that overall that there are no subgroup differences (Type I error rate = 0.05). Then we look at 
each subgroup in turn, after adjusting the Type I error rate for sequential hypothesis testing with 
a conservative Bonferroni adjustment (i.e., we take our pre-determined Type I error rate 0.05 and 
divide it by the number of tests; the null of no difference will only be rejected if p<0.0075). As 
noted earlier, we are estimating causal effects conditional on observable characteristics. We are 
not making claims that the observable characteristics themselves cause the observed differences 
in treatment responses. 
 
4. Experimental Design and Data 
The Cobb County Water System (CCWS) experiment comprised three treatment groups and one 
control group: 
− Pure Information (Treatment 1): A ‘tip sheet’ listing different ways to most effectively 
reduce water use. 
− Weak Social Norm (Treatment 2): The ‘tip sheet’ and a personally addressed letter from 
CCWS officials encouraging water conservation. 
− Strong Social Norm (Treatment 3):  The ‘tip sheet’, the letter from CCWS officials 
encouraging water conservation, and a social comparison that compared the household’s 
2006 summer water use to the median County household us. Summer season is from June 
to September, which is reflected in July to October monthly bills. 
 
In May 2007, the three treatments and control were randomly assigned (mailed) to all 
residential customers who lived in their homes from May 2006 to April 2007 and used at least 
20,000 gallons during the 2006 summer watering season (about 80% of the population). Each 
treatment consisted of roughly 11,700 houses and the control group consisted of roughly 71,800 
houses. For more details about the treatments and experimental design see Ferraro and Price and 
Ferraro, Miranda and Price. Ferraro and Price find that pure information (treatment 1) had no 
significant effect, while the weak social norm message (treatment 2) reduced water use by about 
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2.5%. In contrast, the strong social norm message reduced water use by almost 5%. Ferraro, 
Miranda and Price (2011) find that only the strong social norm message significantly affects 
water use three watering seasons after treatment assignment, albeit with smaller effects. 
We merged the experimental data with the 2007 County Tax Assessor Database and the 
2000 US Census (census block group) using home addresses as the merger link. Tax Assessor 
data provide relevant information about fair market value, ownership status and the age of the 
home. The Census provides data on race and education levels. We matched 97% of the 
experimental sample to the tax assessor data and 89% to the census data. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by treatment and control group for the pre-
treatment data. Columns (1)-(3) display mean values for households assigned to treatment 1 
(pure information), treatment 2 (weak social norm), and treatment 3 (strong social norm). 
Column (4) displays means for the control group. Column (5) shows the F-statistic and column 
(6) its respective p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that mean values are equal across 
treatment and control groups. With the exception of ownership status, for which the mean 
differences are less than one percentage point, there are no statistically significant differences in 
pre-treatment variables, including previous water use (recall our sample is over 100,000 
observations). These results support the claim that randomization was effective. 
The treatments were not, however, randomized within the subgroups identified in 3.1. 
Nevertheless, given that our sample size is large, our randomization was done within small 
neighborhood groups and our subgroup set is small, we would expect that observable and 
unobservable characteristics that affect water use would be well balanced between treatment and 
control groups within subgroups. To provide evidence of this balance, we examine pre-treatment 
water use across the treatment and control groups within each subgroup (see Appendix 3). For 
example, we test (F-test) whether pre-treatment mean water uses across treatment and control 
groups are statistically indistinguishable from each other within the group of renter-occupied 
households, then within the group of owner-occupied households, then within the group of 
above-median fair market value households, then within the group of below-median fair market 
value households, etc. With sixteen sequential tests and Type I error rate set to 0.05, we would 
expect approximately one of them to reject the null hypothesis of no difference through chance 
alone at the p<0.05 level. In no test is the null hypothesis rejected. 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by treatment and control group for post-treatment 
water use. This analysis replicates and complements the results reported in Ferraro and Price and 
Ferraro, Miranda and Price with our slightly smaller sample size. Columns (1)-(4) display mean 
values for treatment and control groups. Columns (5)-(7) display differences with respect to the 
control group and the statistical significance of these differences.  Households consumed less 
water than the control group in summer 2007, with the difference statistically different from zero 
for treatment 2 (weak social norm) and treatment 3 (strong social norm).8 In summer 2008, that 
difference remains significant only for treatment 3. In summer 2009, none of the treatment 
effects is significantly different from zero.9 In winter months, when most water use is indoor 
water use, only the effect of treatment 3 in 2007/2008 is statistically significant. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Nonparametric Tests 
Given treatment 1 had no effect in any year and treatment 2 had no effect beyond 2007, we test 
whether the effects of these treatments are zero for all subgroups in the relevant years (Zero 
CATE Test). We also test whether the effect of treatment 2 (for summer 2007) and treatment 3 
(for all summers) is constant for all subgroups (Constant CATE Test). For completeness, we 
report test results for all treatments in all summers. Table 3 summarizes the results for summer 
water seasons 2007-2009 using the three methods of covariate choice. 
 
Result 1:  There is little evidence of some subgroups responding in all years to treatment 1 (pure 
information). 
Result 2:  There is weak evidence of heterogeneous responses in 2007 to treatment 2 (weak 
social norm) and no evidence that any subgroups respond in later years. 
Result 3:  There is strong evidence of heterogeneous responses in all years to treatment 3 
(strong social norms). 
 
                                                
8 Ferraro and Price also show the differences among treatments are statistically different, as is the trend when they 
are ordered in terms of water use as predicted by their theory (T3<T2<T1<Control). 
9 Ferraro, Miranda and Price increase the statistical precision of these 2008-2009 estimates by estimating a 
regression model that includes controls for other covariates that contribute to the variability of water use and the 
randomization strata, and find an effect for treatment 3 in 2009 at the 5% level. 
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We consider these results in more detail. Each panel shows the results for a specific 
treatment and each column shows the results for each year. These results represent the number of 
times that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (either Zero CATE is equal to zero or Constant 
CATE is equal to a constant number). For Treatment 1 we evaluate Zero CATE for all years 
(2007, 2008, 2009). For Treatment 2 we evaluate Constant CATE (2007) and Zero CATE (2008, 
2009). For Treatment 3, we evaluate Constant CATE for all years (2007, 2008, 2009).  
For treatment 1, results are strong when using higher order covariates. The null 
hypothesis of zero CATE for all subgroups is rejected (p<0.05) all times. These results show 
evidence that some subgroups might have an average effect different than zero, corroborating 
Ferraro and Price (forthcoming) results: when excluding top and bottom 0.25 percentile of the 
distribution, treatment 1 has a statistically significant reduction in water use. However, when 
running other specification tests (e.g., without higher-order terms and with flexible coding of the 
covariates as dummy variables) results are very fragile (results not shown). We thus conclude 
that there is suggestive, but little evidence that treatment 1 affects some subgroups of the 
experimental sample.  
For treatment 2, the null hypothesis of Zero CATE cannot be rejected in 2008 for all 
three ways of covariate selection suggesting that there is no evidence that some subgroups had an 
effect different than zero. However the Zero CATE for 2009 is rejected for all tests (but this 
result is weakened when using dummy variables as covariate specifications where the Zero 
CATE null hypothesis cannot be rejected –results not shown–). Further, in year 2007 the null 
hypothesis of Constant CATE is only rejected one time out of six tests. Thus we conclude there 
is weak evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects for treatment 2. 
Regarding treatment 3, the null hypothesis of Constant CATE is rejected all times. This 
evidence is stronger in year 2007 where all tests are rejected using other covariate specifications 
(e.g., without higher-order terms and dummy variables).10 Thus we conclude there is strong 
evidence of heterogeneous treatments effects for treatment 3.  
                                                
10 We also ran all the tests using education and race measured at the census tract. In these tests, all specifications 
reject the null hypothesis of constant effects for treatment 3 and our results for the other treatments do not change 
(results not shown). 
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In summary, using Crump et al.’s (2008) nonparametric tests, we find clear evidence of 
heterogeneous treatment responses for treatment 3, particularly for year 2007. For treatment 1 
and treatment 2, the evidence for heterogeneity is weak and no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
 
5.2. Quantile Regressions 
The conclusions drawn from the nonparametric tests combined with quantile regressions 
depicted in Figures 1-3 provide stronger evidence that the treatment 3 has strong evidence of 
heterogeneous responses. Figure 1-3 represents the quantile graph for each treatment over the 
three summer periods. Each graph plots the average treatment effect (dashed line), the QTE 
(solid line), and the respective confidence intervals of these point estimates.  
 
Result 4: There is strong evidence of heterogeneous responses only for treatment 3 (strong 
social norms): water users at the upper end of the distribution respond more. 
 
For treatment 1 (Figure 1), most of the distribution lies near the zero effect line for all 
three years without substantial heterogeneity. For treatment 2 (Figure 2), an effect on water use 
is only detected in 2007, and heterogeneity in this year is confined to the upper half of the 
distribution. For treatment 3 (Figure 3), there is clear evidence of substantial heterogeneity in 
2007, with the greatest water reductions in the upper 20% of the distribution. Summer 2008 also 
shows greater reduction by high water users, but not as much in previous year. The impacts in 
2009 are more homogenous. Thus the results of the quantile regressions are consistent with the 
nonparametric tests: strong evidence of heterogeneity in responses to treatment 3, and weak or 
no evidence of such heterogeneity for the other two treatments. 
Furthermore, if one were willing to assume rank preservation (see section 3.3) and 
interpret the figures as estimates of the distribution of treatment effects, one would infer that the 
treatment messages either reduces water use or has no effect. Nowhere in the distribution is there 
evidence of statistically significant increases in water use as a result of receiving any treatment 
message. 
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5.3. Subgroup Analysis 
We define subgroups using the median: a household is thus labeled either as “high value” or 
“low value.” These subgroups represent policy-relevant subgroups and they are easily identified 
for policy makers. For ownership status, the subgroups are owners and renters. In Section 4, we 
demonstrated that pre-treatment mean water use across treatment and control groups are 
statistically indistinguishable from each other within each subgroup. This result provides 
evidence that randomization was effective at balancing household characteristics that affect post-
treatment water use across the treatment and control groups, permitting the analysis of subgroup 
treatment effect heterogeneity. 
Given the strong evidence in the previous two sections of heterogeneous treatment effects 
for treatment 3 (strong social norm), and the weak evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects 
for treatments 1 and 2, we focus on treatment 3. For completeness, we present subgroup analyses 
for all the treatments, but would caution the reader against interpreting any statistically 
significant results as evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects for treatment 1 and 2. 
In regression models that include the treatments, the subgroups, and all interactions of the 
treatments and the subgroups (see Appendix 4), we can reject the null hypothesis that the effect 
of treatment 3 is the same in all subgroups for 2007 (p<0.001). For 2008 and 2009, we cannot 
reject this null hypothesis (p≈0.15). For treatments 1 and 2, we cannot reject this null hypothesis 
for any year. 
Following Heckman, Heinrich and Smith, we simplify the presentation by running 
independent regressions for each subgroup covariate. Table 4 presents the results for 2007. In the 
lower panel are the p-values for a hypothesis test of no difference across subgroups within a 
treatment, unadjusted for repeated hypothesis testing. If we adjust each p-value using the very 
conservative multiple-hypothesis testing adjustment described in 3.4, we draw the same 
inferences. We also draw the same inferences from the full regression with interaction terms (see 
Appendix 4). 
 
Result 5: For treatment 3 (strong social norms), greater responses are observed in households 
that use more water in the past, live in more expensive homes and are occupied by owners rather 
than renters. 
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The evidence of heterogeneity across these characteristics is strongest in 2007. In 2008, we 
observe statistically significant heterogeneity conditional on previous water use and fair market 
value. In 2009, all the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no differences across subgroups 
(there is some weak evidence of heterogeneity based on fair market value). See Appendix 4-6. 
 
5.4. Targeting Information Campaigns 
Ferraro and Price (forthcoming) show that treatment 3 is the most cost-effective treatment among 
the three treatments tested. They then demonstrate that by targeting only those households at or 
above the median use for the previous summer, CCWS could obtain 88% of the original 
reduction for 65% of the original cost.11 Under this targeting rule, 2007 summer water use would 
have been expected to decline by approximately 163 million gallons – the equivalent of shutting 
off the water to about 4500 households — at a cost of $0.43 per thousand gallons reduced. 
Could the information from sections 5.1-5.3 be used to further improve targeting? For 
example, if instead of targeting households based on their use during the previous year’s 
summer, the utility were to instead target households based on their use in the two months before 
the campaign, it could obtain 80% of the reduction for 48% of the original cost (i.e., a reduction 
of 149 million gallons at a cost of $0.35 per thousand gallons reduced12).  
 
Result 6:  By targeting on households identified as being more responsive to treatment, the 
water utility can reduce the overall program cost by over 50%, and the cost per gallon reduced 
by almost 40%, with less than a 20% decline in the total number of gallons reduced. 
 
If the utility were willing to sacrifice further reductions in use to achieve greater cost-
effectiveness, combinations of targeting could further increase cost-effectiveness towards $0.30 
per thousand gallons reduced (e.g., target large water users who own their home and who reduce, 
on average, over 3,000 gallons/household). Combined with information on the benefits from 
reduced water use, heterogeneous treatment effect estimates could be used to determine an 
optimal targeting strategy. 
                                                
11 Recall that approximately the bottom quintile of water consumers is not part of the experiment. 
12 When contrasting cost-effectiveness across different conservation and augmentation policy options, one must 
remember to also consider the persistence of the treatment effects (Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011). 
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5.5. Mechanisms of the Strong Social Norm Message (Treatment 3) 
Among the experimental treatments, treatment 3 had the largest and most persistent effect, and 
the strongest evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects. In this section, we explore the 
mechanisms through which this treatment affects household behavior. We present evidence with 
regard to three mechanism hypotheses:  
(i) The treatment effects are driven mainly by continuous, behavioral changes 
with recurring costs (e.g., watering outdoors less frequently or washing full 
loads of laundry or dishes) rather than one-time, behavioral or technological 
investments (e.g., fixing leaks, buying new appliances)  
(ii) The treatment effects are driven mainly by changes in outdoor water use rather 
than changes in indoor water use; and, 
(iii) The social comparison in the message affects behavior by highlighting social 
norms rather than by sending signals about privately efficient behavior (i.e., 
highlighting cost-savings opportunities). 
The first hypothesis is relevant for understanding the long-term effects of the program. 
This hypothesis can also be viewed as asking whether the home is treated or the home dwellers 
are treated. If the home were treated (e.g., a leak fixed; an efficient irrigation system installed), 
one would expect on-site treatment effects to persist, even after the current inhabitants depart. 
The second hypothesis is relevant to understanding the environmental effects of the 
treatment. Most of the indoor water used in Cobb County returns to the surface water system 
from which it was drawn. Because of processes like evapotranspiration and infiltration, most of 
the outdoor water used does not return on a time scale relevant for stream flow. Previous 
empirical work implies outdoor water use is more price elastic (e.g., Mansur and Olmstead 
2011). Thus, one might predict that, after receiving a message, households would first look to 
reduce water from outdoor use, just as they would respond to a price increase. 
The third hypothesis has not, to our knowledge, been raised in the literature on social 
comparisons. Rather than working through social preferences, as assumed in the literature, the 
social comparison may work simply by conveying costly information about private costs and 
benefits. In an incomplete-information world with costly information acquisition or boundedly 
rational agents, households may not be optimizing their water use. The lack of a treatment effect 
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from the information-only treatment (treatment 1) suggests that households already know how 
they can reduce water use. They may assume, however, that adopting (or disadopting) these 
practices would not be utility-maximizing given their beliefs about costs and benefits. Yet when 
confronted with information about others’ water use, they may update their beliefs (e.g., “I didn’t 
know there could be gains from adopting these tips until I saw how my use compared to others’ 
use.”). Thus, the “social” comparison may actually be a “private” signal. Rather than harnessing 
pro-social preferences, the comparison helps self-interested, utility-maximizing agents get closer 
to the privately optimal water use pattern under complete information. We emphasize the social 
comparison, rather than treatment 3 in its entirety, because (1) Ferraro and Price showed that the 
tip sheet had no detectable effect and that there were statistically significant differences across 
treatments, and (2) treatment 2 could only have affected behavior through social preferences. 
Thus we can conclude that some of the effect from treatment 3 arose from social preferences.  
The question that remains is “How did the addition of the social comparison reduce water use 
further?” 
 
5.5.1. Recurring behavioral changes versus one-shot technological 
investments 
To examine the first hypothesis about the nature of the actions taken by households, we use three 
pieces of information. First, if households were to reduce water use mainly through one-shot 
investments (e.g., fix leaks, install low-flow toilets), one would expect relatively constant 
treatment effects across years within seasons. Yet, as indicated in Table 5, the effects wane over 
time within season (the same waning occurs also in spring months). However, inter-year 
variations in other factors could also explain this pattern. 
Second, if households were to reduce water use mainly through one-shot, fixed-cost 
investments, one would expect such investments to be more likely in older houses where such 
investments are more cost-effective (e.g., they are more likely to have leaking pipes and older 
appliances). Table 4, however, shows that there is no difference in the responses between older 
and newer houses. 
A final test exploits the re-framing of the first hypothesis in terms of asking whether the 
home or home dweller is treated. If one-shot, fixed-cost investments were driving reductions, the 
treatment effects should not disappear when the message recipients move out of their homes. We 
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define “movers” as those households where the customer identification number changed between 
December 2007 and September 2008. Table 6 shows that, in summer 2007, movers (who had not 
yet moved) and non-movers reacted similarly to treatment 3. In fact movers reduced a bit more 
than non-movers: 1,900 versus 1,700 gallons (the difference is not statistically different from 
zero in a pooled regression model). In summer 2008, however, treatment 3 had a positive, but 
statistically insignificant, effect on households in which the message recipients had moved out 
(the difference between movers and nonmovers in a pooled regression model is statistically 
significant at p=0.06). Together, these three pieces of evidence suggest a seventh result: 
 
Result 7:  The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the effects of the strong social norm 
message (treatment 3) are driven mainly by behavioral changes with recurring costs rather than 
fixed-cost investments in technology. 
 
5.5.2. Outdoor versus indoor water use changes 
To examine the second hypothesis, one would ideally be able to observe outdoor and indoor 
water use separately, but Cobb County does not measure these uses separately. So we must 
depend on theory and previous empirical evidence suggesting that outdoor water demand is more 
price elastic, and indirect empirical evidence from our experiment that shows treatment effects 
are largest in the months in which outdoor watering is typically observed. 
The lowest consumption in Cobb County occurs in December, during the winter when, 
water utility employees say, most use is indoor use.  The highest consumption occurs in July, 
during the summer when most outdoor watering occurs.  In 2006, before the experiment was 
implemented, the average December consumption in our sample was 6007 gallons and the 
average July consumption was 11,470, a 90% increase. We thus believe a contrast of treatment 
effects in December and July captures differences in indoor versus outdoor use. 
Table 7 presents estimates of the average treatment effects for July 2007, December 
2007, and July 2008 from regressions that include the strata in which the randomization was 
conducted (meter routes) and pre-treatment water use variables. In July 2007 and July 2008, 
treatment 3 has large and statistically significant effects on water use, and the effect in July 2008 
is half of the effect in July 2007. In December 2007, however, the effect of treatment 3 is small 
and statistically insignificant. Comparing coefficients across regressions, the treatment effects in 
  21 
July 2007 or July 2008 versus December 2007, the differences are statistically significant 
(p<0.01 and p<0.04, respectively).  In order to argue that these results do not imply most of the 
treatment effect was coming from outdoor watering, one would have to argue that waning only 
occurs with indoor water use (and thus the July 2008 effect is the same as the outdoor effect in 
July 2007).  Such an argument is difficult to maintain for two reasons. First, about 60% of indoor 
water use is for toilets, washing and bathing,13 and it is hard to imagine how behavioral changes 
indoors (rather than technological changes) could have accounted for half the water reduction 
observed in July 2007.  Second, the treatment effect from July 2009 is small and insignificantly 
different from zero (-0.081, p=0.23) and significantly different from the treatment effect in July 
2008 (p=0.06). Thus one would have to argue that waning in the outdoor treatment effects only 
started after July 2008. We therefore believe that the evidence supports an eighth result: 
 
Result 8:  The empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the effects of the strong 
social norm message (treatment 3) are driven mainly by changes in outdoor water use. 
 
5.5.3. Social versus private preferences 
To examine the hypothesis that the social comparison works through social preferences rather 
than private preferences, we use three pieces of information. First, we take advantage of Cobb 
County’s increasing block price structure and test for the presence of private preference-based 
mechanisms. The price per additional gallon of water use increased at two thresholds: 9,000 
gallons/month (from $2.21 to $2.55/1,000 gallons) and 16,000 gallons/month (to $2.88/1,000 
gallons). If private preferences motivate treatment responses, households that were using just 
above these threshold limits in the pre-treatment summer period should, on average, be more 
likely to reduce their water use post-treatment than households just below the threshold limits 
(because the expected cost savings are higher for households above the threshold). 
Using bandwidths of 500, 1000, 2000, 3000 and 4000 gallons around the threshold, we 
test whether households just above the threshold respond more to the message than households 
just below the threshold within the bandwidth. We define “above the threshold” in two ways: as 
a dummy variable and as a continuous variable (the difference between water use in summer 
                                                
13 http://www.epa.gov/WaterSense/pubs/indoor.html 
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2006 and the threshold). We estimate models both with and without the other subgroup-defining 
covariates. We also re-estimate all the models using only households who were consistently 
above or below the threshold every month in the previous summer (rather than above or below 
based on average monthly consumption during the summer). Thus we estimate 52 regression 
models (see Appendix 7 – 9). In only three of them could we reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference between those above and below the threshold within the bandwidth, and in these cases 
the sign of the estimated coefficient was inconsistent with the hypothesis (in fact, for 34 of the 52 
cases, the estimated coefficient was inconsistent with the hypothesis). 
Next we combine the results from 5.3 and 5.4.1 with assumptions about heterogeneous 
responses when private preferences motivate water use reductions. In 5.4.1, we presented 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that households respond to the treatment with behavioral 
changes that have recurring costs. If this hypothesis were true and water reductions were driven 
by private preferences, renters and owners should be equally likely to decrease water use to save 
money because savings are immediate and not capitalized into the value of the house, as they 
might be with one-shot, technology investments. In contrast, we observe in 5.3 that owners are 
more responsive to the treatment (even after conditioning on all the other covariates; see 
Appendix 4). 
Third, we assert that if private preferences for cost savings were driving reductions in 
water use, then after holding owner/renter status constant, a change in the percentage of renters 
in the neighborhood (census block group) should not influence the response of a household to 
treatment 3. The political science and economics literature cited in section 3.1, however, 
suggests this percentage may affect a household for whom the social comparison is working 
through social preferences because neighborhoods with greater ownership rates have greater 
social connections and thus the norm created by the social comparison to neighbors is more 
relevant or salient. Moreover, we would not expect any such interaction between the proportion 
of households renting in a neighborhood and treatment 1 or treatment 2 because there is no social 
comparison in these treatments. Thus keeping these treatments in the model helps protect against 
spurious rejections of the null hypothesis because of other factors that may be correlated with an 
increase in renters in a neighborhood. We further protect against such rejections by adding 
previous water use, home characteristics and neighborhood fixed effects (meter route strata) to 
the model. 
  23 
We define high-rental neighborhoods as those who have a percentage of renters greater 
than the median. We then create interaction terms with a dummy variable for above-median 
proportion of renters and the treatment dummy variables. Results are shown in Table 8. The 
interaction term is positive and significantly different from zero for only treatment 3. Holding 
ownership status, home characteristics, previous water use and other neighborhood 
characteristics constant, households who receive treatment 3 are more responsive in census block 
groups with low percentages of renters. 
Recall that treatment 3 augments treatment 2 with a social comparison treatment, and 
treatment 2 affects water use significantly less than treatment 3. Combining this observation with 
the evidence in this subsection, we arrive at our final result: 
 
Result 9:  The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the social comparison induces 
greater water use reductions by highlighting social norms rather than by sending signals about 
privately efficient behavior. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Non-pecuniary, information-based strategies are increasingly being used to influence individual 
decision-making to achieve policy objectives. Despite the increasing application of these 
strategies, their conceptual and empirical foundations remain under-researched. Although a 
growing number of scholars are conducting randomized experiments to test information-based 
strategies, many of them only report average treatment effects, thereby ignoring variation in the 
treatment effects. Moreover, none have attempted to elucidate the mechanisms through which 
these strategies operate. 
In experimental studies in which treatments are not randomized within subgroups, or in 
any observational study, one must be cautious when estimating heterogeneous treatment effects. 
Unlike many studies of heterogeneous treatment effects in social experiments, we reduce the risk 
of mislabeling spurious correlations as heterogeneous treatment effects by combining 
complementary empirical approaches in an experiment with a large sample size and 
randomization conducted within small neighborhood strata. These attributes afford us better 
statistical power and experimental control in estimating heterogeneous treatment effects across 
observable subgroups in the population. 
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In our study of an information-based environmental program aimed at inducing voluntary 
reductions in the use of a common pool resource, we find strong evidence of heterogeneous 
treatment effects for a message that augments pure information with pro-social language and 
social comparisons (strong social norm message). In contrast, the evidence of heterogeneous 
treatment effects from pure information alone or pure information with pro-social language but 
no social comparison (i.e., traditional conservation messages) is weak. The social psychology 
literature on social norms predicts heterogeneous responses to social comparison messages (e.g., 
Schultz et al.), but this predicted heterogeneity is in the form of a “boomerang” effect, whereby 
low users discover through the social comparison that they are low users and, in response, 
increase their use. Based on this literature, OPower’s norm-based, energy conservation program 
(section 2) supplements its social comparisons with emoticons: if a household’s energy use is 
below the average of its comparison group, it receives a green “smiley face” that is assumed to 
prevent the boomerang effect. 
Despite the absence of emoticons in our experiment, we find no evidence of a boomerang 
effect. Assuming rank preservation is a good approximation in our study (section 3.3), there is no 
evidence of statistically significant increases in water use anywhere in the distribution as a result 
of receiving the social comparison message. Likewise, our subgroup analysis reveals no evidence 
that any subgroup, on average, increases its water consumption as a result of receiving the 
message. Complementary evidence comes from Ferraro and Price who show that, on average, 
below-median users reduce their water use upon receiving the social comparison, rather than 
increase it. 
Turning to our mechanism hypotheses, the evidence suggests that the strong social norm 
message operates through behavioral changes with recurring variable costs rather than one-shot, 
fixed-cost investments, and through changes in outdoor watering rather than indoor watering. We 
also explore a third mechanism hypothesis that posits a rival explanation of how social 
comparisons affect behavior: rather than operating through social preferences, they may simply 
convey costly information about privately efficient behavior to households with incomplete 
information. The evidence, however, is inconsistent with this rival explanation. Social 
comparisons do seem to work through social preferences. A better understanding of the 
mechanisms through which norm-based messages operate is important for future attempts to 
estimate the full welfare implications of information-based policies and programs. 
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Finally, our study has at least three policy implications. The first relates to the external 
validity of the CCWS experiment: sites with poor households, many renters, or low water use 
may not see as large of an impact as Cobb County did from an information campaign that 
augments information and pro-social language with social comparisons. 
Second, making information about heterogeneous treatment effects available to decision 
makers can greatly improve program cost-effectiveness. We demonstrated that with improved 
targeting based on observable household characteristics, the overall costs of the program could 
be reduced by over 50% with less than a 20% decline in the aggregate impact. 
Third, as suggested by Ferraro and Price, pecuniary and norm-based, non-pecuniary 
policies may be complementary. The strong social norm message had an immediate effect on 
water use in the month after the message was sent and high-income households are most 
responsive to the message. Thus in contrast to water conservation programs that use pecuniary 
incentives, for which average responses are slow and high-income households are least 
responsive (e.g. Mansur and Olmstead), programs based on norm-based incentives work quickly 
and are most effective among high-income households. Moreover, price changes are typically 
expected to lead to a persistent change in the quantity demanded, whereas the evidence from this 
experiment suggests the effects of norm-based approaches wane over time. Thus the two 
approaches may be preferred in different contexts (e.g., a need to change short-term demand 
rather than long-term demand) and may be complementary when combined. Future experiments 
should directly test the hypothesis of complementarity between the two approaches by randomly 
assigning pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives, in isolation and in combination (and, if 
possible, randomizing within subgroups of interest). 
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Table 1 
Pre-Treatment Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Technical 
Advice  
(T1) 
Weak 
Social 
Norm  
(T2) 
Strong 
Social 
Norm  
(T3) 
Control F-Statistic p-value 
Pre-Treatment Data           
 Water Consumption Jun-Nov 2006 1/ 58.286 58.012 58.381 58.142 0.200 0.897 
Water Consumption Apr-May 2007 1/ 15.952 15.841 15.957 15.867 0.380 0.768 
House's Fair Market Value 257,824 260,984 260,888 258,647 0.950 0.415 
Age of House 20.753 20.830 20.710 20.723 0.230 0.878 
% Owner Occupiers 0.844 0.836 0.835 0.844 3.190 0.023 
% Population 25 years ≥ Bachelor 2/ 0.728 0.727 0.728 0.728 0.020 0.997 
% of Households White 2/ 0.842 0.842 0.843 0.842 0.160 0.924 
1/ In thousands of gallons. 
2/ At census block group level. 
Sources: Experimental Data, 2007 Cobb County Tax Assessor Database, 2000 US Census. 
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Table 2 
Post-Treatment Water Use Descriptive Statistics 
(in thousand of gallons) 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Technical 
Advice  
(T1) 
Weak 
Social 
Norm  
(T2) 
Strong 
Social 
Norm  
(T3) 
Con-
trol 
Diff  
(1)-
(4)  
Diff  
(2)-(4)  
Diff  
(3)-(4)  
Post-treatment Data                   
Summer 2007 1/ 36.35 35.39 34.87 36.40 -0.05 -1.00 *** -1.53 *** 
Summer 2008 1/ 25.51 25.33 24.99 25.49 0.02 -0.17 
 
-0.50 ** 
Summer 2009 1/ 27.78 27.38 27.18 27.42 0.36 -0.04 
 
-0.24 
 Winter 07/08 2/ 21.63 21.58 21.43 21.71 -0.08 -0.13 
 
-0.28 ** 
Winter 08/09 2/ 21.83 21.57 21.63 21.79 0.04 -0.22  -0.16   
1/ Summer season comprises July to October use. 
2/ Winter season comprises December to March use. 
Source: Experimental Data. 
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Table 3 
Test of Zero CATE & Constant CATE 
(Covariates with Higher Order Terms) 
 
  
Treatment 1 
2007  
(Zero CATE) 
2008  
(Zero CATE) 
2009  
(Zero CATE) 
Top Down Selection of Covariates 2 2 2 
Bottom Up Selection of Covariates 2 2 2 
All Covariates 2 2 2 
% Rejections 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
Treatment 2 
2007  
(Constant CATE) 
2008  
(Zero CATE) 
2009  
(Zero CATE) 
Top Down Selection of Covariates 1 0 2 
Bottom Up Selection of Covariates 0 0 2 
All Covariates 0 0 2 
% Rejections 16.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
  
Treatment 3 
2007  
(Constant CATE) 
2008 
(Constant CATE) 
2009 
(Constant CATE) 
Top Down Selection of Covariates 2 2 2 
Bottom Up Selection of Covariates 2 2 2 
All Covariates 2 2 2 
% Rejections 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: These results are summarized from Appendix 1. They represent the number of times that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. For Treatment 1 we evaluate Zero CATE (2007, 2008, 2009). For Treatment 2 we 
evaluate Constant CATE (2007) and Zero CATE (2008, 2009). For Treatment 3, we evaluate Constant CATE 
(2007, 2008, 2009). 
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Table 4 
Subgroup Analysis for Water Consumption (Summer 2007) 
 
      
Dependent Variable: Summer 
2007     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Previous 
water use 
(Jun - 
Nov 
2006) 
Previous 
water use 
(Apr - 
May 
2007) 
Fair 
Market 
Value 
Owners 
/ Renters 
1/ 
Age of 
Home % White 
% with 
higher 
degree  
Treatment 1  
(Technical Advice) 
-0.320 -0.136 0.171 0.399 0.121 -0.550 -0.551 
(0.171) (0.196) (0.264) (0.976) (0.472) (0.342) (0.342) 
Treatment 2  
(Weak Social Norm) 
-0.444* -0.559** -0.732** -0.310 -0.651 -0.678 -0.925* 
(0.185) (0.197) (0.268) (0.777) (0.442) (0.352) (0.371) 
Treatment 3  
(Strong Social Norm) 
-0.653** -0.722** -0.772** 0.248 -1.533** -1.421** -1.100** 
(0.159) (0.198) (0.251) (0.754) (0.405) (0.322) (0.340) 
Subgroup var.  
(high = 1) 
27.45** 27.22** 16.54** 2.634** -4.275** 9.694** 8.642** 
(0.200) (0.208) (0.212) (0.341) (0.221) (0.227) (0.228) 
Treat1*high subgrop var. 0.445 0.420 -0.415 -0.530 -0.294 0.894 0.876 
 
(0.559) (0.589) (0.595) (1.027) (0.616) (0.628) (0.630) 
Treat2*high subgrop var. -0.774 -0.614 -0.383 -0.802 -0.773 -0.775 -0.296 
 
(0.519) (0.541) (0.552) (0.835) (0.570) (0.587) (0.588) 
Treat3*high subgrop var. -1.994** -2.176** -1.406** -2.101** 0.0419 -0.334 -0.887 
 
(0.485) (0.503) (0.523) (0.808) (0.543) (0.555) (0.560) 
Constant 23.02** 23.87** 28.11** 34.17** 38.51** 31.28** 31.82** 
 
(0.0636) (0.0746) (0.0965) (0.320) (0.165) (0.130) (0.134) 
Observations 102,887 102,887 102,871 102,869 102,461 94,833 94,833 
R-squared 0.222 0.217 0.080 0.001 0.006 0.029 0.023 
p-value equal impact T1 0.426 0.476 0.486 0.606 0.633 0.154 0.164 
p-value equal impact T2 0.136 0.257 0.488 0.337 0.175 0.187 0.614 
p-value equal impact T3 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.939 0.547 0.113 
Note: All water consumption variables are in thousands of gallons. 
1/ In the case of Owners (=1) / Renter (=0), interaction terms are for owner group rather than high group. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 5 
Linear Regressions of Water Seasons 
(with meter route fixed effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Summer07 Winter0708 Summer08 Winter0809 Summer09 
Treatment 1 (Technical Advice) -0.237 -0.121 -0.0702 0.0335 0.241 
 
(0.189) (0.121) (0.166) (0.189) (0.169) 
Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) -0.991** -0.108 -0.190 -0.239 -0.0604 
 
(0.171) (0.122) (0.184) (0.181) (0.167) 
Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) -1.741** -0.359** -0.637** -0.223 -0.344* 
 
(0.166) (0.129) (0.161) (0.181) (0.162) 
Water Use from Jun - Nov 2006 0.347** 0.0258** 0.127** 0.0379** 0.170** 
 
(0.0130) (0.00485) (0.00981) (0.00913) (0.0106) 
Water Use in Apr and May 2007 0.829** 0.335** 0.414** 0.237** 0.427** 
 
(0.0450) (0.0171) (0.0246) (0.0160) (0.0251) 
Constant 1.874 16.21** 7.086** 15.79** 14.14** 
 
(1.595) (0.736) (0.841) (0.720) (1.156) 
Observations 106,669 106,669 106,669 106,669 106,669 
R-squared 0.634 0.129 0.248 0.021 0.333 
Note: All water consumption variables are in thousands of gallons. Winter season runs from December to 
March billing. Summer season runs from July to October billing. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6 
Linear Regressions: Movers and Non-Movers 
(with meter route fixed effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Summer 2007 Summer 2008 
  Mover 1/ Non Mover Mover 1/ Non Mover 
Treatment 1 (Pure Information) -1.938 -0.127 -1.367 -0.00830 
 
(1.058) (0.192) (0.968) (0.169) 
Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) -1.329 -0.970** -0.357 -0.175 
 
(1.051) (0.174) (1.104) (0.187) 
Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) -1.931* -1.695** 0.826 -0.671** 
 
(0.959) (0.169) (0.999) (0.163) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 0.226** 0.352** 0.124** 0.126** 
 
(0.0293) (0.0133) (0.0322) (0.0102) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.985** 0.817** 0.133* 0.423** 
 
(0.0872) (0.0462) (0.0587) (0.0259) 
Constant -12.94* 2.679 6.177* 7.292** 
 
(5.905) (1.622) (2.424) (0.861) 
Observations 3,667 102,811 3,667 102,811 
R-squared 0.525 0.640 0.216 0.254 
Note: All water consumption variables are in thousands of gallons. 
1/ New residents between December 2007 – September 2008. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 7 
Linear Regressions of July 2007, December 2007 and July 2008 
(with meter route fixed effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  July 2007 December 2007 July 2008 
Treatment 1 (Technical Advice) -0.0535 -0.0495 -0.0673 
 
(0.0618) (0.0453) (0.0623) 
Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) -0.334** -0.0572 -0.0542 
 
(0.0618) (0.0453) (0.0623) 
Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) -0.548** -0.0870 -0.220** 
 
(0.0618) (0.0453) (0.0623) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 0.103** 0.00763** 0.0360** 
 
(0.000652) (0.000478) (0.000658) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.228** 0.0927** 0.119** 
 
(0.00221) (0.00162) (0.00223) 
Constant -0.899* -1.215** 3.481** 
 
(0.386) (0.283) (0.389) 
Observations 106,669 106,669 106,669 
R-squared 0.555 0.150 0.193 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 8 
Social Norms or Signal of Privately Optimal Behavior  
(with meter route fixed effects) 
 
 Summer 2007 
Treatment 1 (Pure Information) -0.0282 
 
(0.320) 
Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) -0.898** 
 
(0.265) 
Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) -2.127** 
 
(0.264) 
High Proportion Renters (=1 if > median) 0.113 
 
(0.282) 
High Proportion Renters * Treat 1 -0.219 
 
(0.396) 
High Proportion Renters * Treat 2 -0.144 
 
(0.356) 
High Proportion Renters * Treat 3 0.888* 
 
(0.351) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 0.335** 
 
(0.0144) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.823** 
 
(0.0517) 
Ownership status 0.701** 
 
(0.189) 
Fair Market Value 1.79e-05** 
 
(3.12e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0265* 
 
(0.0112) 
Constant -2.422 
 
(1.799) 
Observations 95,233 
R-squared 0.638 
Note: All water consumption variables are in thousands of gallons. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure 1 
Quantile Treatment Effects for Treatment 1: Pure Information 
(summer 2007, summer 2008, summer 2009) 
 
 
Note: Graphs plot quantile estimates and mean treatment effects across water use distribution. Dashed 
line depicts the Average Treatment Effect in a linear regression (OLS) framework, while dotted line 
represents its confidence interval. Solid line depicts the Quantile Treatment Effect and the shadowed area 
represents its confidence interval. 
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Figure 2 
Quantile Treatment Effects for Treatment 2: Weak Social Norm 
(summer 2007, summer 2008, summer 2009) 
 
 
Note: Graphs plot quantile estimates and mean treatment effects across water use distribution. Dashed line 
depicts the Average Treatment Effect in a linear regression (OLS) framework, while dotted line represents 
its confidence interval. Solid line depicts the Quantile Treatment Effect and the shadowed area represents 
its confidence interval. 
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Figure 3 
Quantile Treatment Effects for Treatment 3: Strong Social Norm 
(summer 2007, summer 2008, summer 2009) 
 
 
Note: Graphs plot quantile estimates and mean treatment effects across water use distribution. Dashed line 
depicts the Average Treatment Effect in a linear regression (OLS) framework, while dotted line represents 
its confidence interval. Solid line depicts the Quantile Treatment Effect and the shadowed area represents 
its confidence interval. 
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Appendix 1 
Test of Zero CATE & Constant CATE 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Zero CATE Constant CATE 
  
Chi-
Sq dof p-val Normal p-val 
Chi-
Sq dof p-val Normal p-val 
Top Down Selection of Covariates 
Summer 2007 
          Treatment 1 36.47 13 0.001 4.60 0.000 25.44 12 0.013 2.74 0.003 
Treatment 2 43.79 12 0.000 6.49 0.000 19.49 11 0.053 1.81 0.035 
Treatment 3 230.32 15 0.000 39.31 0.000 175.10 14 0.000 30.44 0.000 
Summer 2008 
          Treatment 1 52.53 15 0.000 6.85 0.000 52.07 14 0.000 7.20 0.000 
Treatment 2 14.21 11 0.222 0.68 0.247 12.91 10 0.229 0.65 0.258 
Treatment 3 191.62 13 0.000 35.03 0.000 176.44 12 0.000 33.57 0.000 
Summer 2009 
          Treatment 1 67.98 11 0.000 12.15 0.000 67.16 10 0.000 12.78 0.000 
Treatment 2 21.48 8 0.006 3.37 0.000 20.84 7 0.004 3.70 0.000 
Treatment 3 189.92 11 0.000 38.15 0.000 185.52 10 0.000 39.25 0.000 
Bottom Up Selection of Covariates 
Summer 2007 
          Treatment 1 34.76 9 0.000 6.07 0.000 25.04 8 0.002 4.26 0.000 
Treatment 2 37.57 10 0.000 6.16 0.000 13.06 9 0.160 0.96 0.170 
Treatment 3 203.97 12 0.000 39.19 0.000 156.30 11 0.000 30.98 0.000 
Summer 2008 
          Treatment 1 48.47 10 0.000 8.60 0.000 48.12 9 0.000 9.22 0.000 
Treatment 2 14.68 9 0.100 1.34 0.090 11.40 8 0.180 0.85 0.197 
Treatment 3 126.37 14 0.000 21.24 0.000 120.26 13 0.000 21.04 0.000 
Summer 2009 
          Treatment 1 67.07 9 0.000 13.69 0.000 66.17 8 0.000 14.54 0.000 
Treatment 2 20.72 8 0.008 3.18 0.001 19.73 7 0.006 3.40 0.000 
Treatment 3 54.34 9 0.000 10.69 0.000 54.17 8 0.000 11.54 0.000 
All Covariates 
Summer 2007                     
Treatment 1 35.02 20 0.020 2.37 0.009 31.87 19 0.032 2.09 0.018 
Treatment 2 23.43 20 0.268 0.54 0.294 19.90 19 0.401 0.15 0.442 
Treatment 3 78.62 20 0.000 9.27 0.000 64.76 19 0.000 7.42 0.000 
Summer 2008 
          Treatment 1 50.30 20 0.000 4.79 0.000 49.94 19 0.000 5.02 0.000 
Treatment 2 13.10 20 0.873 -1.09 0.862 12.68 19 0.855 -1.03 0.153 
Treatment 3 71.26 20 0.000 8.10 0.000 66.81 19 0.000 7.76 0.000 
Summer 2009 
          Treatment 1 82.75 20 0.000 9.92 0.000 82.74 19 0.000 10.34 0.000 
Treatment 2 14.71 20 0.793 -0.84 0.799 14.66 19 0.744 -0.70 0.241 
Treatment 3 59.21 20 0.000 6.20 0.000 56.61 19 0.000 6.10 0.000 
Zero CATE. H0: Average Effect for subpopulation with covariates value X is equal to zero for all X. H1: 
Average Effect for subpopulation with covariates value X is different from zero for some X.  
Constant CATE. H0: Average Effect for subpopulation with covariates value X is equal to ATE for all X.  
H1: Average Effect for subpopulation with covariates value X is different from ATE for some X. 
Note: For the zero and constant conditional average treatment effect test, the chi-sq column is equal to 
the square root of 2K times the normal column plus K, where K is the degrees of freedom. For the 
column with the zero average treatment effect results, the chi-sq column is equal to the square of the 
normal column.  
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Appendix 2  
Rank Preservation Test  
Treatment – Control Difference at Quantiles of the Outcome Distribution 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0 - 25th 
Percentile 
25 - 50th 
Percentile 
50 - 75th 
Percentile 
75 - 100th 
Percentile 
Treatment 1 (Technical Advice) 
Water Use Jun-Nov 2006 1/ -0.0880 
 
-0.8591 ** -0.9299 ** -0.2527 
 Water Use Apr-May 2007 1/ -0.0161 
 
-0.1419 
 
-0.1908 
 
-0.4425 
 House's Fair Market Value -991.46 
 
-641.91 
 
-175.90 
 
1,380.48 
 Age of House 0.1549 
 
-0.4764 * 0.4511 * -0.1842 
 % Owner Occupiers -0.0031 
 
0.0023 
 
-0.0027 
 
0.0012 
 % Population 25 years ≥ Bachelor 2/ -0.0028 
 
0.0031 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0021 
 % of Households White 2/ -0.0025 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0007 
 
0.0014 
 Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) 
Water Use Jun-Nov 2006 1/ -0.0257 
 
-0.7229 ** -0.7690 * -2.4877 ** 
Water Use Apr-May 2007 1/ -0.0222 
 
-0.2729 *** -0.1059 
 
-0.8508 ** 
House's Fair Market Value -5,560.58 ** -1,278.2 
 
-10,617.2 *** -2,128.8 
 Age of House -0.4089 
 
0.2035 
 
0.1609 
 
-0.0550 
 % Owner Occupiers 0.0010 
 
0.0082 
 
0.0011 
 
0.0194 *** 
% Population 25 years ≥ Bachelor 2/ -0.0005 
 
-0.0018 
 
-0.0021 
 
-0.0004 
 % of Households White 2/ -0.0002 
 
-0.0027 
 
-0.0018 
 
0.0002 
 Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) 
Water Use Jun-Nov 2006 1/ 0.047 
 
-1.4748 *** -2.6530 *** -2.3427 ** 
Water Use Apr-May 2007 1/ -0.161 
 
-0.4504 *** -0.8378 *** -0.5060 
 House's Fair Market Value 1,170 
 
-4,894.4 ** -6,122.8 ** -14,537.2 *** 
Age of House -0.100 
 
0.1153 
 
0.3231 
 
0.0554 
 % Owner Occupiers 0.001 
 
-0.0007 
 
0.0119 
 
0.0232 *** 
% Population 25 years ≥ Bachelor 2/ 0.000 
 
-0.0037 
 
-0.0027 
 
-0.0009 
 % of Households White 2/ 0.000  -0.0035  0.0028  -0.0037  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
1/ In thousands of gallons 
2/ At block group level 
 
  
  43 
 
Appendix 3 
Mean on Summer 2006 and F-Test within subgroups 
(in Thousand of gallons) 
 
Subgroup Treat 1 Treat 2 Treat 3 Control F-Statistic 
p-
value 
Previous water use  
(June - Nov 2006) 
Below Median 22.46 22.37 22.45 22.42 0.350 0.786 
Above Median 57.48 57.60 57.36 57.40 0.060 0.981 
Previous water use  
(April - May 2007) 
Below Median 27.91 27.24 27.32 27.51 2.040 0.106 
Above Median 53.52 53.79 53.55 53.50 0.090 0.964 
Fair Market Value Below Median 31.04 30.15 30.37 30.36 2.700 0.044 Above Median 48.14 48.59 48.92 48.54 0.460 0.712 
Ownership Status Renter 38.75 38.65 38.98 38.66 0.060 0.982 Owner 39.75 39.42 39.71 39.61 0.240 0.872 
Age of Home Below Median 41.79 42.05 42.35 41.86 0.420 0.739 Above Median 37.35 36.42 36.83 36.99 1.300 0.274 
% with Higher 
Degree  
Below Median 33.54 33.59 33.66 33.73 0.140 0.934 
Above Median 44.56 44.03 44.51 44.35 0.270 0.850 
% White Below Median 33.22 33.25 33.19 33.45 0.350 0.787 
Above Median 44.88 44.36 44.84 44.60 0.290 0.834 
1/ At block group level 
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Appendix 4 
Subgroup Analysis All Together 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Summer 
2007 
Summer 
2008 
Summer 
2009 
Treatment 1 (Technical Advice) 0.158 -0.0871 0.263 
 
(0.893) (0.575) (0.577) 
Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) -0.154 -0.173 0.613 
 
(0.764) (0.599) (0.579) 
Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) 1.671* 0.193 0.580 
 
(0.703) (0.559) (0.549) 
High - Previous water use (June - Nov 2006) 1/ 15.51** 6.528** 8.512** 
 
(0.184) (0.155) (0.153) 
High - Previous water use (April - May 2007) 1/ 16.45** 9.324** 9.367** 
 
(0.199) (0.163) (0.161) 
High - Fair Market Value 1/ 7.997** 2.839** 5.127** 
 
(0.214) (0.171) (0.170) 
Owners/Renters 2/ 0.144 -1.318** 0.513* 
 
(0.334) (0.248) (0.230) 
High - Age of Home 1/ -0.0427 0.168 -0.920** 
 
(0.205) (0.153) (0.156) 
High - % White 1/ 1.659** -0.596** 0.422* 
 
(0.227) (0.179) (0.182) 
High - % with higher degree  1/ 0.492* 0.117 -0.0736 
 
(0.223) (0.175) (0.182) 
Treat 1* High Water use June - Nov 2006 0.650 0.106 0.132 
 
(0.512) (0.389) (0.399) 
Treat 2* High Water use June - Nov 2006 -0.480 -0.276 0.203 
 
(0.512) (0.426) (0.402) 
Treat 3* High Water use June - Nov 2006 -1.131* -0.319 -0.515 
 
(0.476) (0.390) (0.408) 
Treat 1* High Water use April - May 2006 0.00835 0.133 0.595 
 
(0.564) (0.414) (0.426) 
Treat 2* High Water use April - May 2006 -0.265 0.151 0.0571 
 
(0.541) (0.457) (0.424) 
Treat 3* High Water use April - May 2006 -1.341** -0.549 0.239 
 
(0.510) (0.404) (0.413) 
Treat 1 * High Fair Market Value -1.141 -0.667 -0.836 
 
(0.589) (0.433) (0.449) 
Treat 2 * High Fair Market Value -0.0950 0.193 -0.178 
 
(0.573) (0.430) (0.430) 
Treat 3 * High Fair Market Value -1.349* -0.661 -1.158** 
 
(0.526) (0.489) (0.431) 
Treat 1 * Owner -0.828 0.312 -0.478 
 
(1.054) (0.600) (0.644) 
Treat 2 * Owner 0.0773 -0.235 -0.418 
 
(0.777) (0.607) (0.567) 
Treat 3 * Owner -1.617* -0.0247 -0.237 
 
(0.777) (0.569) (0.553) 
Treat 1 * High Age of Home -0.370 -0.316 0.151 
 
(0.577) (0.415) (0.422) 
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    Cont. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Summer 
2007 
Summer 
2008 
Summer 
2009 
Treat 2 * High Age of Home -0.399 0.0375 -0.672 
 
(0.511) (0.433) (0.405) 
Treat 3 * High Age of Home -0.501 0.203 -0.387 
 
(0.491) (0.407) (0.381) 
Treat 1 * High % White 1.018 0.139 0.463 
 
(0.639) (0.485) (0.477) 
Treat 2 * High % White -0.0607 0.474 0.632 
 
(0.633) (0.487) (0.484) 
Treat 3 * High % White 0.550 0.0398 0.247 
 
(0.574) (0.470) (0.465) 
Treat 1 * High % with higher degree  0.840 0.442 0.400 
 
(0.596) (0.448) (0.453) 
Treat 2 * High % with higher degree  -0.101 0.0141 -0.495 
 
(0.641) (0.478) (0.467) 
Treat 3 * High % with higher degree  -0.267 -0.204 0.224 
 
(0.575) (0.444) (0.445) 
Constant 16.10** 18.06** 16.32** 
 
(0.311) (0.238) (0.231) 
Observations 94,411 94,411 94,411 
R-squared 0.300 0.138 0.192 
P-value Test Equal Impact in All Subgroups in Treat1 0.211 0.828 0.283 
P-value Test Equal Impact in All Subgroups in Treat2 0.888 0.906 0.632 
P-value Test Equal Impact in All Subgroups in Treat3 0.000 0.152 0.141 
P-value Test Equal Impact in All Subgroups in All 
Treatments 0.000 0.545 0.253 
1/ Dummy variables. High subgroup defined above median. 
2/ Dummy variable. Owners (=1). Renters (=0). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix 5 
Subgroup Analysis for Water Consumption in summer 2008 
 
  Dependent Variable: Summer 2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Previous 
water use 
(June - 
Nov 
2006) 
Previous 
water use 
(April - 
May 
2007) 
Fair 
Market 
Value 
Owners / 
Renters 
1/ 
Age of 
Home 
% 
White 
% with 
higher 
degree  
Treatment 1  
(Technical Advice) 
0.0270 -0.00534 0.242 -0.495 0.149 -0.0307 -0.0976 
(0.158) (0.159) (0.210) (0.537) (0.291) (0.263) (0.254) 
Treatment 2  
(Weak Social Norm) 
0.0152 -0.0184 -0.270 0.239 -0.0618 -0.306 -0.304 
(0.169) (0.163) (0.212) (0.562) (0.339) (0.270) (0.268) 
Treatment 3  
(Strong Social Norm) 
-0.0352 -0.174 -0.0202 -0.00421 -0.774** -0.291 -0.196 
(0.152) (0.160) (0.203) (0.520) (0.259) (0.267) (0.262) 
Subgroup var. (high = 1) 12.10** 13.23** 5.774** -0.306 -1.307** 2.647** 2.782** 
 
(0.146) (0.150) (0.149) (0.242) (0.150) (0.158) (0.158) 
Treat1*high subgrop var. -0.0691 0.160 -0.444 0.606 -0.214 0.135 0.262 
 
(0.383) (0.395) (0.393) (0.577) (0.397) (0.416) (0.416) 
Treat2*high subgrop var. -0.206 -0.148 0.266 -0.488 -0.245 0.185 0.178 
 
(0.424) (0.438) (0.428) (0.609) (0.429) (0.454) (0.454) 
Treat3*high subgrop var. -1.047** -0.924* -0.931* -0.602 0.536 -0.348 -0.517 
 
(0.357) (0.362) (0.368) (0.556) (0.370) (0.389) (0.389) 
Constant 19.60** 19.40** 22.60** 25.75** 26.13** 24.25** 24.18** 
 
(0.0597) (0.0648) (0.0795) (0.229) (0.110) (0.0985) (0.100) 
Observations 102,887 102,887 102,871 102,869 102,461 94,833 94,833 
R-squared 0.091 0.110 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 
p-value equal impact T1 0.857 0.686 0.258 0.294 0.590 0.745 0.528 
p-value equal impact T2 0.628 0.735 0.534 0.423 0.567 0.684 0.695 
p-value equal impact T3 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.279 0.148 0.371 0.184 
Note: All water consumption variables are in thousands of gallons. 
1/ In the case of Owners (=1) / Renter (=0), interaction terms are for owner group rather than high group. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix 6 
Subgroup Analysis for Water Consumption in summer 2009 
 
  Dependent Variable: Summer 2009 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Previous 
water use 
(June - 
Nov 
2006) 
Previous 
water use 
(April - 
May 
2007) 
Fair 
Market 
Value 
Owners / 
Renters 
1/ 
Age of 
Home 
% 
White 
% with 
higher 
degree  
Treatment 1  
(Technical Advice) 
0.127 0.112 0.520* 0.568 0.387 0.0644 0.0856 
(0.164) (0.173) (0.212) (0.595) (0.318) (0.261) (0.266) 
Treatment 2  
(Weak Social Norm) 
-0.127 -0.121 -0.126 0.465 0.494 -0.169 -0.0260 
(0.165) (0.173) (0.204) (0.534) (0.340) (0.267) (0.266) 
Treatment 3  
(Strong Social Norm) 
-0.0342 -0.264 0.164 0.112 -0.201 -0.252 -0.180 
(0.166) (0.166) (0.207) (0.511) (0.308) (0.259) (0.260) 
Subgroup var. (high = 1) 15.30** 15.35** 9.654** 2.044** -3.321** 5.022** 4.526** 
 
(0.150) (0.156) (0.155) (0.228) (0.158) (0.164) (0.164) 
Treat1*high subgrop var. 0.417 0.674 -0.303 -0.244 -0.00330 0.375 0.323 
 
(0.403) (0.419) (0.417) (0.637) (0.426) (0.437) (0.437) 
Treat2*high subgrop var. 0.392 0.377 0.265 -0.587 -1.075* -0.0320 -0.330 
 
(0.408) (0.422) (0.418) (0.583) (0.426) (0.431) (0.432) 
Treat3*high subgrop var. -0.529 -0.197 -0.726 -0.389 -0.0376 -0.0566 -0.151 
 
(0.375) (0.386) (0.391) (0.555) (0.399) (0.409) (0.410) 
Constant 19.96** 20.36** 22.58** 25.69** 29.06** 24.79** 25.04** 
 
(0.0636) (0.0663) (0.0776) (0.211) (0.120) (0.101) (0.103) 
Observations 102,887 102,887 102,871 102,869 102,461 94,833 94,833 
R-squared 0.136 0.137 0.053 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.012 
p-value equal impact T1 0.301 0.108 0.468 0.701 0.994 0.390 0.460 
p-value equal impact T2 0.337 0.373 0.527 0.314 0.012 0.941 0.445 
p-value equal impact T3 0.159 0.610 0.063 0.483 0.925 0.890 0.713 
Note: All water consumption variables are in thousands of gallons. 
1/ In the case of Owners (=1) / Renter (=0), interaction terms are for owner group rather than high group. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix 7 
Block Price Threshold Regressions by Treatment: Measure 1 
(Dummy above threshold) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
9,000 16,000 9,000 16,000 9,000 
  bw=500 bw=1,000 bw=2,000 
Treatment 1  
(Technical Advice) 
-0.152 2.026 -0.390 0.956 -0.293 
(0.820) (2.585) (0.534) (1.763) (0.330) 
Treatment 2  
(Weak Social Norm) 
-1.093 -1.086 -1.275* -0.911 -0.562 
(0.811) (2.750) (0.521) (1.791) (0.332) 
Treatment 3  
(Strong Social Norm) 
-1.473* -3.600 -1.163* -4.378** -1.119** 
(0.641) (2.274) (0.480) (1.631) (0.346) 
Dummy Above Bandwidth (bw) 0.921 1.335 2.560** 2.179* 5.865** 
 
(0.472) (1.445) (0.326) (0.975) (0.240) 
Treat1*Above Bandwidth 0.878 -1.566 1.030 3.413 -0.0295 
 
(1.182) (3.691) (0.835) (3.523) (0.597) 
Treat2*Above Bandwidth 1.849 -4.285 1.215 -2.140 -0.227 
 
(1.368) (3.440) (0.905) (2.445) (0.605) 
Treat3*Above Bandwidth 2.409* -4.336 1.345 -0.843 0.206 
 
(1.084) (3.320) (0.841) (2.437) (0.634) 
Fair Market Value 1.98e-05** 3.00e-05** 1.69e-05** 3.20e-05** 1.63e-05** 
 
(2.65e-06) (4.39e-06) (3.19e-06) (5.11e-06) (1.86e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0223 0.132* 0.00432 0.0813 0.00374 
 
(0.0169) (0.0642) (0.0120) (0.0437) (0.00804) 
Ownership status 1.292* 6.519** 0.892* 5.298** 0.728** 
 
(0.548) (1.927) (0.409) (1.364) (0.277) 
% White 3.617* 1.780 3.928** 11.48* 4.566** 
 
(1.723) (7.985) (1.205) (5.237) (0.825) 
% with Higher Degree  -5.993** -13.64* -5.481** -12.72** -6.109** 
 
(1.652) (6.165) (1.459) (4.540) (0.939) 
Constant 28.16** 45.92** 28.38** 37.35** 26.76** 
 
(1.365) (6.098) (0.959) (4.036) (0.667) 
Observations 6,617 1,715 13,338 3,402 27,335 
R-squared 0.027 0.049 0.031 0.060 0.057 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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      Cont. 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
16,000 9,000 16,000 9,000 16,000 
  bw=2,000 bw=3,000 bw=4,000 
Treatment 1  
(Technical Advice) 
-0.988 -0.467 0.197 -0.504* 0.230 
(1.138) (0.240) (0.917) (0.196) (0.917) 
Treatment 2  
(Weak Social Norm) 
-1.799 -0.628* -1.314 -0.609** -1.289 
(1.199) (0.272) (0.915) (0.218) (0.915) 
Treatment 3  
(Strong Social Norm) 
-4.798** -0.968** -4.192** -0.919** -4.148** 
(1.069) (0.257) (0.818) (0.203) (0.819) 
Dummy Above Bandwidth (bw) 4.281** 8.763** 7.349** 11.65** 3.325** 
 
(0.726) (0.206) (0.595) (0.187) (0.476) 
Treat1*Above Bandwidth 2.457 0.177 0.709 0.0943 -0.0953 
 
(2.200) (0.511) (1.786) (0.460) (1.333) 
Treat2*Above Bandwidth -0.930 -0.283 -0.819 -0.523 -0.631 
 
(1.827) (0.521) (1.472) (0.474) (1.264) 
Treat3*Above Bandwidth 0.182 -0.276 1.582 -0.387 1.841 
 
(1.779) (0.538) (1.529) (0.486) (1.195) 
Fair Market Value 2.68e-05** 1.77e-05** 2.71e-05** 1.95e-05** 3.03e-05** 
 
(3.00e-06) (1.48e-06) (2.29e-06) (1.28e-06) (1.86e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0255 0.00843 0.0383 0.0114* 0.0308 
 
(0.0278) (0.00669) (0.0230) (0.00538) (0.0190) 
Ownership status 3.145** 0.423 2.357** 0.190 1.971** 
 
(0.973) (0.227) (0.776) (0.188) (0.644) 
% White 5.956 4.078** 5.791 3.884** 7.289** 
 
(3.670) (0.645) (3.055) (0.528) (2.467) 
% with Higher Degree  -4.854 -5.897** -6.135* -5.066** -5.192* 
 
(3.136) (0.745) (2.529) (0.610) (2.075) 
Constant 40.14** 25.18** 39.48** 22.69** 36.97** 
 
(2.842) (0.520) (2.291) (0.429) (1.850) 
Observations 6,866 42,640 10,619 59,298 14,772 
R-squared 0.053 0.097 0.066 0.146 0.054 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix 8 
Block Price Threshold Regressions by Treatment: Measure 2 
(Continuous Variable, Difference with respect to Threshold) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
9,000 16,000 9,000 16,000 9,000 
  bw=500 bw=1,000 bw=2,000 
Treatment 1 (Technical Advice) 0.641 -2.078 0.522 -0.213 0.736 
 
(1.065) (3.384) (0.820) (2.753) (0.579) 
Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) 0.322 -4.030 0.210 -4.593* -0.397 
 
(1.343) (2.499) (0.962) (2.108) (0.644) 
Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) 0.513 -5.845 0.000839 -5.974* -0.0443 
 
(0.881) (3.069) (0.745) (2.360) (0.552) 
Diff. Threshold – Consump. (Diff.) -0.974 -1.681 -0.0718 -1.032 -0.0863 
 
(0.927) (2.656) (0.552) (1.627) (0.373) 
Dummy Above Bandwidth 0.656 2.207 0.422* 1.028* 0.715** 
 
(0.537) (1.658) (0.173) (0.497) (0.0545) 
Treat1*Dummy Above Bandwidth 0.598 -2.948 0.330 -0.439 0.180 
 
(0.796) (2.696) (0.322) (1.056) (0.110) 
Treat2*Dummy Above Bandwidth 0.763 -1.978 0.500 -1.270 -0.0148 
 
(0.944) (2.469) (0.355) (0.921) (0.124) 
Treat3*Dummy Above Bandwidth 1.217 -0.544 0.363 -0.0999 0.197 
 
(0.648) (2.291) (0.312) (0.983) (0.111) 
Dummy Above BW * Diff. 1.290 -3.652 0.729* -0.874 0.134 
 
(0.904) (2.836) (0.287) (0.841) (0.110) 
Treat 1 * Dummy Above BW * Diff. -0.356 7.621 -0.281 3.612 -0.595* 
 
(2.149) (6.848) (0.761) (3.425) (0.258) 
Treat 2 * Dummy Above BW * Diff. -0.302 -1.061 -0.840 2.567 -0.242 
 
(2.695) (5.581) (0.846) (1.936) (0.274) 
Treat 3 * Dummy Above BW * Diff. -0.633 0.305 -0.430 1.499 -0.587* 
 
(2.046) (6.214) (0.767) (2.184) (0.256) 
Fair Market Value 1.98e-05** 3.00e-05** 1.68e-05** 3.17e-05** 1.57e-05** 
 
(2.64e-06) (4.38e-06) (3.20e-06) (5.13e-06) (1.82e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0220 0.132* 0.00398 0.0770 0.00252 
 
(0.0169) (0.0645) (0.0120) (0.0442) (0.00800) 
Ownership status 1.320* 6.415** 0.908* 5.374** 0.773** 
 
(0.547) (1.929) (0.409) (1.364) (0.275) 
% White 3.694* 1.454 3.953** 10.93* 4.385** 
 
(1.719) (7.993) (1.201) (5.301) (0.819) 
% with Higher Degree  -6.088** -13.42* -5.642** -12.87** -6.118** 
 
(1.644) (6.168) (1.461) (4.558) (0.926) 
Constant 29.12** 49.68** 29.53** 40.88** 30.43** 
 
(1.572) (6.567) (1.054) (4.294) (0.710) 
Observations 6,617 1,715 13,338 3,402 27,335 
R-squared 0.029 0.051 0.035 0.062 0.070 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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      Cont. 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
16,000 9,000 16,000 9,000 16,000 
  bw=2,000 bw=3,000 bw=4,000 
Treatment 1 (Technical Advice) 4.190* 0.221 1.596 0.0752 0.320 
 
(2.116) (0.474) (1.779) (0.401) (0.897) 
Treatment 2 (Weak Social Norm) -2.246 -0.326 -2.298 -0.398 -1.773* 
 
(1.699) (0.500) (1.376) (0.426) (0.800) 
Treatment 3 (Strong Social Norm) -5.146** -0.604 -6.831** -0.745 -2.676** 
 
(1.697) (0.470) (1.402) (0.404) (0.788) 
Diff. Threshold – Consump. (Diff.) -0.601 -0.0170 -1.068 -0.134 -0.896 
 
(1.155) (0.301) (0.939) (0.262) (0.690) 
Dummy Above Bandwidth 0.454* 0.725** 0.780** 0.744** 0.737** 
 
(0.196) (0.0283) (0.0906) (0.0170) (0.0847) 
Treat1*Dummy Above Bandwidth 1.037* 0.0776 0.136 0.0528 -0.0118 
 
(0.413) (0.0592) (0.236) (0.0376) (0.156) 
Treat2*Dummy Above Bandwidth -0.0234 0.0253 -0.0996 0.0156 -0.0394 
 
(0.359) (0.0647) (0.188) (0.0398) (0.143) 
Treat3*Dummy Above Bandwidth 0.0613 0.0402 -0.330 0.0172 0.137 
 
(0.349) (0.0603) (0.189) (0.0369) (0.135) 
Dummy Above BW * Diff. 0.331 0.0572 -0.193 0.0278 -0.0994 
 
(0.324) (0.0591) (0.171) (0.0392) (0.0876) 
Treat 1 * Dummy Above BW * Diff. -1.968* -0.230 -0.413 -0.161 0.108 
 
(0.815) (0.149) (0.476) (0.0958) (0.150) 
Treat 2 * Dummy Above BW * Diff. 0.0794 -0.193 0.172 -0.157 0.0897 
 
(0.845) (0.150) (0.401) (0.103) (0.144) 
Treat 3 * Dummy Above BW * Diff. 0.307 -0.234 1.261** -0.143 -0.107 
 
(0.778) (0.150) (0.446) (0.0978) (0.139) 
Fair Market Value 2.68e-05** 1.62e-05** 2.64e-05** 1.68e-05** 2.59e-05** 
 
(3.01e-06) (1.40e-06) (2.30e-06) (1.18e-06) (1.86e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0261 0.00688 0.0380 0.00788 0.0310 
 
(0.0278) (0.00661) (0.0228) (0.00525) (0.0184) 
Ownership status 3.121** 0.469* 2.387** 0.293 1.985** 
 
(0.974) (0.224) (0.776) (0.184) (0.634) 
% White 5.662 3.853** 5.607 3.282** 5.707* 
 
(3.664) (0.635) (3.048) (0.513) (2.417) 
% with Higher Degree  -5.019 -6.033** -6.538** -5.311** -5.614** 
 
(3.137) (0.722) (2.517) (0.578) (2.043) 
Constant 42.78** 30.94** 45.66** 31.00** 45.15** 
 
(3.026) (0.556) (2.398) (0.454) (1.920) 
Observations 6,866 42,640 10,619 59,298 14,772 
R-squared 0.057 0.123 0.077 0.192 0.106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix 9 
Block Price Threshold Regressions by Treatment: Measure 3 
(Dummy above threshold, for each month, rather than aggregated) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
9,000 16,000 9,000 16,000 9,000 16,000 
  bw=2,000 bw=3,000 bw=4,000 
Treatment 1  
(Technical Advice) 
-0.622 -4.949 -0.0940 -0.655 -0.648** 0.733 
(0.659) (4.075) (0.377) (2.676) (0.245) (3.120) 
Treatment 2  
(Weak Social Norm) 
0.0479 1.158 -0.244 0.310 -0.705** -1.069 
(0.643) (6.289) (0.360) (2.812) (0.246) (1.688) 
Treatment 3  
(Strong Social Norm) 
-0.903 -3.634 -1.145** -4.102 -0.630* -2.743 
(0.573) (4.997) (0.328) (2.682) (0.266) (1.702) 
Dummy Above Bandwidth 3.459** 1.980 6.880** 9.576* 9.854** 7.847** 
 
(0.891) (8.776) (0.562) (3.883) (0.468) (2.657) 
Treat1*Above Bandwidth 5.120 ---- -0.589 -2.066 1.905 -2.031 
 
(3.164) ---- (1.567) (6.462) (1.438) (6.307) 
Treat2*Above Bandwidth 5.809 -3.616 1.307 -1.315 1.255 9.506 
 
(4.157) (12.50) (1.606) (6.180) (1.206) (11.39) 
Treat3*Above Bandwidth 2.483 ---- 2.134 -2.212 0.870 -7.241 
 
(3.216) ---- (1.676) (11.00) (1.271) (6.219) 
Fair Market Value 1.24e-05** 2.51e-05* 1.75e-05** 1.96e-05** 1.77e-05** 2.46e-05** 
 
(2.91e-06) (9.89e-06) (3.06e-06) (5.20e-06) (1.77e-06) (4.24e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0128 0.183 0.0101 0.158 0.0228** 0.169** 
 
(0.0156) (0.124) (0.00903) (0.0867) (0.00692) (0.0504) 
Ownership status 1.049 4.221 0.635 0.409 0.490* 0.834 
 
(0.541) (4.286) (0.342) (2.596) (0.245) (1.538) 
% White 0.718 16.66 0.209 -3.841 1.105 -6.324 
 
(1.616) (16.25) (0.955) (8.637) (0.673) (5.704) 
% with Higher Degree  -1.031 -12.52 -1.644 4.655 -2.082** 10.50 
 
(1.639) (12.97) (1.078) (7.429) (0.732) (5.425) 
Constant 28.62** 34.95** 27.21** 43.47** 24.69** 39.39** 
 
(1.398) (12.16) (0.800) (7.303) (0.563) (4.728) 
Observations 4,056 193 12,065 637 24,888 1,525 
R-squared 0.022 0.069 0.041 0.044 0.053 0.043 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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CHAPTER II:  
COMPARING EXPERIMENTAL AND NON-EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
DESIGNS USING A LARGE-SCALE RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
Socioeconomic policies and programs are rarely implemented within a randomized design. Thus 
researchers aiming to estimate policy and program impacts must depend on non-experimental, 
observational designs. Non-experimental designs have experienced important advances over the 
last two decades, including innovations in panel data analysis, matching methods, inverse 
probability weighting and trimming rules. There remains, however, continued debate about how 
well these non-experimental designs can uncover causal relationships (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Although non-experimental designs are often more feasible and, sometimes, less costly than 
controlled experiments, their ability to uncover causal relationships rests on untestable 
assumptions about the differences between treatment and control groups. 
Starting with Lalonde (1986), a small but growing number of social scientists have tried 
to use randomized experiments to validate non-experimental econometric designs. In these 
studies, called “within-study comparisons” or “design replication studies,” researchers estimate a 
program’s impact by using a randomized control group. Then they re-estimate the impact by 
using one or more nonrandomized comparison groups and econometric techniques to eliminate 
or mitigate observable and unobservable sources of bias. The results from the randomized 
experimental design provide a benchmark for evaluating the success with which non-
experimental designs can recover causal treatment effects. If the non-experimental estimate is 
close to the experimental estimate, which is assumed to have high internal validity, the non-
experimental design is labeled as “successful.”  
Most of design-replication studies have been completed in the context of welfare, job 
training, or employment services programs with voluntary program participation. However, 
socioeconomic policies and programs are frequently implemented or piloted in administrative 
units like towns, counties, or states. Thus to estimate impacts, economists typically look to 
neighboring administrative units for comparison groups and apply various econometric 
techniques to control for observable and unobservable sources of bias. See, for example, the 
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seminal article by Card and Krueger (1994) who use Pennsylvania fast-food restaurants as 
controls for New Jersey fast-food restaurants in order to assess the impact of minimum wage 
laws. Other noteworthy examples are Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), who estimate the effects 
of the terrorist conflict in the Spanish Basque County on GDP using other Spanish regions as a 
comparison group; Besley and Burgess (2004), who evaluate the effect of pro-workers’ labor 
regulation on firm productivity in India by comparing firms in states that adopted these 
regulations with firms in states that did not; Davis (2004), who estimate the impact of pediatric 
leukemia risk on local housing values by comparing households in a county in Nevada with a 
nearby county acting as a control group, and; Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005), who 
evaluate the effect of water service privatization on child mortality in Argentina by comparing 
households in municipalities with and without privatized service. 
Design replication studies based on voluntary program participation has the objective of 
reducing the selection bias problem, i.e. observable and unobservable differences between 
treated and control units. However, programs implemented in administrative units with all 
individuals or houses treated (or untreated), are less likely to have the problem of selection bias. 
Selection bias only arises from the pre-treatment household decision of where to reside and not 
from the participation decision due to the treatment. Thus, it should be simpler to replicate 
experimental results using non-experimental techniques under no selection bias due to the 
treatment itself. Therefore, extending the design-replication approach in a context where the 
selection problem is less problematic would be fruitful and will provide insights about the 
strengths of non-experimental techniques. 
In 2007, a large-scale randomized field experiment tested the effects of three messages on 
voluntary reductions in water consumption among households during a drought in a county in 
metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia (Ferraro and Price, forthcoming). The treatment consisted on 
sending the letter (rather than reading it), thus there is 100% compliance. In this study, we focus 
on two of the three treatments: (i) a social comparison message, and (ii) a technical information 
message. Each treatment group comprised approximately 12,000 households and the control 
group comprised approximately 72,000 households. The social comparison treatment included 
technical information that explained how households could reduce water use, social norm-based 
encouragement, and a social comparison in which own consumption was compared to median 
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county consumption. This treatment had a large and statistically significant estimated treatment 
effect. The technical information treatment, which only instructed households on strategies to 
reduce water use, had a small and statistically insignificant impact. 
We form a non-experimental comparison group of approximately 67,000 households 
from a neighboring county. The neighboring county experienced similar water pricing policies, 
water sources, weather patterns, state and metro regulatory environments and other regional 
confounding factors during the information campaign experiment. Participants do not self-select 
into the program, but they may have sorted themselves across counties based on characteristics 
that also affect water consumption. Our administrative data comprise monthly water use for 17 
months, including pre and post experiment periods. By merging the treatment and non-
experimental control group data with tax assessor and census data, we create a unique data set 
that also includes home characteristics and block group characteristics from the 2000 US census. 
Using the non-experimental comparison group, we estimate treatment effects of the 
conservation information campaigns with popular econometric approaches, including panel data 
estimators, which have rarely been assessed in the context of a design-replication study, and 
inverse propensity score weighting and trimming rules, which have not yet been assessed. We 
use bootstrapping methods to estimate the distribution of the non-experimental treatment effect 
estimates. We then compare these treatment effect estimates to the estimate derived from the 
randomized experimental design. Assuming no randomization or general equilibrium (spillover) 
biases, which were not detected in Ferraro and Price (forthcoming), randomization of households 
into control and treatment groups, followed by a comparison of each group’s mean water 
consumption, provides an unbiased estimator of the average treatment effect. 
We find that the selection of control units matters significantly in the performance of 
non-experimental econometric estimators. When matching methods are used to pre-process the 
data and make more similar the treated and control units’ pre-treatment average outcome trends 
and distribution of baseline covariates, simple panel data methods, with fixed household effects, 
generate estimates almost identical to the experimental estimates. Statistical inferences are also 
identical. However, using alternative designs (e.g., panel methods without pre-processing by 
matching, or matching followed by single difference and difference-in-differences estimators), 
the non-experimental estimators are inaccurate. 
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The next section summarizes the literature on the performance of non-experimental 
evaluation designs. Section 3 describes the study site and the experiment. Section 4 describes 
non-experimental designs used in this study. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the 
experimental benchmark. Section 7 presents the criteria used to evaluate the performance of non-
experimental estimators. Section 8 shows non-experimental sample. Section 9 presents non-
experimental estimates, and Section 10 presents distributions of the non-experimental treatment 
effect estimates. 
 
2. The Performance of Non-Experimental Evaluation Designs 
The literature on the performance of non-experimental designs can be classified into four 
different categories: computer simulations, meta-analyses, double randomized preference trials, 
and design-replication studies (Shadish et al., 2008 and Glazerman et al., 2003). Computer 
simulation studies produce controlled but artificial data varying key features that might affect 
outcome variables. These types of studies can provide accurate results, but the data are artificial 
(e.g. Drake, 1993).14 Meta-analyses compare studies that examine the same (approximately) 
treatment but use different samples, different randomization designs or different methods (e.g. 
Greenberg et al., 2006, Glazerman et al., 2003). In a review, Shadish et al. (2008) note these 
meta-analyses yield mixed evidence on the ability of non-experimental designs to replicate the 
results of experimental designs, but the authors also note that meta-analyses are unable to control 
fully for differences across studies and thus their conclusions should be interpreted with caution. 
Double randomized preference trials are experiments in which some subjects are 
randomly assigned to be in a randomized experiment, in which subjects are randomly assigned to 
one of multiple treatments, or a non-randomized experiment, in which subjects choose one of the 
same multiple treatments. Shadish et al. (2008) present the only example of this type of 
experiment, in which the treatments are training sessions in mathematics or vocabulary and the 
outcomes are exam performances.15 Although double randomized preference trials have 
                                                
14 Drake (1993) generates artificial data and evaluates different sources of bias finding that (i) propensity score did 
not introduce additional bias, and (ii) omitted covariates introduces large bias. 
15 Shadish et al. (2008) found that OLS regressions reduced bias by 84-94%, while propensity score matching 
followed by simple tests of means reduced bias by an average of 74% (59-96%). No other designs were evaluated. 
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attractive characteristics from the perspective of comparing experimental and non-experimental 
designs, they are substantially more difficult to initiate than standard randomized controlled trials 
in realistic policy contexts (which are themselves difficult to initiate). 
Design replication studies, which are also known as within-study designs, estimate a 
program’s impact by using a randomized control group. Then they re-estimate the impact by 
using one or more nonrandomized comparison groups and econometric techniques to eliminate 
or mitigate observable and unobservable sources of bias. This type of study started with Lalonde 
(1986), Fraker and Maynard (1987) and Lalonde and Maynard (1987), who use data from the 
National Supported Work (NSW) randomized field experiment, and non-random comparison 
groups selected from national surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). These authors argue that non-experimental methods 
cannot systematically recover experimental estimates of labor market program impacts. 
Using data similar to the data used by Lalonde (1986), Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) 
came to a more optimistic conclusion. They argue that Propensity Score Matching (PSM) can 
recover experimental estimators when the analyst has detailed information on pre-experiment 
outcomes and covariates. Smith and Todd (2005), however, suggest that the Dehejia and Wahba 
conclusion depends on their choice of a particular subsample of LaLonde (1986), rather than 
qualities of the PSM method. More generally, Smith and Todd (2005) state that the results of 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) and Lalonde (1986) cannot be generalized because their data 
do not satisfy three criteria that Heckman and colleagues have argued are needed to draw 
unbiased (or small bias) inferences from matching estimators (Heckman et al., 1997, 1998a, 
1998b): (i) participant and nonparticipant data come from the same sources, with similar 
measures of the outcome variable being most important; (ii) participants and nonparticipants 
share the same economic environment; and (iii) the data should contain a rich set of variables 
that affect both program participation and the outcome.16 
                                                
16 Heckman et al. (1997) specifically state that: “The major source of bias arising from the application of 
nonexperimental estimators to evaluate training programmes that is reported in LaLonde (1986) arises from the 
mismatch of questionnaires and labour markets across treatment group and comparison group members, and not 
because of the failure of econometric estimators to eliminate selection bias.” (p. 608). 
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Outside of labor market programs, design-replication studies have been conducted on 
educational programs (Agodini and Dynarski, 2004; Hill et al., 2004; Wilde and Hollister, 2007), 
poverty reduction programs (Diaz and Handa, 2006; Handa and Maluccio, 2010), migration 
(McKenzie et al., 2010), and elections (Arceneaux et al., 2006). Most of these studies focus on 
the performance of PSM and none of them found systematic evidence that PSM can replicate 
experimental results (Agodini and Dynarski, 2004; Hill et al., 2004; Diaz and Handa, 2006; 
Handa and Maluccio, 2010; Wilde and Hollister, 2007). Overall, the non-experimental estimates 
are closer to the experimental estimates when Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b) criteria hold. 
Specifically, the greater the use of pre-treatment variables (outcome and covariates) and the more 
similar the treated and control unit environments, the better are the results. 
These previous studies focus on programs that involve voluntary self-selection into the 
program, whereas the program we study is more like a uniformly applied government policy 
(e.g., state-level minimum wage law increases) where participants do not choose to expose 
themselves to the treatment, hence selection bias due to the treatment is minimized. Moreover, in 
contrast to our study, none of previous design-replication studies have focused on environmental 
outcomes, information-based treatments, or programs with 100% compliance due to the fact that 
the treatment consists on sending the letters. Thus, our design replication study contributes to the 
design-replication literature in several and important ways.  
With regard to the designs assessed in the literature, there are only a few design-
replication studies that use panel data (Smith and Todd, 2005; Heckman et al., 1997; Heckman et 
al., 1998b). Results in Heckman et al. (1997 and 1998b) and Smith and Todd (2005), using data 
from the same job training program,17 suggest that a difference-in-differences design, which 
helps eliminate individual, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, combined with matching 
performs better than a cross-sectional matching approach. 
There are no design-replication studies that include inverse probability weighting (IPW) 
and trimming rules. Both approaches attempt to address covariate imbalance and common 
support problems; IPW by re-weighting the units by their propensity scores and trimming rules 
by estimating the optimal range of extreme propensity scores to drop from the sample (Crump et 
                                                
17 These studies have a single pre-treatment observation to form a panel. 
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al., 2009). Busso et al. (2009) and Busso et al. (2011) evaluate the performance of IPW and 
trimming with simulated data and small sample sizes (100 and 500 observations). They find that 
IPW performs well, but trimming performs well only when the treatment effect is homogeneous. 
In sum, the literature using design-replications is small but growing. Previous studies, as 
a whole, do not provide conclusive evidence on the performance of non-experimental designs.  
 
3. Study Site and Experiment 
In 2007, Paul Ferraro, in partnership with Cobb County Water System employees, implemented 
a targeted, residential information campaign as a large-scale randomized field experiment to test 
the effectiveness of three messages in inducing voluntary reductions in water consumption 
among households in Cobb County in metropolitan Atlanta during a drought. Experimental 
treatments were assigned in May 2007. Ferraro and Price (forthcoming) estimate the mean 
treatment impact on aggregated water consumption for the four months of the summer 2007 
watering season (June to September). Each treatment group comprised approximately 11,700 
households and the control group comprised approximately 71,600 households. 
In this study we focus on two treatments: (i) the technical information message, and (ii) 
the social comparison message in which a household’s consumption is compared to median 
consumption in the county (see appendix for examples). The technical information treatment 
only instructed households on strategies to reduce water use. The social comparison treatment 
included technical information that explained how households could reduce water use, social 
norm-based encouragement, and a social comparison in which own consumption was compared 
to median county consumption. We choose the technical information treatment because it had a 
small estimated effect, which was insignificantly different from zero and well below the policy-
relevant impact threshold identified by the Water System of a 2% reduction in water 
consumption. In contrast, the social comparison treatment had the largest and longest-lived (>24 
months) estimated treatment effect, which was more than double the policy-relevant impact 
threshold (Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011). 
We attempt to satisfy the three Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b) criteria for forming 
a credible non-experimental comparison group. We form the non-random control group from 
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households in Fulton County, which is also in metropolitan Atlanta and shares borders with 
Cobb County. Cobb County Water System and Fulton County Water Service Division measure 
the outcome variable in the same way (water meters). The two counties experienced similar 
water pricing policies, water sources, weather patterns, state and metro regulatory environments 
and other regional confounding factors during the pre- and post-experiment periods. Households 
did not volunteer to participate in the treatment. Some households chose to reside in a county 
that adopted the information campaign and others chose to reside in a county that did not adopt 
the information campaign. Thus selection bias only arises from the pre-treatment household 
decision of where to reside. Other sources of bias may come from time-varying unobservable 
factors specific to each county. For households in both counties, we have data on monthly pre-
treatment outcomes and on a set of household and neighborhood variables that are plausibly 
related to both household water use and decisions to live in one county or the other. Note that the 
treatment is unlikely to have affected the post-treatment composition of the two counties. 
Although studies comparing firm, worker or household behavior in neighboring 
administrative units are common in the social science and policy literatures, one might question 
how many independent observations one has in such contexts. In our case, do we have two 
observations (Cobb County and Fulton County) or thousands (the households in each county)?  
Following the predominant approach in the literature, we will assume that the household is the 
unit of observation, but will let our design-replication study inform us about the validity of this 
assumption. 
 
4. Non-Experimental Designs 
We use two non-experimental designs based on the outcome variable analyzed: the post-
experiment, cross-sectional difference in outcomes and the difference-in-differences using pre- 
and post-experiment data. We describe the assumptions required for unbiased estimators of 
treatment effects and then describe statistical methods for making these assumptions plausible 
(e.g., trimming, matching, ordinary least squares regression, fixed-effects regression, inverse 
probability weighting). These methods offer different reweighting schemes to make the control 
and treatment group comparable. Previous design replication studies focus on these methods 
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separately. By combining all them together, we provide a more systematic review of their 
relative performances. 
The experimental design described in the previous sections permits the estimation of the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE), which given treatment randomization, is equal to the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) and the Intention to Treat (ITT). These treatment effects 
are defined as: 
 ATE = E Y!−  Y!                       (1𝑎) ATT = E Y!−  Y!|T = 1               (1𝑏) ITT = E 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!                                         (1𝑐) 
where Y is the outcome of interest, YT and YC are potential outcomes under treatment (YT) and 
control (YC) conditions, T is the treatment status variable (T=1 indicates assignment to treatment 
and T=0 indicates assignment to the control condition) and Z represents the sample at which the 
treatment is administrated regardless of the treatment actually received. The household subscript 
i is suppressed. Given this context, using the non-experimental data, we wish to estimating the 
effect of the treatments on households in Cobb County; i.e., the ATT (which equals to the ITT 
since the program has 100% compliance). 
 
4.1. Single Difference 
One of the simplest approaches to estimate the treatment effect is taking the raw average 
difference between treatment and control units. This is the single difference (D) and can be 
estimated using equation (2a). The key assumption in order to provide an unbiased estimator of 
the ATT is that the expected outcome of the control group represents the expected outcome of 
the treated group in the absence of treatment (equation (2b)). D = E Y!|T = 1 − E Y!|T = 0                     (2𝑎) E Y!|T = 1 − E Y!|T = 0 = 0                      (2𝑏) 
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In a non-experimental setting, equation (2b) is implausible. Thus we use four different 
methods that reweight the control group to control for selection on observable characteristics (or 
on unobservable characteristics correlated with the observable characteristics): matching, 
trimming, inverse probability weighting (IPW), and ordinary least square (OLS). All of these 
methods are different approaches, and sometimes used in combination, to replace equations (2a) 
and (2b) with equations (3a) and (3b): 𝐷 𝑋 = 𝐸 𝑌!|𝑋,𝑇 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌!|𝑋,𝑇 = 0               (3𝑎) E Y!|X,T = 1 − E Y!|X,T = 0 = 0                                    (3𝑏) 
where X are observable covariates. In other words, conditional on the variables in X, the expected 
outcome of the control group represents the expected outcome of the treated group in the absence 
of treatment and thus D(X) provides an unbiased estimator of the ATT. The zero selection bias 
assumption is equivalent to assuming that unobservable variables affecting potential outcomes in 
the control condition are uncorrelated with exposure to treatment, also known as a selection on 
observables assumption (Ravallion, 2008). 
Matching methods match treated units to non-experimental control units in order to achieve 
balance on the means and distributions of confounding covariates, thereby re-establishing 
experimental conditions where the only systematic difference between the groups conditional on 
the covariates is exposure to the treatment (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009). We select the 
matching method that achieves the best covariate balance (see section 8). We match with and 
without calipers. Calipers can further improve covariate balance between treatment and control 
groups by defining a tolerance level for judging the quality of the matches; if a treated household 
does not have a match within the caliper (i.e., available controls are not good matches), it is 
eliminated from the sample. Calipers reduce bias, but at the cost of estimating a treatment effect 
on a subsample that may not be representative of the population of treated households. Sekhon 
(2010) recommends using calipers instead of simply enforcing a common support because 
calipers drops outliers and inliers while common support only drops outliers.  Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1985), in the context of propensity score, found that Mahalanobis matching with calipers 
is superior to Mahalanobis matching alone in reducing bias. As a final measure to control for 
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selection on observables, we use a post-matching bias-correction procedure that asymptotically 
removes the conditional bias in finite samples (Abadie and Imbens, 2006).  
Ho et al. (2007) argue that matching methods can also be viewed as a way to pre-process data 
to make identifying assumptions more plausible and make treatment effect estimates less 
dependent on the specific post-matching statistical model. Since the adjustment for covariates is 
done non-parametrically with matching, the potential for bias is greatly reduced compared to 
parametric analyses (Ho et al., 2007). Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) also recommend 
combinations of methods to achieve robustness under misspecification, a common problem in 
parametric models.  We thus also use matching as a way to pre-process the data before applying 
a parametric estimator (e.g., ordinary least squares, fixed effects). Given we are interested on 
estimating the ATT, there can be gains to dropping control units that do not represent accurate 
counterfactuals for treated units. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that including all control 
units (which in our case are many more than treated units) can artificially deflate the standard 
errors. 
Like matching, trimming is an approach that reweights the control group by restricting the 
sample. The trimmed sample discards (or applies a weight of zero) to observations with extreme 
propensity scores. Trimming is commonly applied when there is limited overlap on covariates. 
Limited overlap introduces substantial bias and large variance (Crump et al., 2009). Although 
previous studies drop observations with extreme propensity score values in an ad-hoc manner, 
Crump et al. (2009) derive an optimal trimming rule for discarding observations with extreme 
propensity scores. The subset of observations is defined in terms of the distribution of covariates 
and the treatment indicator without depending upon the distribution of the outcome variable. 
This practice, however, estimates a treatment effect within a subpopulation that may not be 
representative of the whole population. 
While covariate and propensity score matching can eliminate bias, inverse probability 
weighting (IPW), which uses the propensity scores as weights, can be more efficient 
asymptotically (Hahn 1998; Hirano and Imbens, 2001; Hirano et al., 2003; Busso et al., 2009). 
IPW corrects for unrepresentative, non-random sampling of potential outcomes by giving less 
weight to those individuals who have a high probability of treatment, conditional on the set of 
observable covariates. The IPW estimator weights observations by the inverse of nonparametric 
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estimates of the propensity score (𝑝(𝑋!)). Equation (4) and equation (5) shows the weights for 
the average treatment effect (ATE) and average effect on the treated (ATT), respectively. 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠!"#    1 𝑝(𝑋!)                     𝑖𝑓  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡1 1− 𝑝(𝑋!)       𝑖𝑓  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡                             (4) 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠!""                              1                                        𝑖𝑓  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑝(𝑋!) 1− 𝑝(𝑋!)       𝑖𝑓  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡             (5) 
We focus on the ATT weights because we are interested in estimating the ATT. However, 
IPW studies in the literature have focused on the ATE weights, e.g., Emsley et al. (2008), Hirano 
and Imbens (2001), Millimet and Tchernis (2009). Thus we also present results using the ATE 
weights. 
Hirano et al. (2003) show that IPW yields a fully efficient estimator for the ATE. However, 
IPW is sensitive to large values of the estimated propensity score. Suppose there are observations 
with specific covariates that result in a high propensity score (e.g., 0.9). This suggests that for 
any 10 observations with the same covariate value, 9 of them will be treated and 1 of them will 
be untreated. To be representative of the treated group, the untreated observation with that 
propensity score must be counted 9 times. Thus, the overall treatment effect estimated may end 
up being very sensitive to observations with large weights (Hirano and Imbens, 2001; Huber et 
al., 2010). Some authors (e.g., Stuart, 2009) have thus recommended combining trimming with 
IPW (in other words, applying IPW to a trimmed sample should provide more unbiased 
estimator than applying it to the full sample). 
Using covariates X, we can also estimate equation (3a) using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
OLS is a parsimonious method and provides a reasonable approximation of the treatment effect. 
OLS provides a conditional-variance-weighted estimator of ATE, which is neither equal to ATE 
nor ATT. Angrist and Krueger (1999) suggest “unbiasedness on least square is attainable when 
the variables that determined the treatment assignment are known, quantified, and included in the 
equation”. Some studies have shown OLS regressions perform relatively well in replicating 
experimental benchmarks (Shadish et al., 2008; Arceneaux et al., 2006). Unlike matching and 
trimming, however, OLS fails to alert the analyst to a lack of common support between treated 
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and control units. Moreover, OLS imposes a particular functional form that, if different from the 
true form, may introduce additional sources of misspecification. 
4.2. Difference-in-Differences 
The second non-experimental design is the difference-in-differences (DD) design. DD consists of 
taking the average difference between treatment and control units for periods before and after the 
program were implemented (e.g., McKenzie et al., 2010). DD only requires two points in time 
(before and after). If more time periods are available, a panel data estimator can be used. Under 
certain assumptions, DD removes bias produced by time-invariant unobservable differences 
between treatment and control groups and it cancels out upon subtraction (Blundell and Costa 
Dias, 2009; Ravallion, 2008). When using the raw, unadjusted difference-in-differences, we refer 
to this estimator as the Unconditional Difference-in-Differences (UDD), represented as equation 
(6a), where 0 represents the pre-treatment period and 1 represents the post-treatment period. 
UDD does not impose any particular functional form. The key underlying assumption under this 
approach is that the outcome trend in the control group represents the counterfactual trend of the 
treated group in the absence of treatment (equation (6b)).  𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑇 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑇 = 0                 (6𝑎) 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑇 = 1 = 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑇 = 0                                         (6𝑏) 
In other words, in the absence of the treatment the expected potential changes in both groups are 
equal. Greenstone and Gayer (2009) suggest that this strong assumption is likely to be invalid in 
settings where behavioral responses are possible. We examine this assumption more thoroughly 
below. 
Similar to the single difference estimator, difference-in-differences can be estimated 
conditional on observable covariates using equation (7a), thereby weakening the identifying 
assumption to (7b). 𝐷𝐷 𝑋 = 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑋,𝑇 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑋,𝑇 = 0         (7𝑎) 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑋,𝑇 = 1 = 𝐸 𝑌!! − 𝑌!!|𝑋,𝑇 = 0                                             (7𝑏) 
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Difference-in-differences is a particular case of panel data. With more observations before 
and after treatment assignment, one can use a panel data estimator version of the Equation (7a). 
Given the monthly measurements of water use in our data, we believe a panel data estimator 
would be the most appropriate non-experimental estimator. Such estimators can control for time-
invariant unobservable household characteristics that are associated with treatment assignment 
and water consumption. Among panel data, the standard fixed-effects estimator (FEPD) is the 
workhorse in empirical studies on linear panel data models (Wooldridge, 2005). The main idea 
behind fixed-effects identification strategies is to use repeated observations on households to 
control for unobserved and unchanging characteristics that are related to water consumption and 
the treatment variable (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). 
The key identifying assumption for panel data estimator is that the water consumption trends 
would be the same in both counties in the absence of treatment, the same assumption as for 
difference-in-difference approach.18 If the outcome variable pre-treatment trend for the control 
and treatment group look similar, then it is plausible to assume that unobserved characteristics 
affecting program participation do not vary over time with treatment status. However, the 
implicit assumption that the unobserved effect is additive and time invariant is, as Angrist and 
Krueger (1999) pointed out, “arbitrary in the sense that it usually does not come from economic 
theory or from information about the relevant institutions”. 
There is an additional but very important assumption on fixed effect panel data models to 
consistently estimate the treatment effect: the treatment effects are constant (homogenous) and 
additive (Gibbons et al., 2011; Imai and Kim, 2011). Fixed effects regressions weights on sample 
variances rather than sample frequencies. More specifically, fixed effects regressions average the 
group-specific coefficients proportional to both the conditional variance of treatment and the 
proportion of the sample in each group. Thus, if the assumption of a homogenous treatment 
effect does not hold, then the fixed effect estimator overweights groups that have larger variance 
of treatment conditional upon other covariates and underweights groups with smaller conditional 
variances (Gibbons et al., 2011). For a clear exposition refer to Gibbons et al. (2011). 
                                                
18 In the difference-in-difference approach, where there is only one observation pre-treatment, this assumption is 
difficult to test. 
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4.3. Summary of Non-experimental Designs and Methods 
Table 9 shows all the combination of non-experimental designs and methods used in this study. 
The full sample does not reweight the control group observations. The trimmed sample discards 
(or applies a weight of zero) to observations with extreme propensity scores. The matching 
sample (without and with calipers) restricts the sample to control households that are more 
similar to the treated households. For these samples, we estimate raw differences, matching, 
inverse probability weighting, ordinary least squares regression, and fixed-effect panel data 
regression. 
As we stated before, applying IPW to a trimmed sample should provide more unbiased 
estimator than applying it to the full sample. In the same vain, we expect that OLS will perform 
better when combined with the matched and the trimmed samples because (a) matched and 
trimming will discard inappropriate counterfactuals for the treated group, and (b) OLS will help 
to control for other imbalances that cannot be handled with the matching and trimming method 
alone. 
Regarding fixed effect panel models, we expect that its performance can be evaluated from 
two viewpoints. First, if the pre-program trends do not look similar, then we expect that the non-
experimental method would do a poor job on replicating the experimental estimates. However 
when samples are more similar (e.g., under the matched sample or the trimmed sample) and that 
improvement is reflected on the pre-program trends, then we expect that panel data will improve 
its performance. Second, Ferraro and Miranda (2011) found that indeed there is evidence of 
heterogeneous responses to the social comparison treatment. Thus, after matching, the 
performance of the fixed-effects estimator should improve, but under caliper matching, assuming 
the resulting sample is not unrepresentative of the original sample, it should perform best 
because the variance between treatment and control units is reduced. 
 
5. Data 
The data for our analysis are derived from four sources. Monthly water consumption at the 
household level is obtained from Cobb County Water System (experimental data) and from 
Fulton County Water Service Division (non-random comparison group). We have thirteen 
months of pre-experiment data (May 2006 to May 2007) and four months of post-experiment 
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data (June to September 2007).19 Covariates variables are obtained from county tax assessor 
databases and the 2000 US Census. Tax assessor databases provide home and property 
characteristics. The US Census provides data on neighborhood characteristics at the block 
group.20 
We select covariates that are observable to policymakers and that theory or empirical studies 
suggest could be important controls in a study on water conservation. Ferraro and Price 
(forthcoming) analysis shows that previous water use predicts future water use. Based on 
metering data from the water utilities, we use the two variables used by Ferraro and Price in their 
analysis: June – November 2006 billed use (corresponds to May – October use, which is the 
main water use season) and April – May 2007 billed use (to reflect changes in landscaping prior 
to treatment assignment in May 2007).21 
From the 2007 county tax assessor databases we select fair market value of home ($), 
property size (acres), and age of home (years). We include fair market value (as a proxy for 
income and wealth) because Ferraro and Miranda (2011) found that high-income households are 
more responsive to non-pecuniary, information-based messages. Two measures that reflect the 
scope and incentives for water conservation are the age of the home and the size of property. 
Older homes, on average, have older water-intensive capital, which are more cost-effective to 
replace to achieve water conservation goals. On the other hand, bigger properties houses are 
strongly correlated with the level of water use. 
From the 2000 US Census, we choose block group measures of per-capita income ($), 
percent of adults over 25 years old with college education or higher, percent of people living 
below poverty line, percent of population that is white, and percent of renter-occupied housing 
units. Environmental preferences of household occupants would likely also affect their treatment 
responses. However, we (and water utilities) cannot observe environmental preferences, but 
survey evidence suggests that environmental preferences vary with education levels and race. 
                                                
19 Administrative data correspond to water billing month. Thus, for example, our pre-experiment data are for June 
2006 to June 2007 billing periods. 
20 A block group is a subdivision of a census tract. The number of people in a block group varies from 600 to 3,000 
people, with an average size of 1,500 people. 
21 Later, in an Appendix we reevaluate the use of previous water use by considering only summer 2006 (June to 
September use). 
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Thus, we use measures of education (percent with bachelor’s degree or higher) and race (percent 
white) at the census block group. We also include a variable regarding renters/owners. Ferraro 
and Miranda (2011) show that owner-occupants have greater social connections to their 
neighbors and thus be more responsive to pro-social messages. Finally, we include variables 
regarding poverty measure in order to capture differences across counties (in the next paragraph 
we show strong differences between Fulton and Cobb County on poverty measures: Fulton 
doubles on poverty to Cobb County). 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for Cobb County and Fulton County based on the 
2000 US Census. Both counties have similar proportion of urban population (99% and 98%, 
respectively), average household size (2.6 and 2.4 respectively) and population over 25 years 
with higher degree of college (68% and 65%, respectively). However the Cobb County 
population comprises more White citizens (72% versus 48%) and its income distribution is quite 
different. Although Cobb County has lower per capita income ($ 27,863 versus $ 30,003), it also 
has less poverty (6% versus 16%) and a higher median income ($58,289 versus $47,321). 
The outcome variable is water use. We have data on 66,849 residential households in 
Fulton County. Cobb County measures water consumption monthly. However, Fulton County 
measures it bimonthly or, for some households, less frequently. We split Fulton County billed 
use across months (e.g., if June bill was 2000 gallons, 1000 was assigned to May and 1000 to 
June; more sophisticated weighting that takes into account seasonal variation in use did not affect 
the estimates and thus is not reported). We remove from the Fulton County sample any 
household that went for 5 or more months without a bill during the study period (2,888 obs.). To 
make the Fulton sample comparable to the eligible set of households for randomization in the 
Cobb experiment, we also remove from the Fulton sample any households that consumed fewer 
than 20,000 gallons between May and September 2006 (14,865 obs.), any households that saw a 
change in the name of the billed customer between May 2006 and April 2007 (1,234 obs.), any 
households that consumed more than 1,000,000 gallons between May and October 2006 (a sign 
of catastrophic leaks; 7 obs.), and any households not actually within Fulton County boundaries 
(376 obs.). See Ferraro and Price for explanation of the experimental sampling design. 
Table 11 shows average water consumption in thousands of gallons during key watering 
seasons for Cobb households in the experiment (including the randomized control group) and 
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Fulton County households (the non-experimental control group). There are differences across the 
counties, but within the experimental groups in Cobb County, there are no significant 
differences. Regarding pre-experiment data (summer 2006, winter 2006-2007, and spring 2007) 
in Cobb County, there are no statistical differences across treatments and random control group. 
The only difference arises in post-experiment (summer 2007) for the social comparison 
treatment. The unconditional average treatment effect is approximately 4.2% reduction in water 
consumption, which is statistically significant at p=0.01, while the unconditional reduction for 
the technical information treatment is 0.02%, not statistically significant at p=0.10.  
Finally, Table 14 shows descriptive statistics from the tax assessor and the US census for 
our specific sample. In general, Cobb County has slightly cheaper, older and smaller properties.  
Further, Cobb County has lower per-capita income, lower percentage of people with higher 
degree, lower percentage of renter occupied housing units, and a lower percentage of white.  
 
6. Experimental Benchmark 
As is implicitly assumed in previous design-replication studies, we assume the experimental 
estimate is the relevant benchmark, despite the presence of sampling error. Given the 
characteristics of the available data and the context in which the program took place, we can take 
advantage of the cross-sectional and panel data structures. 
With the cross-sectional data, we estimate an OLS regression using equation (8). To increase 
statistical precision and to properly estimate treatment effects given the within-meter route 
randomization design, Equation (8) includes observable covariates Xi described previously 
(previous water use, household and neighborhood characteristics) and dummy variables for the 
meter routes: 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑈𝑠𝑒  𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟  2007! = α! + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝛿′𝑋! + 𝜀!                     (8) 
With the panel data, we estimate equation (9). The dependent variable is monthly water 
consumption and the time variable goes from May 2006 to September 2007. Post-experiment 
months are the 2007 summer months (June 2007 – September 2007). Estimating treatment 
effects in the experimental design does not require using equation (9) (in fact it needlessly adds 
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assumptions), but we believe the most appropriate non-experimental design would be one that 
takes advantage of the panel data structure to control for time-invariant, unobservable household 
characteristics that are associated with treatment assignment and water consumption. Thus when 
comparing estimates from panel data estimators to the experimental benchmark estimate, we 
wish to compare “apples to apples.” Potential approaches to estimating (9) include first 
differencing and fixed effects estimation (the key identifying assumption of the random effects 
estimator does not seem tenable in this context: i.e., unobserved, household time-invariant effects 
that are uncorrelated with the relevant explanatory variables in all time periods). The fixed 
effects are assumed to exist at the level of the household. 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦  𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑈𝑠𝑒!" = α!" + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝜇! + 𝜂! + 𝜀!"                    (9) 
The experimental benchmark estimates using equation (8) are shown in Table 13. The 
analysis in Table 13 essentially replicates Ferraro and Price (forthcoming) using the sample for 
which we could match addresses in the utility, tax assessor and census databases, and adds 
additional controls that are used in the other analyses.22 The results shown in Column (2) and (3) 
are nearly the same as in Ferraro and Price (forthcoming): the social comparison message 
reduces summer 2007 water consumption, on average, by about 1700 gallons (p<0.01) and the 
technical information message reduced consumption, on average, by only about 130 gallons 
(p>0.10).  
Table 14 presents the experimental benchmark estimates using equation (9). The important 
variables are the interaction term between the treatment and the post-experiment period. Results 
show that the technical information message reduced monthly consumption, on average, by very 
little, whereas the social comparison message reduced monthly consumption, on average, by 
about 350 gallons, which are very close to the estimates reported in Ferraro and Price when 
multiplied by four. Angrist and Krueger (1999), Angrist and Pischke (2009), and Swaffield 
(2001) suggest that panel data estimators are smaller than estimates from cross-sectional data due 
to bias from measurement error that is aggravated when individual effects are removed. 
                                                
22 13.8% of experimental data were dropped. Unconditional differences on pre-experiment water consumption are 
statistically different between observations kept in the analysis and observations dropped for each treatment and the 
experimental control group. Average values for dropped observations are higher than kept observations, however 
when controlling for other observable covariates experimental results do not vary.  
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7. Non-experimental Evaluation Criteria 
The aim of our study is to evaluate the performance of non-experimental (or observational) 
empirical designs in the context of the Cobb County conservation information campaign. The 
design-replication literature provides no guidance for determining whether a non-experimental 
estimate is “good” based on the experimental benchmark estimate.  Many studies apply no 
criteria at all. We define two criteria for judging the quality of the non-experimental estimate: 
Criterion 1: The non-experimental point estimate should be in the 95% confidence 
interval of the experimental point estimate. This criterion is applied in previous design-
replication studies (e.g., Arceneaux et al., 2006; Greenberg et al., 2006). We also wish to 
make the correct inference in testing the null hypothesis of no treatment effect (Type 1 
error = 5%). 
Based on the cross-sectional results (Table 13, column 3), Criterion 1 implies that the 
non-experimental estimate for the social comparison treatment should be on the range [-
2081, -1383] and, for the technical information treatment, on the range [-524, +276]. 
Based on the panel data results (Table 14), Criterion 1 implies that the non-experimental 
estimate for the social comparison treatment should be on the range [-443, -263], and for 
the technical information treatment, on the range [-111, +99].23 
 
Criterion 2: To be considered the “best” non-experimental estimator, an estimator must 
satisfy two properties: (a) under random sampling using bootstrapping, it has the highest 
concentration of estimates within the 95% confidence interval of the experimental 
estimate; and (b) the concentration of estimates with the 95% confidence interval of the 
                                                
23 Another criterion could be defined as a fraction of the policy-relevant treatment effect. One would not want to 
encourage policymakers to scale-up a treatment that in fact does not have a policy-relevant treatment effect, fail to 
encourage scale-up of a treatment that has a policy-relevant effect, or grossly overestimate how effective any scaled-
up initiative will be (e.g., we would not want to claim a treatment effect 25% greater than the experimental 
benchmark). In our case, the minimum relevant treatment effect defined by the water utility is a 2% decline in 
average summer water use and thus if an estimate satisfies Criterion 1, we would not encourage scaling-up of the 
technical information treatment and would encourage the scaling up of the social comparison treatment. Given this 
fact and that we have no policy guidance on an upper bound threshold (i.e., what comprises a “gross overestimate”), 
we do not attempt to craft a third criterion. 
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experimental estimate should be similar for both treatments (i.e., an estimator cannot be 
judged to be successful if it can only consistently recover one of the treatment effects). 
Bootstrapping can be used to estimate a distribution of treatment effects, thereby 
allowing one to judge the sensitivity of the proposed methods to different samples 
(McKenzie et al., 2010). Sensitivity to sample choice has been a concern in the design-
replication literature (e.g., Smith and Todd (2005); Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) 
debate). 
 
8. Non-Experimental Sample 
Recall we use three samples in our non-experimental analyses: the “full sample” using all the 
observations, a “trimmed sample,” and a “matched sample.” The trimmed and matched samples 
were created using the full set of covariates described in Section 5. To create the trimmed 
sample, we use a logistic regression and the full set of covariates to calculate the optimal 
trimming rule (Crump et al. 2009). The rule implies observations with estimated propensity 
scores outside the interval [0.06, 0.94] should be discarded (i.e., assigned a weight of zero).24 
Figure 4 shows clearly the observations discarded. 
To create the matched sample, we choose the matching method that generates the best 
covariate balancing results for our sample: Mahalanobis covariate matching. We apply this 
matching method with and without calipers of 1 standard deviation. Figure 5 shows the 
observations discarded based on covariate matching with calipers.  
Based on the arguments in Section 4, we expect that the ‘matched’ sample will perform 
better than the ‘trimmed’ sample, and the latter better than the ‘full’ sample, because of 
improvements in covariate balance among treated and control units. The full sample includes 
both outliers and inliers with respect to the treated group. The trimmed sample drops only 
                                                
24 The rule for both treatments is similar, but not identical. The exact optimal number for Social Comparison 
Treatment is 0.06116, while the optimal number for the Technical Information Treatment is 0.06227. Logit and 
Probit estimates differ by 1.6 units. Logit coefficient is 1.6 times larger than Probit coefficient (Train, 2009). 
Because we are interested to understand which method provides closer results to the experimental one, the selection 
of Probit and/or Logit matters. It will influence through the propensity score for the trimming set, but also it will 
influence the weights used (either ATT or ATE). Thus later, in an Appendix, we provide some evidence about the 
effect when choosing one of the two models. 
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outliers. The matched sample drops outliers and inliers (bad counterfactuals). Trimming and 
matching, however, lead to estimates of treatment effects for subpopulations rather than the 
entire relevant population. 
Before applying our empirical methods in the next section, we compare balance on the 
covariates selected and evaluate whether there is improvement across samples. Table 15 and 
Table 16 show these balancing results for the social comparison and technical information 
treatment, respectively. Column (1) shows results for the full sample, column (2) for the trimmed 
sample, and column (3) and (4) for the matched samples. Column (5) to (7) shows the percentage 
improvement from the balance achieved in the full sample. 
For each covariate we show four ways to evaluate the improvement in covariate balance: (a) 
difference in means; (b) standardized mean difference, for which Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) 
suggest that a standardized difference greater than 20 should be considered large (Lee, 2011); (c) 
eQQ mean difference, a non-parametric test that evaluates the rank rather than the precise value 
of the observations (Ho et al., 2007); and (d) variance ratio between treated and control units, 
which should be equal to one if there is perfect balance (Sekhon, 2011). 
Out of ten covariates, five of them show clear improvement across all four measures as one 
moves from the full sample to the trimmed sample, matched sample, and caliper matching 
sample (aggregate water use from May 2006 to October 2006, fair market value of home, percent 
of adults over 25 years old with college education or higher, per-capita income, percent of renter-
occupied housing units). Among these five covariates, three of them reduced their standardized 
mean difference from above 20 to less than 20, in absolute value. Three other covariates (age of 
home, percent of people living below poverty line, percent of population that is white) see 
improvements moving from the full sample to the trimmed sample, but declines with matching 
(without caliper), based on standardized mean difference. Caliper matching, however, improves 
balance on all four measures. These three covariates reduced their standardized mean difference 
above 20 (from the full sample) to less than 20 in absolute value (caliper matching sample), and 
the variance ratio is closer to one for the caliper-matching sample. The final two covariates 
(aggregate water use for March and April 2007, property size) see a mix of improvements and 
declines, but the original values were not substantially unbalanced. The balancing results thus 
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corroborate our expectations trimming and matching, in general, improve covariate balance and 
caliper-matching shows the best balance.  
 
9. Non-Experimental Results 
In this section, we present the results for each design and method combination described in 
Table 9. Table 17 and Table 18 show results for the single difference and the difference-in-
differences for the social comparison and technical information treatments, respectively. Column 
(1) and Column (3) show the treated and control average consumption after the experiment 
(Summer 2007), while Column (2) and Column (4) show the treated and control average 
consumption before the experiment was implemented (Summer 2006). Based on these estimates, 
Column (5) calculates the difference-in-differences for treatment and control units before and 
after the experiment took place. Similarly, Column (6) shows the single average difference post-
experiment between treated and control units. Furthermore, the first panel of results shows raw 
mean differences, the second panel of results shows matching with bias correction results, the 
third and fourth panel of results shows weighted means using IPW for ATT and ATE, 
respectively. 
Remember that the average treatment effect in the experimental design implies a reduction of 
about 1.7 thousands of gallons for the social comparison treatment, and about 0.12 thousands of 
gallons for the technical information message (see Table 13). All non-experimental estimates for 
unconditional difference-in-differences overestimate the experimental benchmarks and, more 
importantly, none of them imply a reduction in water consumption (see Column (5) in Table 16 
and Table 17). These results are striking. It suggests that there are other relevant differences 
across counties, besides the treatment effect, that we are not conditioning for. Thus the 
difference-in-differences design does not provide a good estimate of the experimental 
benchmark. Major discrepancies come from the difference in summer 2006 between treated and 
control groups, implying that the key identifying assumption (i.e. that the mean trend of the 
control group represents the proper counterfactual for the treated group) does not hold in our 
case. The non-experimental estimates provide misleading information: they suggest that both 
treatments increase, rather than decrease, water consumption. Naturally, these estimates do not 
satisfy Criterion 1.  
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Estimates based on single difference estimators for Summer 2007 are shown in Column (6) 
in Table 16 and Table 17. The results are less biased than difference-in-differences estimates. 
Simple difference shows the right sign for the social comparison treatment (Table 17): a 
reduction in water consumption, rather than an increment. Under matching sample (no calipers) 
and using the full set of covariates, the single difference for both treatments provides closer 
results to the experimental benchmark than the full, trimmed and caliper-matching samples.25 
IPW does not improve weighted differences using ATT or ATE weights. In fact, the estimate is 
worse when combining matched samples with IPW method: the results are in opposite direction 
to the experimental effects. Thus, these results suggest that combining matching to pre-process 
the data and then re-weighting the matched sample with inverse propensity score weights is not 
an appropriate mix of methods. 
Table 19 and Table 20 show single difference OLS results for social comparison and 
technical information treatment, respectively. Column (1) and (2) show results for the full 
sample. Columns (3) and (4) show results for the trimmed sample. Column (5) to (8) show 
results for the matched sample, both without and with calipers. Results show that specification 
matters substantially. The estimates and inferences drawn are highly sensitive to the set of 
covariates included.26 Just including previous water use as covariates OLS in all samples 
overestimate the experimental effects for both social comparison and technical information 
treatment. This suggests that there are other important covariates not including in the regression 
that affect water consumption. It is clear that using baseline water use alone provides inadequate 
control under selection on observables.  
The census and tax assessor variables are critical to obtaining estimates closer to the 
experimental estimates. When including the full set of covariates, results improve substantially 
and predict that there is a reduction of about 1,550 gallons for the social comparison treatment 
                                                
25 However, these results are very sensitive to covariates specification. See Appendix 10 for more matching results 
using different set of covariates. It is worth nothing that only using neighborhood variables combined with caliper 
matching and bias correction, results are similar to the experimental benchmark. However, again, these results are 
very sensitive to matching specifications; moreover when literature suggest that pre-treatment variables are 
important in the matching context to recover experimental estimates. 
26 Table 11 and 12 show two sets of covariates: (a) only previous water, (b) previous water use, property, and 
neighborhood variables. Appendix 11 and Appendix 12 show other sets of covariates: (c) only property variables, 
(d) only neighborhood variables, and (e) property and neighborhood variables. 
  77 
(the experimental estimate shows a reduction of 1,700 gallons) and no statistically significant 
treatment effect for the technical information treatment (similar to the experimental estimate). 
These results are comparable using the full sample, the matching sample and the caliper-
matching sample: estimates predict a statistically significant reduction for the social comparison 
treatment and statistically insignificant effect for the technical information treatment.27 Thus, 
using OLS regression with single difference and the full set of covariates, the full sample and the 
matched sample (with and without calipers) satisfy Criterion 1.  
OLS results using the trimmed sample, however, are striking and difficult to interpret. They 
differ substantially from the estimates using the other three samples. In both treatments, besides 
the improvement on balance among covariates, they show an increment on water consumption, 
rather than reduction. Further, under some specifications, we find substantial biases and 
statistically significant. Remember that for this exercise, observations with estimated propensity 
score outside the interval [0.06, 0.94] are discarded. We are not yet applying inverse propensity 
score weights. Adding them might provide insights into why OLS and trimming does not provide 
results closer to the experimental benchmark. 
Before showing the IPW results, Table 21 and Table 22 illustrate difference-in-differences 
OLS results for social comparison and technical information treatment. In none of the 
estimations under different samples are results close to the experimental benchmark. As with the 
unconditional difference-in-differences results, the identification assumption does not appear to 
hold in our case and conditioning on other relevant covariates does not help to make this 
assumption more plausible.28 
Following the cross-section estimates, we examine more deeply the performance of IPW and 
the type of weights applied. IPW is subject to extreme values, thus we only show results for the 
                                                
27As we mention before, these results vary greatly. Appendix 11 and Appendix 12 shows that using only property 
and neighborhood variables, the treatment effects are positive and significant for both treatments. 
28 Table 13 and Table 14 were estimated also without using covariate “Water Use from June - November 2006” 
because it could be argued that this period of water use includes Summer 2006 that is also in the left-hand side of the 
regression. However, results (not shown) are more biased than the presented in these two tables. 
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trimmed sample.29 Figure 6 shows that the estimated propensity scores for each treatment are 
condensed in the extreme of the distribution (closer to zero and one). 
Before using IPW, we compare the balance on the set of covariates using ATT and ATE 
weights. Results are shown in Table 23 and Table 24 for the social comparison and technical 
information treatment, respectively. These results are based on the trimmed sample. Column (1) 
and (2) show raw means for treatment and control units. Column (3) and (4) show weighted 
means using ATT weights. Column (5) and (6) show weighted means using ATE weights. 
Columns (7) – (9) show the difference between control and treated groups for each type of 
weights (no weights, ATT weights and ATE weights, respectively). 
Despite our preference for using ATT weights, ATE weights achieve systematically better 
balance between the treated and control groups for both treatments (see columns (7) to (9)). ATE 
weights reduce imbalance for all 10 covariates. ATT weights only reduce imbalance on 7 
covariates (imbalance increases for water use in April and May 2007, age of home, percentage of 
renters). Notice that the mean average for the treated observations in column (1) and (3) are 
equal. This is because the ATT weights for the treated group is equal to one and this could 
explain the better balance using ATE weights: treated units are also weighted to be more similar 
to control units. Therefore, better balance can be achieved using ATE weights. 
Table 25 shows non-experimental estimates using IPW. Both types of weights overestimate 
the effect of the social comparison (ATT estimate: -2.9; ATE estimate: -2.3) and technical 
information treatment (ATT estimate: 0.1; ATE estimate: 0.8). The difference between ATT and 
ATE estimate for each treatment are not statistically different from each other, but ATE weights 
are closer to the social comparison experimental benchmark and ATT weights are closer to the 
technical information experimental benchmark. Thus, IPW method improves the performance on 
the trimmed sample (without weights), but still does not satisfy Criterion 1.30 
                                                
29 Results using full sample show that coefficients are subject of substantial biases. For example, when using ATT 
weights the estimated coefficient for the social comparison treatment is -25.7, and the coefficient for the technical 
information treatment is -18.2. These results corroborate the initial idea that IPW is very sensitive to observations 
with large weights, thus using the trimmed sample is the best approximation when using IPW. 
30 Results shown are based on Logit models. Logit coefficients are roughly 1.6 times larger than Probit coefficient 
(Train, 2009). Appendix 13 shows results using Probit models instead of Logit models. Despite smaller Probit 
coefficients, there is no linear relationship in the estimates on Appendix 13 when compared to Table 17. This 
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Finally, we evaluate the performance of non-experimental techniques using the panel data 
structure. As we mentioned earlier, we believe that panel data is the right empirical approach 
given the nature of the data. Under homogenous treatment effects, panel data under the full 
sample should provide results close to the experimental benchmark. Under heterogeneous 
treatment effects, panel data in the caliper-matching sample should perform best.  
Prior to presenting the estimates, we examine the assumption of parallel-trends prior to the 
experiment for treated and control units. Figure 7 shows the mean monthly consumption trends 
for the social comparison treatment, technical information treatment, Cobb County random 
control (given randomization, their trends look identical) and the Fulton County non-random 
control group.  The two lines do not look similar, thus suggesting that the Fulton households, on 
average, do not form a good counterfactual for the treated Cobb households. Thus, we do not 
expect to have results close to the experimental benchmark using the full sample. Figure 8 and 
Figure 9, for the social comparison and technical information, respectively, shows that the trend 
lines become much more similar after matching and that caliper-matching does not affect the 
mean pre-treatment trends by much. As we will see, however, the use of calipers does have a 
substantial impact on the treatment effect estimates. This impact suggests that similar mean 
trends before the experiment is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to ensure the 
assumptions of the fixed panel data estimator is satisfied. 
Table 26 shows results for the full sample, trimmed sample, matching, and caliper-matching 
samples. Using the full sample, we estimate that the social comparison message reduced average 
use by 965 gallons per month and the technical information message reduced average use by 618 
gallons per month. The non-experimental estimate of the social comparison treatment effect is 
almost three times larger than the experimental estimate, while the non-experimental 
experimental estimate of the technical information treatment effect is over ten times larger. 
These estimates do not satisfy Criterion 1. Importantly, they send the wrong signal to decision 
makers: they erroneously imply that the technical information message achieves almost two-
thirds of the average impact of the social comparison message. Given technical information 
                                                                                                                                                       
happens because the choice model influence in two ways: (a) through the optimal selection rule and trimming set, 
and (b) through the weights used. Having said that, Appendix 13 shows that ATT weights increase bias to the non-
experimental estimates, while ATE weights reduce bias to the non-experimental estimates. Later, on the 
bootstrapping section we reevaluate the difference between ATT and ATE weights for IPW method. 
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messages are (a) cheaper because they require fewer sheets of paper and fewer data (no need to 
examine past consumption patterns), (b) can be targeted to the entire population rather than only 
to customers who lived in their home the previous year, and (c) are well understood by utility 
managers, the results could be interpreted as implying the technical information message would 
be preferable. 
Columns (2) and (6) present estimates using the trimmed sample. The estimates are smaller 
than estimates with the full sample, but still they provide the wrong information: both non-
experimental estimates do not satisfy Criterion 1, although the technical information treatment is 
very close to being within the 95% confidence interval of the experimental estimate. Columns 
(3) and (7) present estimates using the sample pre-processed by matching. The estimates improve 
than the trimmed sample and are very close to satisfying Criterion 1 (in fact, the estimate for the 
technical information treatment does satisfy it). 
Columns (4) and (8) present estimates using the sample pre-processed by caliper matching. 
Despite the barely perceptible impact of caliper matching on the trend of Fulton County pre-
treatment average monthly water use (see Figure 8 and Figure 9), caliper matching prior to 
estimation substantially improves the estimates from the fixed effect model. The estimates from 
the non-experimental data are nearly identical to those generated by the experimental data (see 
Table 12) and satisfy Criterion 1. Thus the non-experimental estimator does a good job of 
replicating the experimental estimator.  Importantly, the inferences drawn from a test of the null 
hypothesis of zero impact are the same from experimental and non-experimental estimators.31 
                                                
31 An open question is regarding what pre-treatment covariates should be included in the analysis. Dehejia and 
Wahba (1999, 2002) included two-year pre-treatment data, thus, dropping observations that do not satisfy their 
requirement. Under that subsample, they found that propensity score matching did recover the experimental 
estimates. However, Smith and Todd (2005) suggested that their conclusions are not generalizable and depends on 
their choice of a particular subsample. Thus, we reevaluate our point estimates using water consumption in Summer 
2006 (from July to October 2006) instead of (a) water use from June to November 2006 and (b) water use in April 
and May 2007. In our case does not mean a different sample, only a change in the pre-treatment covariate. Results 
are shown in Appendix 14. In general, we observed more biased non-experimental results using only one point in 
time as water pre-treatment consumption. For instance results on Section D), under OLS, we cannot recover the 
experimental estimation for any sample specification (moreover, results provide the wrong signal to decision 
makers: treatments increase water consumption). Comparing these results to Table 19 (social comparison treatment) 
and Table 20 (technical information treatment), we did recover the experimental estimates using the full set of 
covariates (pre-treatment water use, household characteristics and neighborhood variables) and for the full and 
matching samples. Further, another important point to make is that under fixed-effects panel data, using water use 
on Summer 2006 to select the matching and caliper-matching samples, helps to recover the experimental estimates 
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10. Non-Experimental Bootstrapping 
The results in the previous section compare one experimental estimate with one non-
experimental estimate. However, this comparison does not reveal anything about the distribution 
of the estimators (Huber et al., 2010). In this section, we apply bootstrapping methods in order to 
estimate the distributions of treatment effects using the non-experimental data. These 
distributions reveal how sensitive each evaluation design is to random sampling with the same 
number of observations. The bootstrapping analysis used 500 repetitions for each non-
experimental method. 
Table 27 summarizes the results.32  The table reports the percentage of repetitions that satisfy 
Criterion 1. Column (1) and Column (2) show the results for the social comparison treatment and 
the technical information treatment, respectively. In other words, the table reports the percentage 
of point estimates that is within the 95% confidence interval of the experimental estimate, which 
relates to our Criterion 2.  Recall that Criterion 2 requires the “best” estimator to satisfy two 
properties: (a) under random sampling using bootstrapping, it has the highest concentration of 
estimates within the 95% confidence interval of the experimental estimate; and (b) the 
concentration of estimates with the 95% confidence interval of the experimental estimate should 
be similar for both treatments (i.e., an estimator cannot be judged to be successful if it can only 
consistently recover one of the treatment effects). 
Under the full sample, only 22% of the estimates from the single difference estimator using 
OLS are within the 95% confidence interval of the experimental benchmark. The Fixed Effect 
Panel Data (FEPD) estimator does worse. It consistently overestimates the treatment effect for 
both treatments: social comparison’s treatment effect estimates vary from [-1.20; -0.72], while 
the technical information estimates vary from [-0.92; -0.31] (results not shown).  
                                                                                                                                                       
(see Section I) on Appendix 14). Non-experimental matching results (without calipers) are closer to the 95% 
confidence interval experimental estimate (in fact, only the social comparison treatment is out of boundaries by 4 
gallons), and results for caliper-matching for both treatments satisfy Criterion 1. 
32 We only show results for single difference estimator (with OLS and IPW) and fixed-effect panel data (difference-
in-differences estimator) because they were the estimators with lower bias in Section 7. 
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Using the trimmed sample, the performances of OLS and FEPD do not improve consistently. 
Furthermore, the performances differ substantially depending upon the model (Logit or Probit) 
used to estimate the propensity scores that determine the optimal trimming threshold. For OLS, 
trimming with Probit propensity scores performs better for both treatments: just changing the 
choice model from Logit to Probit, the percentage increases by approximately 15%. We cannot 
infer the same pattern for FEPD: its performance does not improve homogeneously using Probit 
models. Only the technical information treatment improves (41% of the times) while the social 
comparison treatment just improves by 2% of the time. The performance of IPW weights and 
trimming is also poor, providing evidence that IPW performance depends upon small changes in 
the sample, which is undesirable. The difference in performance in our study based on whether 
trimming is done with Logit or Probit models might be exacerbated because of the concentration 
of propensity scores on the extremes (closer to zero and one). Both choice models differ more at 
the tails than in the middle range of the distribution (e.g., Logistic models have slightly flatter 
tails, i.e. the Probit model approaches to the axes more quickly than the Logit model) (Xie and 
Manski, 1988).  
Using the matching sample, however, OLS and FEPD improve their performances. 
Nevertheless, OLS has mixed results depending upon the type of matching. OLS with matching 
(alone) recovers 60% times the experimental social comparison treatment (specifically, within its 
95% CI), but with matching-caliper that percentage decreases to 48%. Instead, for the technical 
information treatment, matching (alone) recovers only 14%, but caliper-matching increases up to 
70%. OLS results are thus highly sensitive to the covariates included and the sample selection. 
FEPD, on the contrary, improves its performance substantially when using matching: it 
increases from nearly zero under full sample to 16% and 50% for the social comparison and 
technical information treatments, respectively. Caliper-matching expands further the 
achievement of FEPD: 73% and 79% of the time the social comparison and technical 
information treatments estimates, respectively, are within the experimental benchmark’s 95% CI. 
Caliper-matching sample combined with FEPD is the only approach that satisfies Criterion 2’s 
consistency prerequisite under bootstrapping (i.e. both treatments achieve similar conclusions 
with similar percentage rates). We believe this achievement arises because pre-processing the 
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data with matching methods makes panel data identifying assumptions more plausible and, 
therefore, the treatment effect estimates from the non-experimental design more accurate.33  
These results are illustrated graphically in Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12. Figure 10 
shows results for OLS with bootstrapping for the full sample and the matched sample (with and 
without caliper). The dependent variable is summer 2007 and the experimental benchmarks are -
1.70 and -0.13 thousands of gallons reduction for the social comparison and technical advice 
treatment, respectively. These two experimental benchmark estimates are represented as vertical 
dashed lines. Figure 10 suggests that non-experimental OLS results improve substantially with 
the matched sample compared to the full sample. Further, OLS with the matched sample has the 
distribution with the lowest variance. In the case of the technical advice treatment, on the right 
side, the caliper-matching sample outperforms the sample using matching without calipers. In the 
case of the social comparison treatment, on the left side of Figure 10, the performances of the 
two samples are similar. 
Figure 11 shows OLS results (with and without IPW weights) for the trimmed sample. OLS 
results without weights have large variance and do not perform well for both treatments. Using 
IPW weights, either ATE or ATT from Logit and Probit models, results improve, and 
distributions look more alike, but not in a consistent way for both treatments.  
Likewise, Figure 12 shows results for FEPD with bootstrapping. In this case, the dependent 
variable is monthly water consumption and the experimental benchmarks are -0.353 and -0.006 
thousands of gallons reduction for the social comparison and technical advice treatment, 
respectively. In this case it is clear that the caliper-matching sample outperforms, for both 
treatments, the other samples. Thus, the non-experimental panel data, fixed-effect estimator 
combined with matching to pre-process the data does a good job of replicating the experimental 
benchmark. 
 
                                                
33 Appendix 15 shows results not only based on the point estimate. It also includes the significance level (i.e. 
significant for the social comparison treatment and insignificant for the technical information treatment). 
Percentages are similar to those showed in Table 27. 
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11. Conclusions 
Design-replication studies assess the ability of non-experimental designs to replicate impact 
estimates from experimental designs.  If the non-experimental estimate is close to the 
experimental estimate, the non-experimental design is labeled as “successful.” Our design-
replication study builds on a randomized field experiment that was used to test the effectiveness 
of non-pecuniary messages to induce voluntary reductions in water consumption. We focus on 
two experimental treatments: (i) a technical information message, which gave households 
technical information on how to reduce water consumption, and (ii) a social comparison message 
treatment, in which households received the technical information message augmented by social 
norm-based encouragement and a social comparison in which own consumption is compared to 
median consumption in the county. In the randomized experimental trial, the technical 
information did not have statistically significant, or economically relevant, impact on residential 
household water consumption.  In contrast, the social comparison treatment had a policy-relevant 
and statistically significant (p<0.01) estimated treatment effect. 
Using the treatment groups and a non-experimental comparison group from a 
neighboring county, we estimate treatment effects of the two treatments using popular 
econometric approaches.  We find that when using standard panel data approaches with fixed 
effects estimators, the estimates and inferences from the non-experimental data are only similar 
to those from the experimental data if the data are pre-processed via matching methods. With 
caliper-matching followed by a fixed-effect regression model, the non-experimental estimator 
does a good job of replicating the experimental benchmark.  Importantly, the inferences drawn 
from a test of the null hypothesis of zero impact are the same using experimental and non-
experimental estimators. 
Furthermore, the results using panel data show that: (1) panel data are not a panacea for 
addressing bias (even time-invariant, unobservable bias) and (2) careful consideration of the 
validity of the identifying assumptions in any effort to identify causal impacts is critical (Morgan 
and Winship, 2007; Angrist and Pischke 2009).  Pre-processing the data with matching methods 
makes the identifying assumptions more plausible and the treatment effect estimates from the 
non-experimental design more accurate. In a sense, pre-processing via matching followed by 
estimation in a fixed effect model is similar in spirit to an OLS model that includes both lagged 
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dependent variables and unobserved household fixed effects. If what makes Cobb County 
households different from Fulton County households are time-invariant household unobservables 
and time-varying unobservables that are captured by household water use h periods ago, the 
estimation procedure we follow can account for both sources of bias and permit consistent 
estimation of the treatment effect.  In contrast, consistent estimation of the parameters in an OLS 
model that includes both lagged dependent variables and unobserved household fixed effects 
requires the use of 𝑌!"!! as an instrument for 𝑌!"!!, which requires the strong (and untenable in 
our context) assumption that 𝑌!"!! ⊥ 𝜀!". 
Finally, we also find that without pre-processing the data to ensure the selection of an 
appropriate counterfactual, the estimates and inferences from a fixed-effects panel data estimator 
can be quite different from the experimental benchmark: the non-experimental estimates of the 
social comparison treatment effect are almost three times larger than the experimental estimates, 
while the non-experimental experimental estimates of the technical information treatment effect 
are over ten times larger. Discarding observations with high and low propensity score (trimming) 
improve partially the non-experimental estimates. Adding Inverse Probability Weights to the 
trimmed sample also improves the non-experimental estimates, but not substantially; none of 
these approaches to reweighting the data before performing the parametric analysis performs as 
well as covariate matching. 
The implication of our study is that under simpler conditions, i.e., no selection bias due to 
the treatment, the non-experimental methods used still fail to recover experimental estimates. 
Thus, social scientists should applied non-experimental methods cautiously, recognizing their 
advantages, disadvantages, assumptions, and –more importantly– acknowledging clearly which 
method suits better for the specific data characteristics.   
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Table 9 
Summary of Non-Experimental Methods and Sample Selection 
 
  Sample 
  Full Trimmed  Matching 
Caliper 
Matching 
- Simple Difference ✓ ✓ ✓* ✓* 
- Simple Difference with Covariate 
Matching and Bias Adjustment   ✓ ✓ 
- Simple Difference with OLS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
- Simple Difference with IPW  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
     - Difference-in-Differences ✓ ✓ ✓** ✓** 
- Difference-in-Differences with 
Covariate Matching and Bias Adjustment   ✓ ✓ 
- Difference-in-Differences with OLS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
- Difference-in-Differences with IPW  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
     - Fixed-effects Panel Data Estimator ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
* Simple Difference with Matching corresponds to Covariate Matching method without bias 
adjustment. 
** Difference-in-Differences with Matching corresponds to Covariate Matching method without 
bias adjustment. 
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics: Cobb and Fulton County 
 
  Cobb County Fulton County 
Population 607,751 816,006 
Urban Population 99.5% 97.9% 
Race: White alone 72.4% 48.1% 
Race: African American alone 18.8% 44.6% 
Households 227,487 321,242 
Race: White alone 75.3% 53.5% 
Race: African American alone 18.3% 41.1% 
Average Household Size 2.64 2.44 
Housing Units 237,522 348,632 
Urban Units 99.5% 98.1% 
Vacant Units 4.2% 7.9% 
Population 25 years and over 395,349 527,738 
Education ≥	  College 68.0% 64.6% 
Income Distribution 
  Less than $24,999 24,427 70,291 
$20,000 to $39,999 45,250 69,098 
$40,000 to $59,999 47,340 52,047 
$60,000 to $99,999 61,986 60,644 
$100,000 or more 48,587 69,186 
Per capita income 1999 27,863 30,003 
Median household income 1999 58,289 47,321 
Population below Poverty Level1/ 6.5% 15.7% 
1/ Compared with 1999 income. 
Source: 2000 US Census. 
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Table 11 
Water Consumption by Seasons* 
 
Variable Indicator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cobb County Fulton County 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment 
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment 
Experimental 
Control 
Non-
Experimental 
Control 
Summer 2006 1/ Mean 39.04 39.03 38.95 48.94 
 
St. Dev. 28.48 29.21 29.90 44.45 
Summer 2007 1/ Mean 36.03 34.53 36.04 41.55 
 
St. Dev. 30.30 26.13 29.01 52.64 
Spring 2007 2/ Mean 27.14 26.67 27.20 25.19 
 
St. Dev. 19.78 18.91 44.94 71.16 
Winter 2006/2007 3/ Mean 25.25 25.19 25.19 27.78 
  St. Dev. 14.59 14.62 16.05 94.01 
* In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Summer season includes June, July, August, September. 
2/ Spring season includes March, April, May. 
3/ Winter season include from November, December, January, February. 
Source: Cobb County Water System and Fulton County Water Service Division. 
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Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics: Cobb and Fulton County 
Household and Neighborhood Variables 
 
Variable Indicator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cobb County Fulton County 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment 
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment 
Experimental 
Control 
Non-
Experimental 
Control 
Tax Assessor (Household) Variables 
Fair Market Value ($) Mean 249,469.30 252,355.80 250,604.30 350,238.30 
St. Dev. 157,745.30 174,657.30 161,127.80 219,111.70 
Age of Home (Years) Mean 22.04 22.04 22.04 16.99 
St. Dev. 12.74 12.87 12.97 8.65 
Size of Property (Acres)  Mean 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.62 St. Dev. 1.23 1.07 1.17 0.90 
Census (Neighborhood) Variables 1/ 
% of People with Higher 
Degree 
Mean 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.85 
St. Dev. 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.07 
% of People Below 
Poverty Level 
Mean 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
St. Dev. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Per-capita Income Mean 30,813.86 30,817.17 30,804.28 42,383.66 St. Dev. 9,220.59 9,218.93 9,195.02 10,537.61 
% Renter-Occupied 
Housing Units 
Mean 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 
St. Dev. 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
% White  Mean 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.87 St. Dev. 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.06 
1/ At census Block group level. 
Source: 2000 US Census, Cobb County and Fulton County Tax Assessor. 
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Table 13 
OLS Regression: Experimental Results 
Dependent Variable: Water Use on Summer 2007* 
(with meter route fixed effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Technical Information Treatment -0.0132 -0.149 -0.124 
 
(0.303) (0.205) (0.204) 
Social Comparison Treatment -1.534*** -1.678*** -1.732*** 
 
(0.267) (0.178) (0.178) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 
 
0.357*** 0.341*** 
  
(0.0166) (0.0162) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 
 
0.824*** 0.812*** 
  
(0.0576) (0.0580) 
Fair Market Value 
  
1.82e-05*** 
   
(3.90e-06) 
Age of Home 
  
0.0268* 
   
(0.0142) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
  
0.0761 
   
(0.126) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
  
1.274 
   
(1.854) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
  
-3.774 
   
(4.266) 
Per-capita Income 
  
4.11e-05 
   
(4.06e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
  
0.393 
   
(1.068) 
% White 
  
-0.284 
   
(1.698) 
Constant 34.08*** 1.284 -4.397 
 
(2.301) (1.883) (2.741) 
Observations 82,027 82,027 81,585 
R-squared 0.129 0.632 0.637 
*In thousands of gallons. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Tax Assessor and 2000 US Census. 
  
  96 
Table 14 
Panel Data Regression with Fixed Effects: Experimental Results 
Dependent Variable: Monthly Water Use* 
 
  (1) 
Technical Information Treatment * Post Experiment 1/ -0.00573 
 
(0.0539) 
Social Comparison Treatment * Post Experiment 1/ -0.353*** 
 
(0.0461) 
Post Experiment 0.561*** 
 
(0.0219) 
Constant 8.446*** 
 
(0.00430) 
Observations 1,394,455 
Number of code 82,027 
R-squared 0.000 
*In thousands of gallons. Regression analysis period is from May 2006 to September 
2007. 
1/ Post Experiment represents from June 2007 to September 2007. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System. 
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Table 15 
Social Comparison Treatment: Balance Test on Covariates 
 
Full 
Sample 
Trimmed 
Sample 
Matching 
without 
Calipers 
Matching 
with 
Calipers 
% 
Improvement 
(1) to (2) 
% 
Improvement 
(1) to (3) 
% 
Improvement 
(1) to (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Water Use from June - November 2006 
Mean Difference -8.565 -4.416 -2.480 -0.697 48% 71% 92% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -21.170 -11.498 -6.130 -1.919 46% 71% 91% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 8.667 4.524 2.917 1.825 48% 66% 79% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.551 0.538 1.102 1.082 -3% 77% 82% 
  Water Use in April and May 2007 
Mean Difference 0.875 1.088 2.082 2.419 -24% -138% -176% 
Standardized Mean Diff. 7.629 9.856 18.151 23.128 -29% -138% -203% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 2.334 3.542 2.136 2.442 -52% 8% -5% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.033 0.015 1.722 1.770 -2% 25% 20% 
  Fair Market Value 
Mean Difference -96,280 -58,738 -45,676 -26,950 39% 53% 72% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -55.1 -38.2 -26.1 -18.9 31% 53% 66% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 97,173 58,755 47,582 28,213 40% 51% 71% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.656 0.675 1.192 1.138 6% 44% 60% 
  Age of Home 
Mean Difference 5.060 1.050 1.850 0.533 79% 63% 89% 
Standardized Mean Diff. 39.319 10.061 14.377 5.345 74% 63% 86% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 5.294 1.845 1.952 0.885 65% 63% 83% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 2.213 1.333 1.397 1.216 73% 67% 82% 
  Size of Property (Acres) 
Mean Difference -0.419 -0.370 -0.311 -0.305 12% 26% 27% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -40.983 -102.130 -30.372 -66.572 -149% 26% -62% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.460 0.400 0.328 0.314 13% 29% 32% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 1.326 1.787 1.020 1.194 -141% 94% 40% 
  % of People with Higher Degree 
Mean Difference -0.126 -0.056 -0.069 -0.027 56% 45% 79% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -86.258 -55.861 -47.145 -29.831 35% 45% 65% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.126 0.057 0.069 0.028 55% 45% 78% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 4.275 1.456 1.953 1.397 86% 71% 88% 
  % of People Below Poverty Level 
Mean Difference 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.002 84% -32% 70% 
Standardized Mean Diff. 15.567 2.950 20.571 7.423 81% -32% 52% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.004 49% -14% 56% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 1.892 1.101 1.145 1.082 89% 84% 91% 
  Per-capita Income 
Mean Difference -11,538 -5,259 -5,255 -3,105 54% 54% 73% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -125.3 -61.6 -57.0 -37.8 51% 54% 70% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 11,537 5,686 5,395 3,516 51% 53% 70% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.764 1.468 1.378 1.330 -99% -61% -40% 
  % of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
Mean Difference -0.036 -0.018 0.007 -0.001 49% 80% 97% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -24.813 -16.692 5.011 -1.061 33% 80% 96% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.039 0.022 0.016 0.010 42% 57% 73% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.823 0.616 0.899 1.033 -117% 43% 81% 
  % White 
Mean Difference -0.027 -0.004 -0.041 -0.005 85% -53% 80% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -20.323 -3.649 -31.030 -11.160 82% -53% 45% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.040 0.031 0.041 0.009 22% -1% 77% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 4.061 2.496 3.172 0.811 51% 29% 94% 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US Census.  
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Table 16 
Technical Information Treatment: Balance Test on Covariates 
 
Full 
Sample 
Trimmed 
Sample 
Matching 
without 
Calipers 
Matching 
with 
Calipers 
% 
Improvement 
(1) to (2) 
% 
Improvement 
(1) to (3) 
% 
Improvement 
(1) to (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Water Use from June - November 2006 
Mean Difference -8.786 -4.021 -2.495 -0.861 54% 72% 90% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -22.798 -10.383 -6.474 -2.360 54% 72% 90% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 8.887 4.135 2.766 1.736 53% 69% 80% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.500 0.559 1.057 1.061 12% 89% 88% 
  Water Use in April and May 2007 
Mean Difference 0.902 1.351 2.154 2.585 -50% -139% -187% 
Standardized Mean Diff. 7.788 11.321 18.594 23.298 -45% -139% -199% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 2.363 3.742 2.219 2.610 -58% 6% -10% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.033 0.018 1.847 1.869 -2% 12% 10% 
  Fair Market Value 
Mean Difference -99,257 -57,902 -46,502 -27,024 42% 53% 73% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -63.0 -38.6 -29.5 -19.8 39% 53% 69% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 100,137 57,980 48,010 28,746 42% 52% 71% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.532 0.658 1.101 1.163 27% 78% 65% 
  Age of Home 
Mean Difference 5.064 1.223 1.955 0.629 76% 61% 88% 
Standardized Mean Diff. 39.743 11.632 15.344 6.265 71% 61% 84% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 5.282 1.965 2.040 0.919 63% 61% 83% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 2.169 1.370 1.410 1.226 68% 65% 81% 
  Size of Property (Acres) 
Mean Difference -0.433 -0.359 -0.314 -0.309 17% 27% 28% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -36.992 -110.530 -26.876 -76.632 -199% 27% -107% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.464 0.385 0.337 0.319 17% 28% 31% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 1.735 1.676 1.224 1.293 8% 70% 60% 
  % of People with Higher Degree 
Mean Difference -0.126 -0.058 -0.068 -0.026 54% 46% 79% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -85.732 -57.345 -46.536 -29.532 33% 46% 66% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.126 0.059 0.069 0.028 53% 46% 78% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 4.322 1.494 1.930 1.353 85% 72% 89% 
  % of People Below Poverty Level 
Mean Difference 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.002 83% -24% 68% 
Standardized Mean Diff. 16.814 3.433 20.863 8.491 80% -24% 50% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.004 49% -11% 54% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 1.935 1.116 1.133 1.093 88% 86% 90% 
  Per-capita Income 
Mean Difference -11,533 -5,223 -5,184 -3,028 55% 55% 74% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -125.2 -60.9 -56.3 -37.0 51% 55% 70% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 11,532 5,650 5,328 3,462 51% 54% 70% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.765 1.495 1.397 1.341 -111% -69% -45% 
  % of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
Mean Difference -0.034 -0.021 0.009 0.000 38% 74% 99% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -22.388 -18.744 5.844 -0.424 16% 74% 98% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.036 0.024 0.017 0.011 33% 53% 71% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 0.874 0.626 0.926 1.046 -197% 41% 64% 
  % White 
Mean Difference -0.027 -0.004 -0.040 -0.006 86% -49% 80% 
Standardized Mean Diff. -20.497 -3.272 -30.510 -11.812 84% -49% 42% 
Mean Raw eQQ Diff. 0.040 0.033 0.041 0.010 19% 0% 76% 
Variance Ratio (Tr./Ct.) 4.189 2.691 3.169 0.797 47% 32% 94% 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US Census.  
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Table 17 
Non-Experimental Results: Single Difference and Difference-in-Differences for Social 
Comparison Treatment* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Social Comparison Treatment 
 Cobb Treated Group 
Fulton Control 
Group Diff. in 
Diff. 
Single 
Diff.   Summer 2007 
Summer 
2006 
Summer 
2007 
Summer 
2006 
 - Full Sample 34.53 39.03 41.55 48.94 2.89 -7.03 (0.261) (0.292) (0.299) (0.253) (0.343) (0.397) 
 - Trimmed Sample 35.43 40.71 39.70 46.10 1.13 -4.26 (0.294) (0.332) (0.448) (0.299) (0.555) (0.603) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) 
34.54 39.06 36.42 43.46 2.52 -1.88 
(0.261) (0.293) (0.287) (0.307) (0.295) (0.388) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) 
35.56 40.25 36.21 43.00 2.09 -0.65 
(0.289) (0.320) (0.301) (0.325) (0.318) (0.417) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) & Bias Correction 
        0.65 -1.10 
    
(1.021) (0.945) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) & Bias Correction     
0.66 -1.12 
        (0.723) (0.684) 
 - Trimmed Sample & IPW 
(ATT) 
35.43 40.71 38.38 44.75 1.10 -2.94 
(0.299) (0.344) (1.032) (1.028) (0.590) (1.074) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) & IPW (ATT) 
35.43 40.71 31.09 37.61 1.24 4.34 
(0.299) (0.344) (0.283) (0.329) (0.457) (0.610) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) & IPW (ATT) 
35.91 41.24 30.96 37.37 1.07 4.94 
(0.317) (0.359) (0.258) (0.315) (0.461) (0.573) 
 - Trimmed Sample & IPW 
(ATE) 
37.11 43.11 39.38 45.78 0.40 -2.27 
(0.433) (0.499) (0.531) (0.410) (0.568) (0.685) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) & IPW (ATE) 
37.11 43.11 33.24 39.94 0.70 3.88 
(0.433) (0.499) (0.259) (0.293) (0.476) (0.639) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) & IPW (ATE) 
37.79 43.80 33.02 39.58 0.55 4.77 
(0.466) (0.529) (0.260) (0.300) (0.472) (0.616) 
*In thousands of gallons.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Cobb County Water System and Fulton County Water Service Division. 
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Table 18 
Non-Experimental Results: Single Difference and Difference-in-Differences for Technical 
Information Treatment* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Technical Information Treatment 
 Cobb Treated Group 
Fulton Control 
Group Diff. in 
Diff. 
Single 
Diff.   Summer 2007 
Summer 
2006 
Summer 
2007 
Summer 
2006 
 - Full Sample 36.03 39.04 41.55 48.94 4.38 -5.52 (0.302) (0.283) (0.299) (0.253) (0.357) (0.425) 
 - Trimmed Sample 37.48 40.65 38.86 45.61 3.58 -1.38 (0.354) (0.325) (0.437) (0.293) (0.391) (0.486) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) 
36.03 39.02 36.10 43.16 4.08 -0.06 
(0.302) (0.283) (0.266) (0.296) (0.305) (0.402) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) 
37.49 40.48 36.42 43.10 3.69 1.07 
(0.334) (0.324) (0.292) (0.326) (0.327) (0.443) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) & Bias Correction 
        3.07 1.61 
    
(0.700) (0.672) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) & Bias Correction     
2.02 0.56 
        (0.512) (0.508) 
 - Trimmed Sample & IPW 
(ATT) 
37.48 40.65 37.36 44.21 3.68 0.12 
(0.379) (0.343) (0.757) (0.819) (0.623) (0.847) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) & IPW (ATT) 
37.48 40.64 31.00 37.44 3.27 6.47 
(0.379) (0.343) (0.270) (0.322) (0.475) (0.609) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) & IPW (ATT) 
37.85 41.21 31.60 37.96 3.01 6.25 
(0.368) (0.358) (0.267) (0.331) (0.482) (0.593) 
 - Trimmed Sample & IPW 
(ATE) 
39.38 42.99 38.51 45.28 3.16 0.86 
(0.556) (0.515) (0.358) (0.378) (0.523) (0.661) 
 - Matched Sample (no 
calipers) & IPW (ATE) 
39.37 42.99 33.09 39.84 3.14 6.29 
(0.556) (0.515) (0.241) (0.282) (0.502) (0.653) 
 - Matched Sample 
(calipers) & IPW (ATE) 
39.75 43.62 33.49 40.09 2.73 6.26 
(0.564) (0.532) (0.257) (0.305) (0.510) (0.648) 
*In thousands of gallons.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Cobb County Water System and Fulton County Water Service Division. 
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Table 19 
Non-Experimental Results: OLS Regression with Single Difference for Social Comparison 
Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample Trimmed Sample   
Social Comparison Treatment -2.835*** -1.549** -2.446*** 1.586 
 
(0.445) (0.642) (0.597) (1.118) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 0.466*** 0.430*** 0.435*** 0.386*** 
 
(0.0265) (0.0293) (0.0454) (0.0506) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.110 0.107 0.0962 0.0960 
 
(0.109) (0.108) (0.104) (0.104) 
Fair Market Value 
 
1.53e-05*** 
 
1.81e-05*** 
  
(4.20e-06) 
 
(6.24e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
-0.0265 
 
-0.0421 
  
(0.0199) 
 
(0.0408) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
1.178*** 
 
8.042*** 
  
(0.385) 
 
(3.091) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-15.89*** 
 
-11.36*** 
  
(3.186) 
 
(3.945) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
3.944 
 
-5.001 
  
(6.721) 
 
(8.330) 
Per-capita Income 
 
8.35e-05*** 
 
0.000126* 
  
(2.89e-05) 
 
(6.57e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
-0.196 
 
3.802 
  
(1.028) 
 
(3.399) 
% White 
 
18.41*** 
 
15.63*** 
  
(3.062) 
 
(4.056) 
Constant 8.773*** -0.545 10.41*** -4.683 
 
(1.515) (1.804) (2.752) (4.211) 
Observations 41,011 40,742 21,513 21,513 
R-squared 0.298 0.299 0.176 0.183 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 
0.94] are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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     Cont. 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Matched Sample 
  No Calipers Calipers 
Social Comparison Treatment -2.746*** -1.662*** -2.135*** -1.435*** 
 
(0.314) (0.307) (0.271) (0.316) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 0.365*** 0.334*** 0.393*** 0.365*** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0173) (0.0122) (0.0124) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.855*** 0.834*** 0.720*** 0.695*** 
 
(0.0713) (0.0739) (0.0423) (0.0421) 
Fair Market Value 
 
1.33e-05** 
 
1.90e-05*** 
  
(6.35e-06) 
 
(2.51e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
-0.0112 
 
0.0305* 
  
(0.0277) 
 
(0.0171) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
0.372 
 
0.941 
  
(0.321) 
 
(0.583) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-1.594 
 
-0.954 
  
(2.059) 
 
(2.849) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
-18.62*** 
 
-36.18*** 
  
(6.113) 
 
(8.306) 
Per-capita Income 
 
3.84e-05 
 
-6.86e-05** 
  
(7.12e-05) 
 
(3.40e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
2.657 
 
5.128** 
  
(1.653) 
 
(2.106) 
% White 
 
4.043** 
 
8.674** 
  
(1.653) 
 
(3.495) 
Constant 2.746*** -2.498 3.009*** -5.767* 
 
(0.857) (1.895) (0.438) (3.506) 
Observations 19,971 19,971 14,086 14,086 
R-squared 0.604 0.611 0.596 0.605 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 
0.94] are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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Table 20 
Non-Experimental Results: OLS Regression with Single Difference for Technical 
Information Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample Trimmed Sample   
Technical Information Treatment -1.152** 0.472 0.309 3.671*** 
 
(0.472) (0.659) (0.479) (0.970) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 0.478*** 0.440*** 0.454*** 0.398*** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0300) (0.0478) (0.0524) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.111 0.108 0.0984 0.0981 
 
(0.110) (0.109) (0.105) (0.105) 
Fair Market Value 
 
1.96e-05*** 
 
2.80e-05*** 
  
(4.54e-06) 
 
(6.52e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
0.00362 
 
0.0379 
  
(0.0214) 
 
(0.0264) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
0.635* 
 
5.700*** 
  
(0.325) 
 
(1.669) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-11.96*** 
 
-6.532 
  
(3.219) 
 
(4.051) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
6.650 
 
0.205 
  
(6.751) 
 
(8.466) 
Per-capita Income 
 
6.32e-05** 
 
3.96e-05 
  
(3.01e-05) 
 
(5.15e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
-0.126 
 
3.859 
  
(1.034) 
 
(2.678) 
% White 
 
18.52*** 
 
15.25*** 
  
(2.999) 
 
(3.426) 
Constant 7.930*** -5.579*** 8.617*** -10.01*** 
 
(1.568) (1.980) (2.837) (3.735) 
Observations 41,073 40,801 21,833 21,833 
R-squared 0.301 0.303 0.443 0.463 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 
0.94] are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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     Cont. 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Matched Sample 
  No Calipers Calipers 
Technical Information Treatment -0.985*** 0.161 -0.645** -0.0616 
 
(0.358) (0.324) (0.287) (0.321) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 0.392*** 0.353*** 0.409*** 0.379*** 
 
(0.0263) (0.0212) (0.0129) (0.0130) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.884*** 0.840*** 0.798*** 0.773*** 
 
(0.0676) (0.0692) (0.0455) (0.0455) 
Fair Market Value 
 
2.53e-05*** 
 
2.13e-05*** 
  
(6.25e-06) 
 
(2.39e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
0.0406* 
 
0.0406** 
  
(0.0239) 
 
(0.0185) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
0.189 
 
0.00559 
  
(0.270) 
 
(0.451) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-2.486 
 
-5.152* 
  
(1.980) 
 
(2.784) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
-23.53*** 
 
-48.44*** 
  
(5.081) 
 
(7.931) 
Per-capita Income 
 
-2.21e-05 
 
-1.10e-05 
  
(6.01e-05) 
 
(3.99e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
1.401 
 
7.804*** 
  
(1.562) 
 
(1.781) 
% White 
 
2.816* 
 
11.69*** 
  
(1.487) 
 
(3.539) 
Constant 0.475 -4.169*** 1.037** -9.479*** 
 
(0.888) (1.605) (0.502) (3.322) 
Observations 20,087 20,087 14,351 14,351 
R-squared 0.593 0.607 0.612 0.621 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 
0.94] are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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Table 21 
Non-Experimental Results: OLS Regression with Difference-in-Differences for Social 
Comparison Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007 – Summer 2006* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample Trimmed Sample   
Social Comparison Treatment -0.0149 0.680 -0.326 2.651** 
 
(0.427) (0.646) (0.593) (1.049) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 -0.307*** -0.335*** -0.306*** -0.340*** 
 
(0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0277) (0.0291) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.111 0.108 0.0960 0.0960 
 
(0.110) (0.109) (0.104) (0.103) 
Fair Market Value 
 
1.38e-05*** 
 
1.45e-05*** 
  
(3.04e-06) 
 
(4.37e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
0.0161 
 
0.00774 
  
(0.0176) 
 
(0.0409) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
0.894** 
 
6.412** 
  
(0.361) 
 
(2.977) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-8.291*** 
 
0.573 
  
(2.967) 
 
(3.574) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
20.19*** 
 
23.87*** 
  
(6.798) 
 
(8.544) 
Per-capita Income 
 
9.00e-06 
 
-2.52e-05 
  
(2.58e-05) 
 
(6.65e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
-3.484*** 
 
-0.839 
  
(1.043) 
 
(3.306) 
% White 
 
16.06*** 
 
11.77*** 
  
(2.680) 
 
(3.175) 
Constant 11.46*** 0.297 11.75*** -4.412 
 
(1.015) (1.836) (1.632) (4.302) 
Observations 41,011 40,742 21,513 21,513 
R-squared 0.145 0.146 0.095 0.099 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] 
are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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     Cont. 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Matched Sample 
  No Calipers Calipers 
Social Comparison Treatment -0.262 0.471 -0.0909 0.431 
 
(0.314) (0.309) (0.284) (0.330) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 -0.378*** -0.401*** -0.360*** -0.380*** 
 
(0.0198) (0.0191) (0.0118) (0.0121) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.886*** 0.869*** 0.797*** 0.777*** 
 
(0.0712) (0.0736) (0.0433) (0.0435) 
Fair Market Value 
 
1.04e-05* 
 
1.51e-05*** 
  
(5.60e-06) 
 
(2.53e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
-0.00534 
 
0.0392** 
  
(0.0248) 
 
(0.0178) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
0.420 
 
1.360** 
  
(0.302) 
 
(0.592) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-0.819 
 
-3.852 
  
(2.060) 
 
(2.875) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
-7.881 
 
-16.95** 
  
(5.986) 
 
(8.494) 
Per-capita Income 
 
-2.28e-05 
 
-9.45e-05*** 
  
(6.41e-05) 
 
(3.41e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
2.020 
 
3.545* 
  
(1.639) 
 
(2.155) 
% White 
 
6.755*** 
 
9.485*** 
  
(1.643) 
 
(3.518) 
Constant 3.570*** -2.543 4.041*** -2.195 
 
(0.809) (1.881) (0.441) (3.542) 
Observations 19,971 19,971 14,086 14,086 
R-squared 0.284 0.292 0.263 0.272 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] 
are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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Table 22 
Non-Experimental Results: OLS Regression with Difference-in-Differences for Technical 
Information Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007 – Summer 2006* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample Trimmed Sample   
Technical Information Treatment 1.516*** 2.565*** 2.303*** 4.782*** 
 
(0.462) (0.671) (0.483) (0.855) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 -0.298*** -0.328*** -0.284*** -0.326*** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0309) (0.0310) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.113 0.110 0.0983 0.0981 
 
(0.111) (0.110) (0.105) (0.104) 
Fair Market Value 
 
1.76e-05*** 
 
2.33e-05*** 
  
(3.54e-06) 
 
(5.11e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
0.0413** 
 
0.0696** 
  
(0.0195) 
 
(0.0275) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
0.436 
 
4.587*** 
  
(0.312) 
 
(1.324) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-4.582 
 
5.509 
  
(3.004) 
 
(4.010) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
22.26*** 
 
31.99*** 
  
(6.898) 
 
(8.791) 
Per-capita Income 
 
-7.16e-06 
 
-0.000111** 
  
(2.77e-05) 
 
(5.61e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
-3.565*** 
 
-0.994 
  
(1.059) 
 
(2.442) 
% White 
 
15.68*** 
 
12.22*** 
  
(2.619) 
 
(2.684) 
Constant 10.82*** -3.883* 9.833*** -10.38*** 
 
(1.068) (2.064) (1.755) (3.977) 
Observations 41,073 40,801 21,833 21,833 
R-squared 0.136 0.137 0.246 0.262 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] 
are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
 
  
  108 
 
     Cont. 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Matched Sample 
  No Calipers Calipers 
Technical Information Treatment 1.034*** 1.838*** 0.988*** 1.484*** 
 
(0.388) (0.346) (0.299) (0.336) 
Water Use from June - November 2006 -0.368*** -0.399*** -0.362*** -0.383*** 
 
(0.0294) (0.0236) (0.0132) (0.0135) 
Water Use in April and May 2007 0.986*** 0.949*** 0.924*** 0.904*** 
 
(0.0736) (0.0776) (0.0475) (0.0477) 
Fair Market Value 
 
2.16e-05*** 
 
1.62e-05*** 
  
(7.23e-06) 
 
(2.57e-06) 
Age of Home 
 
0.0420 
 
0.0409** 
  
(0.0268) 
 
(0.0194) 
Size of Property (Acres) 
 
0.204 
 
0.640 
  
(0.271) 
 
(0.479) 
% of People with Higher Degree 
 
-1.867 
 
-6.593** 
  
(2.074) 
 
(2.884) 
% of People Below Poverty Level 
 
-12.77** 
 
-25.39*** 
  
(5.277) 
 
(8.203) 
Per-capita Income 
 
-6.52e-05 
 
-3.09e-05 
  
(6.77e-05) 
 
(4.02e-05) 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 
 
0.226 
 
5.160*** 
  
(1.748) 
 
(1.847) 
% White 
 
4.739*** 
 
12.74*** 
  
(1.571) 
 
(3.703) 
Constant 1.522 -3.421** 2.521*** -6.637* 
 
(0.974) (1.731) (0.507) (3.504) 
Observations 20,087 20,087 14,351 14,351 
R-squared 0.240 0.256 0.246 0.254 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] 
are discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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Table 23 
Balance on Covariates using IPW for Social Comparison Treatment 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Raw Mean Weighted Mean ATT 
Weighted Mean 
ATE 
  Tr. Ct. Tr. Ct. Tr. Ct. 
Water Use Jun - Nov 2006 59.6 64.0 59.6 62.5 62.5 63.7 
Water Use Apr - May 2007 16.1 15.0 16.1 21.9 16.7 16.7 
Fair Market Value 271,704 330,442 271,704 318,608 309,426 327,601 
Age of Home 19.4 18.4 19.4 21.7 19.7 19.2 
Size of Property (Acres) 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 
% of People with Higher Degree 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
% of People Below Poverty Level 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Per-capita Income 33,276 38,535 33,276 33,922 37,646 37,427 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
% White 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
            
  (7) (8) (9) 
 
Difference Treatment & Control* 
  Raw ATT ATE 
Water Use Jun - Nov 2006 4.4 2.9 1.2 
Water Use Apr - May 2007 1.1 5.8 0.0 
Fair Market Value 58,738 46,903 18,175 
Age of Home 1.1 2.3 0.5 
Size of Property (Acres) 0.4 0.4 0.3 
% of People with Higher Degree 0.1 0.0 0.0 
% of People Below Poverty Level 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Per-capita Income 5,259 646 219 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 0.0 0.1 0.0 
% White 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
            
 
F-test (p-value) 
Water Use Jun - Nov 2006 0.000 0.038 0.177 
Water Use Apr - May 2007 0.152 0.440 0.992 
Fair Market Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age of Home 0.000 0.000 0.030 
Size of Property (Acres) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% of People with Higher Degree 0.000 0.013 0.001 
% of People Below Poverty Level 0.042 0.000 0.000 
Per-capita Income 0.000 0.002 0.325 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% White 0.006 0.000 0.000 
* In absolute value  
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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Table 24 
Balance on Covariates using IPW for Technical Information Treatment 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Raw Mean Weighted Mean ATT 
Weighted Mean 
ATE 
  Tr. Ct. Tr. Ct. Tr. Ct. 
Water Use Jun - Nov 2006 59.4 63.4 59.4 62.0 62.3 63.1 
Water Use Apr - May 2007 16.3 14.9 16.3 22.8 16.7 16.7 
Fair Market Value 268,871 326,773 268,871 315,683 305,389 324,200 
Age of Home 19.5 18.3 19.5 21.4 19.4 19.0 
Size of Property (Acres) 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.4 
% of People with Higher Degree 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
% of People Below Poverty Level 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Per-capita Income 33,226 38,449 33,226 33,761 37,096 37,361 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
% White 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
            
  (7) (8) (9) 
 
Difference Treatment & Control* 
  Raw ATT ATE 
Water Use Jun - Nov 2006 4.0 2.6 0.8 
Water Use Apr - May 2007 1.4 6.5 0.0 
Fair Market Value 57,902 46,812 18,811 
Age of Home 1.2 1.9 0.5 
Size of Property (Acres) 0.4 0.3 0.3 
% of People with Higher Degree 0.1 0.0 0.0 
% of People Below Poverty Level 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Per-capita Income 5,223 535 265 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 0.0 0.1 0.0 
% White 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
            
 
F-test (p-value) 
Water Use Jun - Nov 2006 0.000 0.033 0.342 
Water Use Apr - May 2007 0.072 0.444 0.995 
Fair Market Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age of Home 0.000 0.000 0.029 
Size of Property (Acres) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% of People with Higher Degree 0.000 0.005 0.000 
% of People Below Poverty Level 0.017 0.000 0.000 
Per-capita Income 0.000 0.012 0.232 
% of Renter-Occupied Housing Units 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% White 0.012 0.000 0.010 
* In absolute value 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US 
Census. 
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Table 25 
Non-Experimental Results: IPW for Social Comparison and Technical Information 
Treatments 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Trimmed Sample 
 
ATT ATE 
  
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment 
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment 
Social Comparison Treatment -2.941*** 
 
-2.266*** 
 
 
(1.074) 
 
(0.685) 
 Technical Information Treatment 
 
0.119 
 
0.864 
  
(0.847) 
 
(0.661) 
Constant 38.38*** 37.36*** 39.38*** 38.51*** 
 
(1.032) (0.757) (0.531) (0.358) 
Observations 21,513 21,833 21,513 21,833 
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*In thousands of gallons. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 
US Census. 
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Table 26 
Non-Experimental Results: Panel Data (Fixed Effect) for Social Comparison and Technical 
Advice Treatments 
Dependent Variable: Monthly Water Use* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Social Comparison Treatment 
 
Full 
Sample 
Trimmed 
Sample 
Matched Sample 
  No Caliper Caliper 
Social Comparison Treat. * Post Experiment 1/ -0.965*** -0.720*** -0.514*** -0.353** 
 
(0.0870) (0.144) (0.158) (0.161) 
Post Experiment 1.174*** 0.973*** 0.721*** 0.726*** 
 
(0.0770) (0.136) (0.153) (0.155) 
Constant 9.020*** 8.843*** 8.406*** 8.421*** 
 
(0.0139) (0.0223) (0.0186) (0.0189) 
Observations 697,187 365,721 339,507 239,462 
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Number of code 41,011 21,513 12,290 8,667 
     
       (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Technical Information Treatment 
 
Full 
Sample 
Trimmed 
Sample 
Matched Sample 
  No Caliper Caliper 
Technical Information Treat. * Post Experiment 1/ -0.618*** -0.119 -0.109 -0.00257 
 
(0.0914) (0.105) (0.161) (0.164) 
Post Experiment 1.174*** 0.827*** 0.665*** 0.755*** 
 
(0.0770) (0.0845) (0.153) (0.156) 
Constant 9.027*** 8.817*** 8.406*** 8.485*** 
 
(0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0189) (0.0193) 
Observations 698,240 371,160 341,478 243,966 
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Number of code 41,073 21,833 12,472 8,918 
*In thousands of gallons. Regression analysis period is from May 2006 to September 2007. 
1/ Post Experiment represents from June 2007 to September 2007. 
2/ Number of observations for matched sample with calipers represent unique households. Repeated observations 
are taken into account using frequency weights. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division. 
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Table 27 
Non-Experimental Bootstrapping Results 
Percentage Results within 95% CI Experimental Estimate (Criterion 2)* 
 
  (1) (2) 
  
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment 
Full Sample 
  - OLS & Full Sample 24% 22% 
- Panel Data & Full Sample 0% 0% 
Trimmed Sample     
- OLS & Trimming Rule (Logit) 3% 2% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule (Probit) 17% 19% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATT, Logit) 15% 32% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATE, Logit) 29% 18% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATT, Probit) 2% 1% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATE, Probit) 45% 28% 
- Panel Data & Trimming Rule (Logit) 2% 41% 
- Panel Data & Trimming Rule (Probit) 0% 2% 
Matching Sample 
  - OLS & Matching without Calipers 60% 14% 
- OLS & Matching with Calipers 48% 70% 
- Panel Data & Matching without Calipers 16% 50% 
- Panel Data & Matching with Calipers 73% 79% 
* Results based on 500 repetitions. 
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Figure 4 
Optimal Trimming Rule: Observations Within and Outside Range 
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Figure 5 
Matching Rule: Observations Discarded using Covariate Matching with and without 
Calipers 
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Figure 6 
Estimated Propensity Score Histogram for Social Comparison and Technical Information 
Treatments 
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Figure 7 
Pre-Treatment Mean Water Consumption 
Social Comparison Treatment, Technical Information Treatment, Cobb Random Control 
Group, and Fulton non-Random Control Group* 
 
 
* In thousands of gallons. 
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Figure 8 
Pre-Treatment Mean Water Consumption: Social Comparison Treatment and Fulton non-
Random Control Group 
Matched Sample with and without Calipers* 
 
 
* In thousands of gallons. 
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Figure 9 
Pre-Treatment Mean Water Consumption: Technical Information Treatment and Fulton 
non-Random Control Group 
Matched Sample with and without Calipers* 
 
 
* In thousands of gallons. 
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Figure 10 
Non-Experimental Bootstrapping of Treatment Effect: 
 OLS for Full Sample and Matched Sample 
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Figure 11 
Non-Experimental Bootstrapping of Treatment Effect: 
 OLS and IPW for Full Sample and Trimmed Sample 
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Figure 12 
Non-Experimental Bootstrapping of Treatment Effect: 
Panel Data for Full, Trimmed and Matched Sample 
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Appendix 10 
Covariate Matching Single Difference Estimates using Different Subset of Covariates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Social Comparison 
Treatment 
Technical Information 
Treatment 
  No Caliper Caliper No Caliper Caliper 
1. Previous Water Use variables 1/ -4.775 -4.748 -3.156 -3.156 
   Standard Error (0.262) (0.261) (0.291) (0.291) 
1.1. With Bias Correction -4.814 -4.778 -3.187 -3.187 
   Standard Error (0.347) (0.345) (0.376) (0.376) 
     2. Property variables 2/ 4.853 4.917 7.075 7.029 
   Standard Error (0.369) (0.366) (0.374) (0.365) 
2.1. With Bias Correction 5.493 5.760 7.676 8.029 
   Standard Error (1.320) (1.319) (1.183) (1.180) 
     3. Neighborhood variables 3/ -4.293 -2.162 -2.840 -0.237 
   Standard Error (0.409) (0.486) (0.438) (0.527) 
3.1. With Bias Correction -2.892 -1.831 -1.382 0.143 
   Standard Error (1.159) (0.861) (1.164) (0.873) 
     4. Property and Neighborhood variables -0.013 2.163 1.961 4.375 
   Standard Error (0.365) (0.413) (0.369) (0.439) 
4.1. With Bias Correction 4.953 5.770 7.073 9.116 
   Standard Error (1.258) (1.101) (1.261) (1.133) 
1/ Aggregate water use from May 2006 to October 2006, Aggregate water use for March and 
April 2007. 
2/ Fair market value of home ($), Property size (acres), Age of home (years) 
3/ Per-capita income ($), Percent of adults over 25 years old with college education or higher, 
Percent of people living below poverty line, Percent of population that is white, and Percent of 
renter-occupied housing units. 
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Appendix 11 
Non-Experimental Result: Single Difference with OLS Regression for Social Comparison 
Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample Trimmed Sample   
Social 
Comparison Treat. 
0.598 -2.660*** -1.704** 6.268*** -0.444 5.936*** 
(0.853) (0.667) (0.707) (0.757) (0.810) (1.075) 
Fair Market Value 6.2e-05***  
6.1e-05*** 6.3e-05*** 
 
6.0e-05*** 
(9.47e-06) 
 
(1.07e-05) (3.41e-06) 
 
(4.69e-06) 
Age of Home -0.00564  
-0.0680 0.00441 
 
-0.0677 
(0.0603) 
 
(0.0600) (0.0342) 
 
(0.0467) 
Size of Property 
(Acres) 
2.918*** 
 
2.236*** 18.34*** 
 
16.49*** 
(0.820) 
 
(0.742) (2.868) 
 
(3.070) 
% of People with 
Higher Degree  
-32.97*** -38.85*** 
 
-54.08*** -27.46*** 
 
(3.505) (3.484) 
 
(8.175) (5.312) 
% of People 
Below Poverty  
28.57*** 12.19 
 
-44.82*** -20.98** 
 
(8.779) (9.033) 
 
(12.39) (10.29) 
Per-capita Income  
0.000678*** 0.000152* 
 
0.00125*** 0.000315*** 
 
(2.58e-05) (8.72e-05) 
 
(6.10e-05) (7.30e-05) 
% of Renter-
Occupied  
-1.245 -1.963 
 
9.477*** 12.90*** 
 
(1.317) (1.315) 
 
(2.903) (3.636) 
% White  
33.18*** 38.74*** 
 
12.32*** 28.32*** 
 
(2.981) (2.960) 
 
(3.800) (3.365) 
Constant 17.71*** 11.43*** 12.49*** 9.934*** 26.56*** -1.244 
(4.450) (2.323) (2.386) (1.322) (4.923) (5.271) 
Observations 40,742 41,011 40,742 21,513 21,513 21,513 
R-squared 0.092 0.027 0.099 0.066 0.022 0.069 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] are 
discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US Census. 
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       Cont. 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Matched Sample 
  No Calipers Calipers 
Social 
Comparison Treat. 
1.683*** 2.660*** 1.745*** 1.807*** 1.628*** 1.438*** 
(0.429) (0.406) (0.419) (0.422) (0.411) (0.435) 
Fair Market Value 7.8e-05***  
7.7e-05*** 8.1e-05*** 
 
8.4e-05*** 
(5.77e-06) 
 
(7.79e-06) (2.87e-06) 
 
(3.74e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0548**  
0.0592* 0.128*** 
 
0.148*** 
(0.0257) 
 
(0.0348) (0.0213) 
 
(0.0250) 
Size of Property 
(Acres) 
0.251 
 
0.213 1.079 
 
0.717 
(0.526) 
 
(0.537) (0.759) 
 
(0.777) 
% of People with 
Higher Degree  
-2.655 -8.213*** 
 
23.65*** -1.572 
 
(3.225) (2.983) 
 
(3.876) (3.912) 
% of People 
Below Poverty  
7.676 -27.08*** 
 
36.38*** -30.76*** 
 
(7.323) (8.173) 
 
(11.63) (11.48) 
Per-capita Income  
0.000836*** 6.09e-05 
 
0.000475*** -0.00014*** 
 
(6.34e-05) (8.72e-05) 
 
(5.51e-05) (4.82e-05) 
% of Renter-
Occupied  
8.184*** -0.0415 
 
6.335** 0.0267 
 
(1.893) (2.140) 
 
(2.923) (2.820) 
% White  
11.00*** 3.775* 
 
43.22*** 16.89*** 
 
(2.003) (2.136) 
 
(4.754) (4.888) 
Constant 11.77*** -2.483 13.64*** 9.097*** -41.03*** -0.293 
(2.105) (2.135) (2.392) (0.999) (4.582) (4.855) 
Observations 19,971 19,971 19,971 14,086 14,086 14,086 
R-squared 0.226 0.066 0.228 0.198 0.060 0.200 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] are 
discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US Census. 
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Appendix 12 
Non-Experimental Result: Single Difference with OLS Regression for Technical 
Information Treatment 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample Trimmed Sample   
Technical 
Information Treat. 
2.379** -0.552 0.291 9.321*** 3.235*** 9.537*** 
(0.941) (0.705) (0.708) (0.816) (0.648) (0.906) 
Fair Market Value 6.6e-05***  
6.5e-05*** 7.3e-05*** 
 
7.0e-05*** 
(1.04e-05) 
 
(1.18e-05) (4.19e-06) 
 
(5.03e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0249  
-0.0344 0.0804*** 
 
0.00712 
(0.0657) 
 
(0.0657) (0.0299) 
 
(0.0352) 
Size of Property 
(Acres) 
2.454*** 
 
1.822*** 18.16*** 
 
17.16*** 
(0.748) 
 
(0.671) (1.531) 
 
(1.646) 
% of People with 
Higher Degree  
-29.95*** -36.03*** 
 
-43.35*** -18.16*** 
 
(3.538) (3.457) 
 
(5.388) (5.524) 
% of People 
Below Poverty  
25.60*** 9.343 
 
-45.11*** -20.67** 
 
(9.025) (9.161) 
 
(10.78) (10.30) 
Per-capita Income  
0.000694*** 0.000137 
 
0.00129*** 0.000245*** 
 
(2.65e-05) (9.62e-05) 
 
(6.43e-05) (6.28e-05) 
% of Renter-
Occupied  
-0.352 -1.804 
 
15.49*** 15.92*** 
 
(1.333) (1.359) 
 
(2.890) (2.899) 
% White  
32.02*** 38.55*** 
 
7.818*** 24.84*** 
 
(2.956) (2.936) 
 
(2.894) (2.969) 
Constant 15.98*** 9.133*** 9.153*** 5.090*** 18.68*** -9.029* 
(4.862) (2.557) (2.649) (1.969) (4.585) (4.882) 
Observations 40,801 41,073 40,801 21,833 21,833 21,833 
R-squared 0.093 0.026 0.099 0.177 0.049 0.181 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] are 
discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US Census. 
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      Cont. 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Matched Sample 
  No Calipers Calipers 
Technical 
Information Treat. 
4.017*** 4.645*** 3.799*** 3.673*** 3.607*** 3.266*** 
(0.466) (0.458) (0.407) (0.455) (0.458) (0.473) 
Fair Market Value 8.8e-05***  
8.9e-05*** 9.1e-05*** 
 
9.5e-05*** 
(5.37e-06) 
 
(7.20e-06) (2.82e-06) 
 
(3.56e-06) 
Age of Home 0.0958***  
0.115*** 0.154*** 
 
0.179*** 
(0.0236) 
 
(0.0302) (0.0226) 
 
(0.0269) 
Size of Property 
(Acres) 
0.577 
 
0.474 0.767 
 
0.224 
(0.482) 
 
(0.482) (0.769) 
 
(0.776) 
% of People with 
Higher Degree  
-3.333 -8.651*** 
 
22.34*** -4.262 
 
(3.023) (2.802) 
 
(4.127) (4.061) 
% of People 
Below Poverty  
-5.447 -38.83*** 
 
25.07** -51.70*** 
 
(7.857) (7.598) 
 
(12.28) (11.80) 
Per-capita Income  
0.000886*** -1.72e-05 
 
0.000574*** -0.00015*** 
 
(5.95e-05) (7.09e-05) 
 
(6.35e-05) (5.54e-05) 
% of Renter-
Occupied  
9.961*** -1.641 
 
11.07*** 5.435** 
 
(1.837) (2.116) 
 
(2.888) (2.741) 
% White  
9.692*** 3.626* 
 
45.38*** 19.60*** 
 
(2.023) (2.064) 
 
(4.975) (4.944) 
Constant 7.812*** -2.722 12.56*** 6.247*** -45.47*** -3.483 
(1.948) (2.249) (2.193) (1.011) (4.731) (4.759) 
Observations 20,087 20,087 20,087 14,351 14,351 14,351 
R-squared 0.220 0.066 0.222 0.195 0.063 0.198 
*In thousands of gallons. 
1/ Trimmed sample: Propensity Score estimated using logit model. Observations outside interval [0.06, 0.94] are 
discarded. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 US Census. 
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Appendix 13 
Non-Experimental Result: Inverse Probability Weighting Regression (IPW) using Probit 
Models for Social Comparison and Technical Information Treatments 
Dependent Variable: Summer 2007* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Trimmed Sample 
 
ATT ATE 
  
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment 
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment 
Social Comparison Treatment -3.434*** 
 
-1.779*** 
 
 
(0.829) 
 
(0.643) 
 Technical Information Treatment 
 
-2.375*** 
 
0.552 
  
(0.895) 
 
(0.733) 
Constant 38.85*** 39.35*** 39.78*** 39.80*** 
 
(0.775) (0.822) (0.471) (0.469) 
Observations 25,150 25,945 25,150 25,945 
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*In thousands of gallons. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Cobb County Water System, Fulton County Water Service Division, Tax Assessor and 2000 
US Census. 
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Appendix 14 
Summary of Non-Experimental Results using Summer 2006 as Previous Water Use 
 
  Social Comparison Treatment 
  
Full 
Sample 
Trimmed 
Sample 
Matching 
Sample 
Caliper-
Matching 
Sample 
Single Difference Estimator 
A) Single Difference -7.026*** -3.338*** -0.220 1.289*** 
B) Single Difference with Covariate 
Matching   3.856*** 3.658*** 
C) Single Difference with IPW     C.1) ATT weights  -1.666* 5.889*** 6.575*** C.2) ATE weights  -1.026 5.837*** 7.017*** D) Single Difference with OLS     D.1) Only Previous Water Use -0.939*** -0.704 1.623*** 2.060*** 
D.2) Previous Water Use, Property and 
Neighborhood Variables 0.0352 2.101** 2.750*** 2.833*** 
          
Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
E) Difference-in-Differences 2.887*** 0.783 2.553*** 2.457*** 
F) Difference-in-Differences with Covariate 
Matching   3.856*** 3.658*** 
G) Difference-in-Differences with IPW     G.1) ATT weights  0.506 0.946** 0.993** G.2) ATE weights  -0.259 0.388 0.460 H) Difference-in-Difference with OLS     H.1) Only Previous Water Use -0.939*** -0.704 1.623*** 2.060*** 
H.2) Previous Water Use, Property and 
Neighborhood Variables 0.0352 2.101** 2.750*** 2.833*** 
H.3) Only Property and Neighborhood 
Variables (No Previous Water Use) 1.340** 0.391 2.355*** 2.446*** 
I) Difference-in-Differences with Fixed-
Effects Panel Data -0.965*** -0.760*** -0.447*** -0.293* 
Notes:  
- Panel A), B), C), E), F), G) are comparable to Table 9 (Social Comparison Treatment) and 
Table 10 (Technical Information Treatment). 
- Panel D) is comparable to Table 11 (Social Comparison Treatment) and Table 12 (Technical 
Information Treatment). 
- Panel H) is comparable to Table 13 (Social Comparison Treatment) and Table 14 (Technical 
Information Treatment). 
- Panel I) is comparable to Table 18. 
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  Cont. 
  Technical Information Treatment 
  
Full 
Sample 
Trimmed 
Sample 
Matching 
Sample 
Caliper-
Matching 
Sample 
Single Difference Estimator 
A) Single Difference -5.519*** -0.435 1.233*** 2.616*** 
B) Single Difference with Covariate 
Matching   5.573*** 5.214*** 
C) Single Difference with IPW     C.1) ATT weights  1.593** 7.777*** 7.994*** C.2) ATE weights  2.345*** 8.072*** 8.382*** D) Single Difference with OLS     D.1) Only Previous Water Use 0.663* 1.894*** 3.238*** 3.527*** 
D.2) Previous Water Use, Property and 
Neighborhood Variables 2.001*** 4.479*** 4.220*** 4.304*** 
          
Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
E) Difference-in-Differences 4.383*** 3.292*** 4.109*** 3.940*** 
F) Difference-in-Differences with Covariate 
Matching   5.573*** 5.214*** 
G) Difference-in-Differences with IPW     G.1) ATT weights  2.968*** 3.160*** 2.931*** G.2) ATE weights  2.663*** 2.983*** 2.612*** H) Difference-in-Difference with OLS     H.1) Only Previous Water Use 0.663* 1.894*** 3.238*** 3.527*** 
H.2) Previous Water Use, Property and 
Neighborhood Variables 2.001*** 4.479*** 4.220*** 4.304*** 
H.3) Only Property and Neighborhood 
Variables (No Previous Water Use) 3.248*** 1.847** 3.785*** 3.995*** 
I) Difference-in-Differences with Fixed-
Effects Panel Data -0.618*** -0.147 -0.0670 0.0178 
Notes:  
- Panel A), B), C), E), F), G) are comparable to Table 9 (Social Comparison Treatment) and 
Table 10 (Technical Information Treatment). 
- Panel D) is comparable to Table 11 (Social Comparison Treatment) and Table 12 (Technical 
Information Treatment). 
- Panel H) is comparable to Table 13 (Social Comparison Treatment) and Table 14 (Technical 
Information Treatment). 
- Panel I) is comparable to Table 18. 
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Appendix 15 
Non-Experimental Bootstrapping Results 
Percentage Results within 95% CI Experimental Estimate and Rejection Rates* 
 
  (1) (2) 
  
Social 
Comparison 
Treatment  
(Within 
Experimental 
95% CI & Null 
Rejection) 
Technical 
Information 
Treatment  
(Within 
Experimental 
95% CI & No 
Null Rejection) 
Full Sample 
  - OLS & Full Sample 23% 22% 
- Panel Data & Full Sample 0% 0% 
Trimmed Sample     
- OLS & Trimming Rule (ATT, Logit) 2% 2% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule (Probit) 17% 19% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATT, Logit) 12% 32% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATE, Logit) 29% 18% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATT, Probit) 2% 1% 
- OLS & Trimming Rule & IPW (ATE, Probit) 44% 28% 
- Panel Data & Trimming Rule (Logit) 2% 41% 
- Panel Data & Trimming Rule (Probit) 0% 2% 
Matching Sample     
- OLS & Matching without Calipers 60% 14% 
- OLS & Matching with Calipers 48% 70% 
- Panel Data & Matching without Calipers 16% 50% 
- Panel Data & Matching with Calipers 73% 79% 
* Results based on 500 repetitions. 
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